Land and politics in New Caledonia by Ward, Alan W
Land and politics 
in New Caledonia 
Alanwward 
Polltlcal  and social Change Monogra p h  2 
Political and Social Change Monograph 2 
LAND AND POLITICS 
IN 
NEW CALEDONIA 
Alan Ward 
Department of Political and Social Change 
Re search S chool of Pacific S tudies 
Australian National University 
Canberra , 1982 
© Alan Ward 
This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose 
of private study, research, criticism, or review, as permitted under 
the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without 
written permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher. 
First published 1982 , Department of Political and Social Change, Research 
School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University. 
Printed and manufactured in Australia by Pink Panther Instant Printing. 
Distributed by 
Department of Political & Social Change 
Research School of Pacific Studies 
The Australian National University 
Box 4 ,  P.O. 
Canberra, A.C.T. 
Australia 
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-publication entry 
Ward, Alan, 19 35- . 
Land and politics in New Caledonia. 
Bibliography 
Includes index. 
ISBN - 86784 0 7 7  3 .  
1 .  New Caledonia - Politics and government. 
2 .  Land use - Planning - New Caledonia. 
I. Australian National University. Dept. 
of Political and Social Change. II. 
Title. (Series: Political and social 
change nvnograph; 2).  ISSN 0 72 7-599 4 .  
320 . 99 3 ' 2  
CONTENTS 
Preface 
Colonial ori gins 
Demographi c  and po liti cal change 
Proposals for sys temati c land re form 
The Di j oud plan 
New dire ctions in land policy 
The outlook 
( a) the French state 
(b)  the se ttlers 
( c) the Kanaks 
( d) the interaction 
( e )  impli cations 
Australi a ' s responsibili ty 
Pos tscript 
References 
Index 
i 
1 
13 
26 
32 
49 
6 1  
6 1  
64 
6 6  
6 8  
7 3  
75 
78 
79 
81 

Preface 
This work arose out of my preoccupation with land in Oceania -
land as a key focus of the values and aspirations of the peoples 
of Oceania. The interests of indigenous and settler peoples con­
cerning land have recently produced some sharp confrontations, but 
there are also deeper-seated choices between 'tradition' and 
'modernity' which complicate, and may override, the essentially 
colonial issues. The technical aspects of land tenure or land 
reform both reflect and shape the flux of values and aspirations. 
During the decolonization of the Anglophone islands of Oceania a 
considerable amount of comparative experience was developed about 
how to mediate between competing aspirations and to assist in the 
evolution of new ones, with concern for social stability. This 
knowledge is, of course, embedded in the context of much larger 
social, economic, legal and political concerns, often reflecting 
deep cultural divisions between Oceanic and European peoples. The 
purpose of my research in New Caledonia was to observe this inter­
action in a French territory and to exchange knowledge about 
experience in the Anglophone states. I gratefully acknowledge the 
reciprocal interest by the directorate and scholars of ORSTOM, the 
French Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Te�hnique Outre-Mer, 
who enabled me to study in association with them in Noumea. Their 
assistance and advice, and that of the High Commissioner and senior 
officials in New Caledonia, was generous and kind. Our discussions 
were frank and cordial. Moreover, I travelled and talked freely 
with people of all races and social categories. I have tried to 
represent their various viewpoints accurately and with due emphasis. 
The overall judgements and interpretations expressed here are, 
however, strictly my own. 
The primary intention of studying the evolution and particularly 
the judicial framework of the current land reform (reforme fonciere) 
in New Caledonia is, I hope, reflected in the ensuing pages. It was 
irranediately apparent, however, that the land reform was being shaped 
very greatly by the political context: the opposition between 
Melanesian nationalism seeking Independance Kanak on the one hand, 
and French corranitment to a multi-ethnic society on the other, with 
the Melanesians being only one group, outnumbered by a majority of 
settler groups. This study has, in the end, therefore become much 
nore concerned about politics than was originally intended. 
I have allowed this to occur because of the intense interest 
in Australia about New Caledonia. Not, it should be added, by 
the 'average' Australian, whose interest in New Caledonia is nore 
accurately symbolized by the suntanned bodies on the beach of the 
Club Med at Noumea. But among Australian academics, officials, and 
those politicians concerned with the Oceanic region there is very 
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gre at concern and anxiety to understand the comple xi tie s  o f  the 
Territory during an era of pro found change in the re gion . I t  seemed 
important to write as ful ly as possible about it . The extraordinary 
rnisperceptions on all s i des about the forces operating in Vanuatu , 
rnisperceptions which led to civil stri fe and nearly to a tragedy of 
quite horrible magnitude for the region , have rea ffirmed my convi c­
tions about that . The interpretation o f fered he re is a personal one . 
It is bound to provoke dis sent . I hope it wi l l  provide discus s ion , 
across national and e thni c  line s , in the inte re sts of understanding 
and stabi lity in the region . 
Often research and wri ting about New Caledonia has been a sad 
experience , because everywhere one encounters people o f  goodwi ll , 
possessed of great talent , o f  great warmth and charm , by no means 
narrowly se lf-seeking , ye t who are at odds with one another from the 
depths o f  their di f ferent cultural commitments . Their hostility 
o ften seems needle ss - often to be based on j udgements about the 
worst , not the best or even the average , of the other culture , the 
other race . It is a beauti ful land , where racial divis ions have 
been needle ssly strengthened rather than assuaged , where two cultural 
traditions have been placed in oppos ition , rather than each valued 
for the contribution it can make to a new emergent Oceanian society .  
The search for insti tutional ways o f  bridging and sharing has been 
minimal . In the last few years , howeve r ,  there have been signs o f  
gre ater understanding and flexibility , notably in land matters . 
Taken further , and wri t large r ,  the se attitudes coul d have re sulted 
in the truly Caledonian people of di ffering e thni c ori gins deve loping 
some common cause , out of common re cogni tion that it is an Oceanian 
society , not a European one , which needed to be bui l t .  But now the 
con frontations have intensi fied and it is probably too late to 
bridge the racial gul f.  
In conclusion I wi sh to acknowledge the assis tance o f  the S chool 
of Humani ties at La Trobe Unive rs ity in contributing to the costs o f  
re search and to the Research Centre for Southwest Paci fic Studies , 
La Trobe University, and the Department of Political & Social Change , 
Aus tral ian National University ,  for provi ding opportunity to di s cuss 
aspects of the work in se minars . In parti c ular I wish to thank my 
colleagues Dr Bronwen Douglas and Dr Myriam Dorney , for reading and 
commenting on the text , Dr Dorney for re ading French National 
As sembly debates in the Nationa l Library , and Pro fessor Jamie Mackie 
and Dr Ron May for encouraging me to publi sh the work. 
A.W . 
November 1981 
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From the late 1960s radical groups among the Melanesians of 
New Caledonia began to campaign for Independence. By the mid 1970s 
three Melanesian political parties championing Independence held 
seats in the Territorial Assembly and in 1977 the multi-racial 
Union Caledonienne also opted for Independence. The French govern­
ment has recently sought to meet the pressures with a wide-ranging 
progranune of economic and social development. Central to the 
programme is a renewed reforme fonciere aimed at returning sub­
stantial areas of land on the main island - the Grande Terre -
to Melanesian ownership and control. There is considerable agree­
ment that this is urgently necessary. But there is great disagree­
ment about the extent and location of the land to be affected, the 
terms on which it will be acquired and the manner on which it should 
be reallocated among Melanesians. These matters underlie current 
New Caledonian politics and strongly affect the Independence issue. 
This text will examine the reform programme, and the land reform in 
particular, in relation to New Caledonian society and politics, 
including the colonial background. It will then attempt to relate 
the New Caledonian situation to Australia's regional interests and 
responsibilities. 
COLONIAL ORIGINS 
Several authors have traced with thoroughness and skill the 
impact of colonization on Melanesian society and Melanesian lands 
(notably Douglas 1972; Saussol 1971, 1979; Roux 1974, 19771). 
Bronwen Douglas cites the official attitude in Paris shortly after 
the annexation in 1853. It embodied the prevailing European 
distinction between the rights of civilized nations and those of 
'peuplades sauvages' not organized under recognizable governments: 
The uncivilised inhabitants of a country have over that 
country only a limited right of domination, a sort of right of 
occupation . . .  A civilised power on establishing a colony 
in such a country, acquires a decisive power over the soil, 
or, in other terms, she acquires the right to extinguish 
the primitive title (Minister of the Navy and Colonies to 
Foreign Minister, 22 February 1854, cit. Douglas 1972:369). 
A proclamation of 20 January 1855 by Governor Du Bouzet trans­
lated this principle into a recognition of the Melanesians' right 
only to land actually under cultivation. 'Vacante' , or unoccupied, 
land would constitute the domaine of the state and be available for 
1 The following section draws substantially on the work of Douglas 
for the nineteenth century and Saussol for the twentieth to 1977. 
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settlement. The vagueness of the term 'vacante' led to the over­
riding of Melanesian claims not only to their zone of hunting and 
gathering .land but to their fallowed gardens as well, the French 
authorities not understanding the extent of the cycle of fallowing. 
In other respects, however, Du Bouzet's policies contained certain 
safeguards. Saussol and Roux regard the proclamation as effectively 
recognizing the rights of individual families and clans as proprie­
tary rights. Further proclamations annulled all previous transfers 
of land to settlers, established the sole right of government to 
acquire land from Melanesians, and declared that in addition to their 
cultivations one tenth of the rural land available for sale to 
colonists would be reserved for Melanesians. 
The attempt to distinguish between 'occupieq' and 'vacant' lands 
was a classic one among European powers colonizing the Pacific, but 
like the British in New Zealand and the Germans in New Guinea the 
French soon found that truly vacant land - in the sense of land not 
subject to any claim by indigenous clans - was practically non­
existen t. Virtually all land was claimed or controlled by one or 
more clans and, if not subject to actual cultivation, formed their 
hunting and gathering zone. The anticipated straightforward survey 
of the land and location of settlement therefore did not take place; 
instead Melanesians, feeling.threatened by settler encroachments, 
attacked isolated groups of settlers who thought they had bought 
proprietary rights by making presents to chiefs, or who had been 
installed by the administration without thorough consultation and 
agreement with the clans. The administration responded with 
punitive expeditions, widespread confiscation of land and confine­
ment of offending or allegedly offending clans to small areas. 
From 1858 Paris instituted a policy of making large concessions 
of land outside the pacified area to intending settlers and settler 
companies. This, and other grandiose plans, were opposed by Du 
Bouzet and a later governor, Guillain, who sought to confine the 
settlements to areas where the Melanesian population was sparse, 
but the reservation of one tenth of the vacant land for the 
Melanesians was quietly dropped, they were now assured, at 
best, their 'occupied' lands - a concept dependent on administrators' 
estimates of their requirements. 
Guillain for some years diverted settlement from the Melanesian 
settlements in the north and east of the island but by 1868 the 
transportation of cofrvicts and settler lobbying in Paris caused him 
to embark on a new programme of defining and concentrating the 
scattered Melanesian holdings. This was the policy of 'can tonnement' . 
It involved defining a space deemed sufficient to protect the 
Melanesian clans in their subsistence culture, while making available 
for settlement the land outside the reserve (Guillain momorandum, 
28 February 186 7 , cit. Douglas 1972 : 380} . 
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Moreover the land was to be held on an entirely new basis. 
Traditional Melanesian land rights were complex. The clan of a 
patr1lineal descent group (typically numbering about fifty persons) 
developed intimate and intricate cultural ties with the territory 
of which it was, theoretically, the first cultivator. It occupied 
a hamlet or small village, the focal point of which.was the big 
house (grande case) situated on a llK>und or hillock ( tertre) and 
surl'OC>unted by a sculpture of a deified ancestor and a spire con­
taining totemic emblems. This was the scene of collective group 
activity and decision making. Because of the flux of population, 
migration and war, several clans may have I'OC>ved in upon the same 
territory, in which case there might be several 'great houses' in 
a village. Clans, families within clans, and their mal� heads were 
ranked, the rank order being denoted by ritual offerings of yams. 
Ideally the senior male of the senior line of the founding clan 
would be 'the chief' with diverse ritual responsibilities and pre­
rogatives of leadership (rather than command). But chiefship in 
multi-clan settlements could be complex and reflect changing 
physical or political preponderance. Yet in this complexity one 
important principle seems to have been recognized. . The authority 
over land of the clan segment deemed 'original' was normally 
respected, because of its relation with the spirits who dwelt on 
the land. The head of that segment, the ma£tre de la terre (master 
of the land), retained important responsibilities as custodian of 
genealogical and cadastral knowledge with authority to arbitrate 
difficult questions in the disposition of the land within the 
collective clan proprietorship. The 'political' chiefs normally 
deferred to this and they traditionally did not control larger areas 
or own larger land rights than other members. Individuals 
personally held 1:ights to their gardens and garden produce {Douglas 
1972' 1980) . 
In contrast to this system Guillain allowed himself to be 
persuaded by arguments that Melanesian land was, or ought to be, 
communal property of a larger unit, the tribu ,  which acted through 
the chiefs. His decree of 22 January 186 8 inaugurated the system 
of reserves , on that basis. The tribu , as a proprietor of land, 
was in fact a fictional, administrative concept. The traditional 
proprietary rights of individual families and clans, more accurately 
recognized by Du Bouzet, and the traditional authority of the 
customary ma2tres de la terre , although they persisted to a greater 
or lesser degree in the Melanesian culture, were administratively 
overridden. Under Guillain's can tonnement the 'political' chiefs 
were given formal authority to allocate land within the reserves -
powers which they had to only a limited extent traditionally. 
Douglas writes: 
. . .  the traditionally scattered pattern of settlement, based 
on the family unit and centred on the garden lands of parti­
cular clans was to be formally replaced by concentration in 
villages, based on the artificial administrative unit of the 
tribe {Douglas 1972: 380 ) . 
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The reserves were totally inalienable by the tribu yet they were 
not true proprietorships but octroi , donations or concessions by 
the state, and their boundaries could be modified for public pur­
poses. 
The policy was first applied in the northeast, after rebellions 
in that area in 1868-69 and on the west coast after 1876, possibly 
contributing to the rebellion of 1878 which threatened Noumea. 
Paradoxically Guillain had considered his policy, while making way 
for settlement, to be protective of Melanesian culture against 
pressure from both settlers and Paris to individualize Melanesian 
land rights in order to acquire them IOC>re easily. The more paterna­
listic officials hoped that ultimately the Melanesians would acquire 
individual holdings but assumed that if they acquired them at this s tage 
they would soon alienate them.· However, as Douglas and other writers 
have pointed out, the reserves system had opened the way to equal 
rapacity by the state. 
A further decree of 1 876 permitted the modification of reserve 
boundaries by simple administrative act, according to the numerical 
strength of the clans. The Melanesian population was estimated to 
be falling rapidly from about 50,000 persons before colonization to 
42,000 in 1887, and 2 7,768 in 1901 . 1 This was held, after 1895, as 
substantial justification by. Governor Feillet of his vigorous pur­
suit of cantonnement to make way for a new programme of free 
settlement. Feillet furthermore asserted in a decree of 2 3  November 
189 7 that the administration had the right of appropriation, pure 
and simple, of portions of reserved land, and the right to relocate 
the inhabitants on other land of the administration 's choice. As 
Saussol points out, he justified this by the legal fiction that the 
chief was sovereign proprietor of the reserve, and had surrendered 
that authority to France. This itself was an extension of Guillain 's 
fatal fiction of 186 8, which has erected the concept of a collective 
tribal property controlled by chiefs (Saussol 1971:104} . 
Feillet 's governorship thus resulted in a wholesale bundling 
of clans onto rese�ves, more often than not on land not their 
traditional patrimony, dependent on the tolerance and generosity of 
the host clans and their ma1tres de la terre . New Caledonia was 
not nearly as bountiful in good soils as Feillet and his associates 
1 Modern deIOC>graphers and Pacific historians are now casting doubt 
on the theory of drastic decline of Pacific populations, arguing 
that the early explorers' estimates were serious exaggerations and 
that losses by epidemic disease were quickly made up. In view of 
the IOC>re accurate census-taking by the late nineteenth century, 
I am not wholly convinced by the new revisionist theories. In any 
case drastic population decline was assumed to be a fact by 
contemporary officials and indigenes alike, and their assumptions 
were potent in what followed. 
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had depicted and demand for the scarce alluvial soils caused a 
progressive erosion of the reserves, in particular on the lower 
river valleys where the Melanesians' traditional settlements and 
yam gardens had been most heavily concentrated. The process con­
tinued until 1902 until the reserves on the Grande Terre totalled 
less than one tenth of the island. 
The cantonnement produced enormous confusion and demoralization 
among Melanesians, the more so since the grands chefs and peti ts 
chefs appointed by the administration often became parties to it, 
obliged to cooperate in the surrender of territory in return for 
some monetary compensation. From the outset, and still, there has 
been (on many of the more land-short reserves especially) severe 
tension and discord between the officially recognized chiefs and 
their kin, and between the 'stranger' and 'host' clans. These 
tensions have been difficult to resolve, given the colonial dis­
tortions of the traditional authority structure; but one important 
traditional technique, sorcery, has continued to be used. Assaults 
and alcoholism are other unhappy outcomes of cantonnemen t and the 
tensions on the reserves. The jealousy and competition for limited 
resources, and the rigid notion of a collective property, incommu­
table and inalienable, directed by the chiefs, has also contributed 
to the frustration of commercial agriculture by individuals or 
families (although lack of agricultural extension services and 
reliable collecting, processing and marketing facilities have also 
been serious inhibitions). 
After 1903 cantonnement as a systematic process ceased, but 
in particular cases, such as the opening of new nickel mines, 
reserves were diminished. Moreover, unofficially, the settlers and 
their cattle continued to encroach on Melanesian reserves. 
Officially, however, and largely at the injunction of the missiona­
ries, a small countercurrent qf increase of reserves began. In 
1869, local unrest and missionary pressure caused the shelving of 
plans to use the Loyalty Islands as a new convict settlement and 
in 1900 the Islands were declared entirely a reserve. In 19 13 the 
Ile des Pins (which had been used as a settlement for deported 
Paris communards among others), was also so declared. On the 
Grande Terre there was a net increase of about 10,000 ha in the 
reserves between 1903 and 1945 (Saussol 19 79 : 109 ) . 
In addition to the spoliation of their lands (comparable to 
that suffered by the Australian Aborigines} the Melanesians of New 
Caledonia - especially the Grande Terre - came under the regime of 
the indi genat , a code of 'native regulations' comm:>n to French 
colonies before World War II, which forbade free movement from the 
reserves and closely regulated life thereon. In addition, 
Melanesians were required to do compulsory labour on roads and 
other public works and (through levy of a head tax} obliged to 
work as exploited labour for settlers. These obligations were 
enforced by the syndi cs des affai res autochtones - that is the 
ubiquitous gendarmes in one of their many roles. The appointed 
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chefs were paid a percentage of taxes and wages collected . Many were 
drawn into thi s  exploitative ro le ; more defiant ones were replaced . 
Sometimes they retained a certain customary authority ( S aussol 1979 ; 
Thompson and Adloff 197 1 : 260-66 ) . 
Yet , whi le us ing them as a source of labour for European enter­
prises the administration did not set out to assimi late the 
Melanes ians . On the contrary the reserves were to uphold a form of 
tradi tional society - notably customary marriage and succession to 
property . This was underpinned by a j udicial s eparation . While the 
French and other non-Melanes ian minorities live under the prescriptions 
of the droi t commun , roughly translatable as the French common law , l 
Melanesians ( except for a few hundred who have opted for the droi t 
commun ) l ive under the statut particulier ( authori zed by the French 
code ci vi l )  whi ch exempts them from some of the obligations of the 
French ( such as mi litary servic e  abroad) and upholds the ' civi l ' 
aspects of custom ( droi t coutumier) . This was to become important in 
land reform in 19 78- 80 . 
On the reserves education and amelioration o f  the Melanesian so cial 
condition was largely the respons ibility o f  the Chri stian mis sions . 
Some mi s s ionaries also helped defend the reserves against further 
encroachment . No hi story of New Caledonia would be complete without 
mention of Pas tor Maurice Leenhardt ,  a giant among Chris tians , whose 
regard for the Melanesians is reflected in hi s profound writings on 
their culture . 
French colonization of New Caledonia has thus borne marked 
s imi larities to Bri tish colonization in Austral ia , characterized by 
ruthless land acquis i tion and the concentration of the indi genous 
people on reserves , largely out of convenience to settlement but also 
with the confused and poorly developed motive of preserving customary 
society against the ravages of a settlement deemed inevi table . The 
compulsory exactions of Melanesian labour betokens a basic and early 
purpose of exploitation ; the encouragement of coffee growing and some 
relaxations of the indi genat in the 19 30s an amelioration of that 
exploitation . In any event there was a sharp formal separation o f  
indigenous and s ettler populations uncharacteri stic of French colonialism . 
Thi s  was only sl ightly modified by interracial marriage among some o f  
the early settlers . In general a highly unfavourable s tereotype of 
Melanesians - even a racist attitude - has obtained among the French , 
quite di fferent from their attitude to Polynesians , for example . 
1 The word ' statut ' does not refer to a s ingle ' s tatute '  but to the 
•status•established by the totali ty o f  laws and regulations which lay 
down the fundamental conditions of a collectivi ty . The translation of 
' droi t commun ' by ' common law ' i s  a li ttle mi sleading in that, since 
the Code Napoleon , French law does not admi t al l the heritage o f  
medieval precedents and interpretations which English common law does ; 
nor in the French system does modern j udi cial interpretation have quite 
the proportion of importance vis-a-vi s  statute law and regulation as 
does the English . Provided these points are recogni zed it is neverthe­
less pos sible to talk of a French common law .  
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The mos t  s igni ficant f eatures (for thi s  analysi s) of the evolution 
of settler society are the mining rush from l87 3 ,  culminating in the 
overwhelming dominance of the economy by nickel mining and proces sing -
notably by the So cie te Le Nickel founded by John Higginson and s ub­
sequently under the s ubstantial control of the Rothschi l d  bank and the 
French government .  A coro llary o f  this was the decline o f  arab le 
farming - partly from s carc i ty of cultivable land and partly for 
comp lex problems of cos ts , markets and cultural preferences - in favour 
of cattle ranching , and the aggregation o f  land titles into fewer and 
fewer large estates , often owned by absentee proprietors or pas toral 
societies founded by nickel-wealthy Noumeans . This was further 
encouraged by extensive leases of domaine land both before and after 
World War II ( Roux 19 7 7:29-4 8 ) . 
Immediately a fter World War II the land holding s i tuation was as 
fol lows : 
. Melanes ian reserves on the Grande Terre to talled 126 , 6 14 ha on 
which dwelt about 19 , 000 Melanes ians ( 1946 census fi gures ) . The 
l and was very uneven in quality and very unevenly dis tributed 
among the clans . On some reserves there was a dequate land for a 
small surplus for cof fee production ; on o thers there was not 
enough for the subsis tence cycle . 
. The Loyalty Islands and Ile des Pins comprised a further 
2 09 , 37 2  ha, on whi ch dwelt approximately 12 , 000 Melanesians 
( 19 46 census figures ) . 
. On the Grande Terre 318 , 500 ha were held in proprietorship by 
Europeans and other settlers . A further 2 3 3 , 500 ha were held in 
lease from the Terri tory ( 1950 figures , c i t . Thompson and Adloff 
19 7 1:381) . The European population in 1946 was 18 , 100 while 
settlers o f  other origin ( mostly Vi etnamese and Indonesi an 
indentured labour and their descendants ) totalled 1 3 , 600 
( 1946 cen sus figures ) .  The balance of the 1 . 6  mi l lion ha of 
the Grande Terre was held as the domaine of the Territory . 
Mos t  of it is in the uncultivable mountain chain and some o f  i t  
i s  sub j ect to mining conces sion s . 
The maldi s tribution o f  land holding between Melanesians and 
settlers on the Grande Terre is matched by a comparable maldi stribution 
among settlers .. Of land held in private es tates in 19 50 
6 landowners held 5 , 000 ha or more each ( 29% o f  total area ceded) , 
89 500 to 5,000 ha ( 4 3% ) ,  
1 , 7 3 8  les s  than SOO ha ( 2 8% ) • 
The distribution of leaseholds was similar ( Thompson and Adloff 19 7 1: 
381)  . The maldi stribution of European holdings intensi fied , rather than 
ameliorated , in the pos twar decades , with the continued decline of agri­
culture and concentration on nickel produc tion . Fol lowing the report of 
Inspector Sorin ( 19 55-56)  Roux notes : ' Bes ides 105 large estates of which 
7 cover each 5 , 000 to 10 , 000 ha and 2 respectively 15 , 000 ha ( Etablis se­
ments Ballande) and 32 , 60 0  ha ( Societe Ouaco ) ; there are nearly 
1 , 300 settlers living on an average area of 10 ha' (Roux 1977:2 2 ) . 
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These imbalances , their hi storical origins , the economic/ 
politi cal structures whi ch sustained them, and social and economic 
divisions between Melanesians and settlers to which they gave ri se , 
shaped the politi cs o f  the postwar period . 
POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS 
Occupation of New Caledonia by allied forces in the Paci fic 
War , their enployment o f  Melanesian labour in wartime construction , 
and the easy-going anti -colonial atti tudes o f  the Ameri cans in 
particular , caused the effective col lapse o f  the indi genat .  The 
first postwar French governments attenpted a libera li zation though 
certainly not a relinquishment o f  their imperial order and in 1946 
formal ly abolished the indi g�na t .  In New Caledonia Melanesians 
acceded to ci vi l  liberties and the rights o f  free labour .  From 
195 1  they were e ffecti vely enfranchised (Saussol 19 79 : 36 1-63 ; 
Lenormand 195 3 ;  Dorney 198 1 ) . 
The first organi zations effectively to mobilize Melanesi an 
voters were mis s ion-based , reflecting in part the strength o f  
Melanesian regard for the mi ssions and in part the Churches ' con­
cern about early postwar socialist and co:rranunist proselyti zation 
among them. The Catholics in 1946 formed the Union des Indigenes 
Cale doniens Ami s de la Liberte dans l ' Ordre (UICALO) ; the Protestants 
responded wi th the As sociation des Indigenes Caledoniens et 
Loyaltiens Fran�ais (AICLF) . 
Both organi zations regarded the land question as central . Thi s 
involved , firs t ,  the defence o f  the reserves against further 
encroachment or s ubdivision . Paradoxi cally , now that they were no 
longer virtual pri sons , the reserves gained a new respect ,  indeed 
veneration , among Melanesi ans , as a bastion of their culture 
against the colonial onslaught . 
But there qui ckly developed also a demand for the return o f  
much more land. For many thi s  was s imply a response t o  demographic 
growth and economic need. In soxre cases the population densi ties 
on reserves had reached the order of 5 0  persons per km2 o f  
cul ti vable land - inadequate for the tradi tional subs i stence cycle 
let alone commercial production . For others the demand related more 
to the recovery of tradi tional clan territory , the return o f  
uprooted c lans t o  their ancient tertre and cultural roots , and an 
easing o f  the tensions and con fli cts among the clans thrown together 
in the reserves . In other words , what o ffi cials tended to call the 
' economi c '  claim and the ' psychologi cal ' claim were mixed from the 
beginning of resurgent Melanesian demands . 
Both dema.nds came to be reflected in the programme o f  the 
Union Cal€donienne (UC) , the politi cal movement formed in 1951 by 
liberal Frenchmen and Melanesian s  of the UICALO and AICLF following 
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the enfranchisement of the Melanesians . It supported Mauri ce 
:U:normand who was success ful in the l95l elections to the National 
As sembly , largely on the Melanesian vote . The UC programme drew 
upon that o f  the two earlier mi ssion-based organi zations but also 
had support from the urban progressives , many of whom favoured 
redistribution o f  some of the underused estates of the pas toral 
companies and absentee owners on the west coas t .  From its 
inception the UC was a multi-racial party , using the slogan '.Deux 
couleurs , un seul peuple ' .  When the conservatives sought to 
neutralize the Melanesian vote by demanding separate electoral 
colleges for the two races - thereby relating the progressive/ 
conservative divi sion to the politics o f  colour - the UC success­
fully resisted . It favoured a liberal grant o f  respons ibi lity for 
an elected New Caledonian assembly and council , perhaps leading to 
autonomie interne . 
It should nevertheless be noted that the settler supporters of 
the UC gave their support for many di fferent reasons, for example 
the advancement of New Caledonian businessmen and public servants 
against the influence of the me tropolitan French .  Not all of these 
were liberal and progressive ,  and almost all would have as sumed 
that au tonomie interne meant continued white dominance . 
The UC leaders who were most progres sive on Melanesian rights 
had constantly to compromi se with the m::>re conservative of their 
settler supporters .  Not s urpri singly the early UC programme for 
Melanesians was aime d more at greater inclusion of Melanesians 
within the framework of white insti tutions than at any accentuation 
of Melanesian c ulture . In land policy it was evolutionary in the 
sense that , while it advocated the defence of the reserves , it also 
spoke of cadastral survey and regi stration of individual and fami ly 
as well as clan holdings , and it acknowledged the freedom o f  
individual Melanesians to renounce their statut parti culier and come 
as individuals under the statut de droi t commun ( Saussol 1979 : 370- 71) . 
With Melanesian and peti t bl anc support the UC in 19 5 3  won a majority 
in the Territory ' s  General Counci l ;  ni ne Melanes ians were elected . 
In 1956 a Soci alist government in Pari s developed a progressive 
loi -cadre ( ' framework-law ' ) for all French overseas territories . 
As applied to New Caledonia in 19 5 7  ( under :U:normand' s pressure) 
it involved the creation of a Terri torial Assembly and a Governing 
Counci l - an embryo ministerial system with members selected by 
maj ori ty vote of the Assembly . ( For a published di scussion see 
Thompson and Adloff 19 7 1 : 290- 306 ; for an authori tative treatment 
see Dorney 19 81) . 
Under the impetus of this po liti cal evolution , and of cri ti cal 
reports by metropoli tan o ffi cials (notably of Inspector Sorin 19 55-
1956) , a variety o f  efforts at land reform was attempted . These have 
been brilliantly analysed by Saussol ( 19 79 ) . 
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There firs t ensued what S aussol calls the era o f  the agrandisse­
ment des reserves , as they were enlarged by trans fers of domaine 
land , repurchased private estates and land sequestrated from Japanes e  
nationals during the war . S aussol ' s  figures for the Grande Terre 
reserves ( S aussol 19 79 : 3 7 7 )  are : 
19 46 
1956 
196 3 
1969 
126 , 614 ha 
14 3 , 2 7 1 ha 
14 3 , 515 ha 
16 1 , 9 32 ha 
Thereafter the aggrandi sement of reserves l and s lowed . In 19 79 they 
still total led only 16 2 , 5 36 ha . Although i t  relieved the pressure 
on some reserves , at no time did the process keep pace wi th the 
Melanesian derrographi c explosion ; indeed Saus sol calculates that the 
overal l  ratio of hectares per head o f  population on Grande Terre 
reserves fel l  from 7 . 6 1  in 19 12 to 4 . 8  in 1969 . 
There were other weaknesses in the proces s .  Firs t , the areas 
added were no t neces sarily added to the reserves of greatest need . 
For example, they were larger in the less populous reserves o f  the 
m::>untain chain , where i t  was easier to transfer areas of domaine 
land , than on the crowded coas tal pockets where fertile land was 
held as tenacious ly by the settlers as it was demanded by Melanesians . 
The question of di s tribution among the various fami lies and 
clans on the reserves also became contentious . The admini stration 
legally recogni zed only the tribu as a co l lective proprietor and 
the extensions of the reserves were vested in the tribu . Allocation 
wi thin the reserves was formal ly the respons ibi lity o f  the o ffi cial 
chefs and a newly-recogni zed body ( on each reserve ) , the Conseil 
des Anciens , comprising several appointed elders . These o fficials 
were sometimes cus tomary clan heads and maftres de la terre , sometimes 
not .  There was frequently contention about the al location o f  the 
land am::>ng the leadership and between c lans with tradi tional c laims 
to the l and and the s tranger clans thrown into the reserves by the 
cantonnement .  In general ,  the admini s tration leaned towards s upport 
of the ' economi c ' claim - the actual land needs for s ubsistence or 
farming - rather than the ' psychological ' claim to ancestral territory . 
The tradi tional claimants therefore often fel t  their claims to the 
land further threatened by the entrenchment o f  the other groups on 
the extensions to the reserves . 
Saussol has anal ysed the internal subdivi sion of the agrandisse­
ments on seve ral re serve s and found con s i derable vari ati on according to 
local factors . Where the extensions affected reserves containing 
one or more of the tradi tional cl aimant clans , these did tend to 
gain roore in the internal allocation , and the traditional maftres 
de la terre had a preponderant in fluence .  Where the extensions 
involved no viab le tradi tional c laimant the Conseil des Anciens 
handled the internal allocation and tended to a more equal di s tri­
bution , on a needs bas i s , though the rrore infl uenti al fami lies on 
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the Consei l may have done rather better than others . Sometimes 
the disputes over redis tribution led to the land lying idle for 
much of the time (Saus sol 19 79 : 39 4 ) . 
Problems such as these brought into ques tion the who le concept 
of reserves ( and their agrandissemen� . So too di d the fact that 
increase of the reserves was not always accompanied by a correspon­
ding increase in Melanesian agri culture . On the contrary , some o f  
the reserves were turned over to beef cattle ranching which expanded 
rapidly among Melanesians in this period , while co ffee growing 
halted or even dec lined. This was partly a function of the easier 
work and greater prestige assoc iated with cattle ranching and partly 
a function of the entry of Melanesians into salaried employment in 
the towns and the mines . The income flowing to reserves from the 
salari es has far outstripped the returns from agri culture , whi le 
the population of reserves has in some cases fal len , despite the 
overall denographi c  increase . By 1976 over 20 per cent of Melane­
sians lived in towns . The reacqui s ition of land was thus taking 
place within a new set of economi c aspirations and opportuni ties . 
Roux ( 1974)  and Saus so l ( 19 79 : 394-404)  have shown that the atti tudes 
of young Melanesians ,  in parti cular , are very ambivalent . Whi lst 
seeing in the reserve a kind o f  securi ty , they are frequently bored 
with the li fe of the reserve and frustrated by the limited economic 
opportuni ties there . A further pressure point i s  created by the 
customary succession rules whi ch may favour a man ' s elder brother 
rather than his own chi ldren , or another lineage al together if he 
has only usufruct rights . These factors led to di scussion , among 
the admi ni stration and among some Melanesians , of the desirability 
of dissolving the collective proprietorships o f  the reserves and 
regi stering individual and fami ly titles to the land , perhaps under 
the droi t commun , free from the restrictions on alienabi lity ,  in­
cluding mortgage . 
Meanwhi le in the 1950s entrepreneurial Melanes ians themselves 
began to acqui re land from settlers on lease or share-cropping 
arrangements , and occas ionally even by purchase . Responding to the 
demand ,  and intending now - at long last - to ass imilate Melanesians 
better into the introduced economi c system , the adminis tration 
developed two means of trans ferring land to Melanesians in individual 
ti tle outside the reserves and under the droi t commun . These were 
locations domaniales and concessions domaniales .  The loca tions 
were leases with a promi se of sale after a certain term of years and 
improvement of the land . They were favoured by the Melanes ians both 
as a mode of aquiring individual ti tles and as effectively adding to 
reserves, on the margins of which they were often granted . Saus sol 
cal culated that 196 locations totalling 18 , 86 1  ha were granted in 
the period 1958-19 63 , greatly exceeding formal aggrandisements of 
reserves during that time . 
The second method ,  concessions domaniales, involved grants of 
domaine land , avai l able first to returned soldiers (of any race) 
then to enfants du pays (persons born in New Caledonia) . Free grants 
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(concessions gra tui tes ) were normal ly 2 5  h a  each but could be 
added to a loca tion or to a concession involving progress ive 
p ayments (ti tre onereux) . The concessions gratui tes were gi ven 
in provi sional title for five years . These were made definite when 
improvement condi tions were me t .  Widely granted to European 
applicants they were made avai lab le to Melanesians increasingly in 
the 1960s and eventua lly overtook loca tions in importance as a 
means by which Mel anesi ans acquired lan d .  They were o ften , but by 
no means always , on the margins of reserves . The system o f  
concessions was s uspended i n  19 74 , partly because Europeans were 
acqui ring them for hunting and recreation purposes around the 
margins o f  Mel anes i an reserves in the mountain chain , and partly 
to al low the Servi ce du Demaine ( Lands Department ) to catch up 
with the s urvey and paperwork generated by a back log o f  appli cations 
( Roux , verbal communications 19 79- 80 )  . 
During the indus trial boom also , Mel anesians began to acquire 
lots de vi llage - urban concessions in new Noumea s uburbs and other 
townships . 
Other modes o f  l and tran s fer analysed by S aussol reflect an 
interest by French admini strators in trying to adapt c us tomary 
Melanesian soci al organization to modern l and development . These 
include d an early ( 19 5 8 )  experiment with a cooperative at Nas sirah 
whi ch fai led , as cooperatives have fai led elsewhere in the Paci fi c ,  
because o f  rather nai ve European assumptions about the collecti ve 
nature o f  Melanes i an society and economi cs . Later ' societ�s ci viles 
agri coles ' ( a gricultural coopera tives ) were organi zed around 
exi sting Melanesian entrepreneurs and regulated within a framework 
governing s uch societies generally . These have been much more 
success ful and have recei ved loan finance from new state credit 
organi zations des igned to foster rural development . 
Internal s ubdivi sions o f  reserves by whi ch the appointed and 
cus tomary authori ties formally recognize ' a  permanent right o f  
possession and enj oyment ' ( though not o f  alienation ) i n  a parti cular 
parcel o f  land by an individual or fami ly , may also be regi s tered 
by the Service du Demaine and form the basis of personal loans . 
This practi ce has been used on some reserves to foster indivi dual 
enterpri ses ( S a ussol 19 79:42 3- 3 1 ) . I t  i s  es sentially a formaliza­
tion o f  tradi tional indivi dual rights within group land . 
Another signi fi cant experiment in the Tchamba valley involved 
the subdivis ion of a former Japanese proprietorship into thirty-two 
lots and their al loc ation under droi t commun , after pub l i c  dis cus sion 
involving the c lans of the adj acent reserve (whose land it formally 
was )  in the ratio of seventeen lots to the traditional claimants 
and others linked to them , to fi f teen to Europeans and Melanesi ans 
having no relationship with or consent from the locals . The eviden ce 
of improvemen t of the land by the tradi tional claimants and the 
fai lure to improve ( or even res i de on ) the land among the stranger 
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Melanes i ans , i s  cons idered by some French analys ts (notab ly Guiart 
19 6 1 ,  1974 ) to show that without the consent of the customary 
authori ties Melanesi an landholders are not well IIK>tivated to 
improve their holdings , whatever ri ghts the droi t commun gives 
them . Saussol surmi ses , however ,  that where they hold under both 
the droi t conrnun and the approval o f  traditional authorities the 
former rights wi l l  in time supp lant the l atter in importance 
( S aussol 1971 : 12 0 - 2 1 ) .  
Whether thi s  i s  so i s  a m:>ot point ,  because there i s  a tendency 
for indivi dual hol dings on the margins o f  reserves to be drawn i nto 
the property-rights system of the clans . This is partly a function 
of the customary l aw of succession, which favours the nearest clan 
claimant , not necess arily the children or widow o f  the deceased . 
Since on ly a few hundred Melanesi ans have opted for the s ta t u t  
conunun IIK>s t Melanesi ans ' inheritance rights are governed legally 
by the s tatut parti culier. Pres sure for a cus tomary devolution o f  
land therefore has been supported i n  e f fect by the l aw ,  even though 
the inci dents o f  title may have been those o f  the droi t commun . 
It is clear then that the French authori ties had made some 
effort to return land to Melanesians , and had evolved several forms 
of ti tle , of trans fer , o f  rural credi t and of adapting customary 
organi zation to IIK>dern exigencies . In some ways they had been IIK>re 
adventurous than their counterparts in adj acent Anglophone Oceanic 
dependencies - if only because they had at their disposal the 
category o f  domaine land , ruthles s l y  acquired by their predecessors . 
But preci sely because it raised fundamental questions of the 
form o f  society to evolve in New Caledonia ,  and of who should control 
that society , the land reform question evoked IIK>re and more contro­
vers y .  
DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE 
In the 19 5 0s more progressive sections o f  the Union Caledonienne 
began to feel that the piecemeal aggrandisement of reserves was 
al together too limited and contemplated a much more thorough-going 
trans fer of land to be based on much hi gher l and rents or taxes , and 
on powers of pre-emptive purchase or even expropri ation of unused or 
underused settler l and . The grands colons - led by Henri La fleur , 
Roger Laroque and Georges Chatenay - were already anxious about the 
threat to their primacy apparent in the growing success of the 
Melanesi an-backed UC and by the adoption in New Caledonia of the 
loi-cadre . Lenormand consi dered the revi sed statute granted to 
New Caledonia in 19 5 7  inadequate ( especi ally in its fai lure to 
devolve fi scal powers ) but under it ministers had authority to 
di rect various departments o f  government , and the UC , having won 
the elections to the Territori al Assemb ly , occupied these posts . 
Among the conservatives apprehension developed not only of liberal­
socialist reforms but a lso about the implications of autonomist 
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think in g .  Autonomist i deas , in the sense o f  a desi re for greate r 
independence from France in e conomic matters , we re not absent from 
the se ttlers' thinking either , even among bus ine ss circles . But 
thei r  views were ambi guous , and with the Melane sians s ti l l  com­
pri sing 50 per cent of the pop ulation , many began to fe ar the 
ul timate abrogation of whi te supremacy . 
I f  such notions were then actual ly remote from the UC , more 
thorough- going land re form was not and it was thi s whi ch p re cipi­
tated dras ti c  action by the se ttl e rs . In 1958 , with De Gaul le 
re cently acceding to power in Pari s , armed broussards (bush settlers) , 
with the complicity of the army , cause d  di s turbances in Noumea and 
threatened Lenormand . When Lenormand was thought to be organ i zing 
Melanesians to make co unte r-demonstrations his deputy , the Melane ­
sian chie f Hoch Pidjot , was harrassed and other UC leade rs tempora­
ri ly impri sone d .  The governo r , Grimal d ,  re gained control and there 
fo llowed De Gaulle's famous re fe re ndum by whi ch the French ove rs e as 
te rri tories voted whe ther to s tay in the French Union . Lenormand 
and the UC , anxious to rebut charges of s e cessioni s m ,  campai gne d 
for a 'yes' vote ( unl ike Pouvanaa a Oopa of Tahiti who was subse­
quently charged wi th incendiarism and e xi le d ) ; b ut they have s ubse­
quently claimed that they we re as sured by Pari s - and s ti l l  have 
the te le gram to prove it - that poli ti cal e volution to sel f-dete r­
mination , along the lines subsequently fol lowed by France's tropical 
Afri can colonie s ,  had been promised for New Caledonia . Instead , 
the new gove rno r ,  Pechoux , be gan whittling away the powers accorded 
under the loi -cadre and ob lige d  Lenormand to resi gn from the 
Gove rning Counci l .  Although he was overwhelmingly ree l ected to 
the National Assembly , and the UC continue d  to win majori ti e s  i n  
Te rri tory e le ctions , further disturbances occurred and in 196 3  
Lenormand , impli cated i n  an alleged bomb p lot , was depri ve d  o f  
civi l  l iberties for five ye ars . The U C  remained a cons i de rabl e  
force unde r Roch Pidjot's le adership b u t  the 196 3  revi sion o f  the 
Territory statute unde r Gove rno r  Jacquinot sha:rply re duced the 
powe rs and s i ze of the Governing Counci l .  On ly five non-o f fi c i al 
members remained; they were no longe r  'ministers' and they were 
elected by propo rtional , not majo ri ty , represen tation of the 
Te rri tori al Assembly ( Thompson and Adloff 19 7 1 : 3 1 7- 18; Dornoy 1981) . 
Ef fe ctive powe r lay large ly wi th the gove rno r ( late r called high 
commi ss ioner) , his secre tary-general , and the army and gendarme rie 
they controlled; and wi th Pari s , wh i ch subvented the annual 
Terri tory budge t ,  appointed the pri ncipal o f fi cials , and ove rs aw 
in great de tai l all new deve lopments . 
The even ts of 1958- 19 62 e s tab lished the conjunction of the 
right and cen tre in France with the s e ttler ri ght in New Cale doni a .  
Fran ce nee ded the se ttlers to re tain the French presence ; the 
settlers , despite the evident subordination of the Territory to 
metropoli tan intere sts , ne eded Fran ce to prese rve the i r  privi leges 
against the re surgent Me lanesians . 
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The denographi c  balance in the i sland also moved against the 
Melanesians . New inunigration o f  French settlers inc luded perhaps 
2 , 000 pieds-noirs from Algeri a , l and a considerable number of ex­
servi cement on retirement pay . The b iggest influx , i ncluding many 
small busines s people , came with the nickel boom o f  1969- 19 74 . 
Immigration o f  Po lynesians from Wal l i s  Island and French Polynesi a  
( Tahi ti , Aus tral Islands , Marquesas , etc . ) flowed s teadi ly from 
the 1950s and these groups al so formed substantial minorities . 
Both groups of Polynes ians tended to mani fest an ethnocentric 
superiority towards the Melanesi an s , and the Wallis Islanders in 
parti cular s aw themselves as dependent upon the French for j obs 
and land,  and voted with them . 
Table 1 compares the size o f  the Melanesian population wi th 
that of European and other settler groups . 2 
Table 1 
PoEulation 
Year European s Melanes i an s  Others Total 
% of % o f  % of 
number total number total number total 
popul .  popu l . popul . 
1887e 18 , 800 30 . l 42 , 500 6 8 . 0  1 , 200 1 . 9 6 2 , 5 00 
190 1 22 , 75D 41 . 8 2 9 , 100 5 3 . 5  2 , 55 0  4 . 7 5 4 , 400 
1906 2 0 , 900 39 . 2 2 8 , 500 5 3 . 5  3 , 900 7 . 3 5 3 , 300 
19 1 1  17 , 300 34 . 2 2 8 , 800 5 6 . 9  4 , 500 8 . 9  50 , 600 
19 2 1  14 , 2 00 2 9 . 9  2 7 , 100 5 7 . 1 6 , 2 00 1 3 . l  4 7 , 5 00 
19 3 1  15 , 200 26 . 6  2 8 , 60 0  5 0 . 0  1 3 , 400 2 3 . 4 5 7 , 200 
19 36 15 , 400 2 8 . 9 2 8 , 800 5 4 . 1  9 , 00 0  16 . 9  5 3 , 2 00 
19 46 18 , 100 2 8 . 9  31 , 00 0  49 . 4  1 3 , 600 2 0 . 7  62 , 70 0  
195 1  2 0 , 400 3 1 . 1 34 , 000 5 1 . 9 1 1 , 100 16 . 9  6 5 , 500 
19 56 2 5 , 160 36 . 7 34 , 96 9  5 1 . 1 8 ,  35 1 12 . 2 6 8 , 4 80 
1962 3 3 , 355 38 . 6  4 1 , 190 4 7 . 6  1 1 , 9 74 1 3 . 8  86 , 5 19 
1969 4 1 , 26 8  4 1 . 0 46 , 200 4 5 . 9  1 3 , 1 1 1  1 3 . 0  10 0 , 5 79 
19 74e 5 1 , 582 39 . 2  5 3 , 72 5  40 . 8  26 , 358 2 0 . 0  1 3 1 , 665 
19 76 50 , 7 5 7  3 8 . 1  55 , 59 8  4 1 .  7 26 , 878 2 0 . 2  1 3 3 , 2 3 3 
19 79e 49 , 90 0  36 . 1  59 , 400 4 3 . 0  2 8 , 800 20 . 9  1 3 8 , 100 
19 8oe 49 , 700 35 . 6  60 , 500 4 3 . 3 2 9 , 40 0  2 1 . 1 1 39 , 6 00 
e - estimated 
Source : INSEE : l9 76 ; Servi ce de la Stati s tique 1980 : 10 .  
1 
2 
The number of ex Algerian colons tends to be exaggerated by 
Aus tralian commentators . They were not o f ficially assi sted 
and no s tati s ti cs are kept to preci sely i denti fy the group . 
Retired army personnel are probably equal ly numerous . 
In recent work Dr Dorothy Shineberg o f  the Australian Nati onal 
Universi ty has shown that the estimate and censuses for the 
years 1887 to 1911 probably involved errors o f  up to 12 per cent . 
They must therefore be treated with considerable reservation . 
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These figures show that the Melanesians fi rs t became outnumbered by 
the combined se ttler groups as re cently as the late 1950s , and then 
only marginally unti l the nickel boom of 1969- 19 74 when they com­
prised only 4 1 . 7 pe r cent o f  the population . In the last three 
years the Me lanes ian proportion has increased again in compari son 
with the European population . The col lapse of nickel pri ce s  and 
the ens uing e conomi c malaise has led to a ne t de cline in migration 
of Europeans ,  whi ch the net bi rth rate does not make up . 
The other obvious feature is the growing importance o f  the 
' othe r '  ethnic groups , notably the Wal lis I s l anders . Table 2 shows 
the proportions for the 1969 and 19 76 censuses . 
Table 2 
Composition of ' other ' e thni c groups 
Wal lis Islanders 
French Polyne sians 
Indones ians 
Vietnamese 
New Hebrideans 
(ni-Vanuatu) 
Othe rs 
( from Reunion , 
Martinique , Guyana , 
Guade loupe e tc . ) 
1964 ( es timate )  
number % o f  total 
population 
6 , 2 20 6 . 2  
3 , 370 3 . 3 
4 , 400 4 . 4  
1 , 500 1 . 6  
200 0 . 2 
600 0 . 6  
Source : Servi ce de la S tati stique 1980 : 8  
1976 
number % of total 
population 
9 , 5 7 1  7 . 2  
6 , 39 1  4 . 8  
5 , 111 3 . 8  
1 , 943 1 .  5 
1 , 050 0 . 8 
2 , 812 2 . 1  
By 1969 the Wal lis Islanders were already the third largest e thni c  
group and they have rapidly in creased both i n  numbe rs and proportion 
si nce . In 19 79 they were es timated at 10 , 800 , 7 . 8  per cent of the 
popula tion , wi th French Polynes i ans 6 , 500 and 4 . 7  pe r cent ( a  
slightly de clining proportion ) . The rapid growth o f  the Wal lisian 
popula tion is the re sult of very high birth rates - s ustained 
large ly by the generous French allocations fami liales as we l l  as by 
inmigration . But there has been a net decl ine in Wallis Is land 
mi gration in 19 79- 1980 (wi th more departing than arriving) . 
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The 1976 census showed the proportions o f  each ethnic group 
born in New Caledonia (Table 3 } . 
Table 3 
Proportions of ethnic groups 
born in New Caledonia 
Melanesians 
Indones ians 
Vietnamese 
Europeans 
Walli sians 
Polynesi ans 
New Hebrideans 
( ni-Vanuatu) 
Others 
Source : INSEE 1976 : 26 
per cent 
9 9 . 8  
78 . 0  
60 . 1  
60 . l  
49 . 8  
3 4 . 0  
2 0 . 4  
40 . 3  
Preci sely at the time o f  their reassertion , therefore , the Melanes ians 
found themselves outnumbered as the result of new migration . In this 
basic fact alone originates much of the ensuing politi cal confrontation . 
The economi cs of the ni ckel boom did not favour the Melanesi ans , 
either . The rise in ni ckel prices from 1969 brought a heavy invest­
ment in mining and in secondary and servi ce industries of Noumea , which 
enjoyed a spectacular but temporary boom . During thi s period young 
Melanesi ans began to move to Noumea and its environs in considerable 
numbers , reducing the commi tment to co ffee and the rural economy 
general ly and contributing to unemployment i n  the towns when the boom 
passed in the early 1970 s . Salari ed officials of the various servi ces , 
especi ally me tropoli tan French offi cials and the employees of the 
Societe Le Nickel and other favoured firms , were the principal 
bene fi ciaries of the prosperity . In 1976 average wages were 6 . 4  
times the level o f  1969 but the number o f  wage earners i ncreased only 
2 . 5  times ( Dornoy 1981 : Chapter 4 ) . Inflation , stimulated by the heavy 
demand from the wealthy for consumer goods , spiralled ahead of wages . 
It was aggravated by the regres sive tax s tructure : there was no income 
tax but heavy duties on imported goods . The oligopoly of three or 
four big import/export firms l imited competition . In short the boom 
benefitted those on high salaries and certain well situated entre­
preneurs . Most others suffered under the inflati on . 
The Melanesi ans ' share of the boom was di sproportionately low .  
True , more Melanesians were brought into government employ i n  the 
service industries and into the teaching profes sion , and the average 
salaries of Melanesians in employment doubled .  But i n  1976 few 
Melanesians were employed i n  the private se ctor ( relative to Wal li s  
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Is landers or other immigrant groups) ; among the salaries the 
Melanes ians remained the least numerous group , and they formed 
less than 1 per cent of the employer c lass . Whi lst the ' s ervi ces ' 
proportion of employees grew by 4 7  per cent from 1969- 1976 and 
' commerce ' by 43 per cent , the Me lanesians remained proportionate ly 
much the least involved ethni c group in those s ectors . On 19 76 
figures 70 per cent of Me l anesians were still engaged in s ubsistence 
agri culture , with but a small cash s urpl us ( INSEE 19 76 : 5 5 ) . 
Moreover , in respect of fami ly allowances and other bene fits payable 
to employees , the Mel anes i ans were frequently earning below the 
minimum of CFP 2 5 , 00 0  per month required to quali fy , or were only 
�ctifs temporaires ' .  For cultural and his tori cal reas ons - shyness 
and maladroi tness with regard to the bureaucrati c process and a 
re luctance to confront offi cials after a century of contempt and 
condes censi on - they do not apply for all they c ould in the way of 
extra allowances or unemp loyment bene fits . Thus , whi le a spectacular 
but insubs tantial prosperity came to Noumea and a few small centres 
between 1969 and 19 74 , it widened the gap between the returns to 
mos t Mel anesians and those to mos t s ettlers . 
The unhealthy dependence on nickel also intens i fi e d ,  as the b oom 
drew people further away from the rural economy . In 19 76 ni cke l  
exports accounte d for 9 7  p e �  cent of value of a l l  exports (Dornoy 1981 : 
Chapter 4 ) . 
In this period , also , although s ome concessions continued to be 
grante d ,  the rate of land redi s tribution to Me lanes i ans s lowed .  By 
contrast there was a flurry of activi ty in the real es tate market in 
Noumea and its envi rons to the advantage of deve l opers and new migrants . 
Settlers also continued to receive concessions of bush land , largely 
for hunting and recreation purpos es . 
It is not s urprising , in the face of al l these trends and the 
continued inability of the Union Caledonienne to secure advances in 
politi cal respons ibi lity for the Territory , that Me l anes i an politi cs 
became more radical . It is also important to note , however ,  as has 
been pointed out in recent theses ( Sim-Barr 19 7 7 ; Dornoy 19 81 ) , that 
in any case the Me lanesians were re j e cting the cultural as simi lationist 
poli cies of the UC - which had largely aimed at Me lanesian advancement 
within Eurocentric concepts of progress - in favour of a reas sertion 
of Kanak culture and values . This reas serti on was to make at leas t 
as great an impact on New Cale donian politi cs as the earli er politi­
cal mobili zation of Me lanesians by the UC . 
From the late 1960s there emerged organized groups of educated 
young Me lanes i ans . Among the leaders was M Nidoish Naisseline , a 
young high chi e f  from Mare Is land who was s tudying in Pari s in 19 6 8  
a t  the height o f  the student fe rvour for de colonization and anti­
capi tali st revolt .  The movement he founded in 1969 , the Foulards 
Rouges , aimed at redi s covering and reass erting Kanak i denti ty and 
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culture . Memories of the humilia,tion and exploi tation of the 
indi gena t ,  and continued day to day reminders o f  European paternalism 
and racism, produced a note of bi tterness- in the attitudes o f  many 
of the young radi cals , whose basic nationalist , anti-colonial s tance 
found expres s ion in a certain amount of marxis t  analysis and rhetoric . 
But the movement generally operated at many more practical leve ls , 
emb racing questions such as land rights , the place of Me lanesian 
language and culture in the education sys tem ,  and the right to publish 
Melanes i an-language newspapers (forbidden as ' subve rsive ' by the 
Adminis tration ) .  A later o f fshoo t ,  the Groupe 1878, aimed particularly 
at mobili zing Melanesian opinion in respect of the land prob lems o f  
the Grande Te rre . Thei r  demands included the wholes ale return o f  
ances tral land , a demand which , as Saussol wrote i n  19 7l , had ' more 
and more the appearance o f  a "battlehors e 0  crystallis ing all the 
resentments of Melanesians and ,  by consequence , the reaction o f  the 
settlers . Under this heading one can a ffi rm that now the question o f  
land is the maj o r ,  i f  not the only p rob lem i n  the rural bush lands o f  
New Caledoni a ' . He urged that i t  mus t b e  de fused be fore a con fron­
tation ove r land became unavoi dab le ( Saussol 19 7 1 : 1 12 ) . 
Demons trations by Foulards Rouges and other groups in Noumea in 
Septembe r  1969 , and from time to time in the early 19 70s , produced 
confrontation , s ometimes vio lent , wi th the forces of l aw and o rde r .  
These tended t o  occur about 2 4  September , the day celebrated for the 
prise de possession of New Caledonia by France but t reated by the 
Melanesians as a day of mourning for the los s of thei r  liberty and 
the sub j ugation of thei r culture . 
But the Me lanesians were fas t moving from protes t  to organized 
party politics . In 19 70 a new Me lanes i an-led politi cal party , the 
Union Multi raciale de Nouve lle Caledonie ( UMNC ) was formed by M Yann 
Celene Uregei , hithe rto a membe r  of the Union Caledonienne . The UMNC 
captured many Melanesian s upporters o f  the UC as we l l  as the tempo­
rary adherence of many Foulards Rouges . In the early 19 70s both the 
UC and the UMNC pressed for autonomi e interne ( responsib le s e l f­
government in all domestic matters ) b ut already the 19 70s were wit­
ness ing the advance towards Independence in Fi j i  ( attained in 19 70 ) , 
Papua New Guinea ( 19 75 ) , the Solomon Is lands ( 19 78) and other adj acent 
Briti sh possessions . Consequently , and as a res ult of the fai lure o f  
France t o  make any moves towards autonomie for New Caledoni a ,  from 
19 75 the UMNC ( renamed the F ront Uni pour la Libe ration des Kanaks -
FULK - in 19 7 7 )  demande d ful l  independence for New Caledoni a .  So too 
di d a new radi cal party , the Parti de Liberation Kanak ( PALIKA) , 
forme d in 19 7 7  by Naisse line , E lie Poigoune and Mlle Dewe Gorodey 
from e lements of Foulards Rouges , Groupe 1878 , Union des Jeune s s e s  
Caledoniennes and others , who prefe rred their own party t o  working 
under the aegis of FULK. Another moderate group , the Union Pro­
gressiste Multi raci ale ( rename d Uni o n  Progre s � i s te Me l ane s i enne i n  
19 77) ( UPH) , a l s o  broke away from t h e  UMNC under Andre Gopea ; i t  
inc luded many a c t ive . Chr i s t i an membe r s , and favour ed I ndependence 
by non-revo l utionary mean s . The se par ti e s  adumbr a ted a policy 
no t merely of Independence but of ' Independance Kanak ' - an 
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Independence recognizing the paramountcy o f  the Me lanesians as the 
legitimate people of New Caledoni a .  Some s uch movement would 
certainly have arisen even if the conservative quasi- coup of 19 5 8-
1963 had not occurred . It is ce rtain , however , that it would have 
had much l.ess easy and swi ft s uc cess among the Mel anes i ans i f  the 
UC , the party of the i r  previous general al legiance , had been per­
mi tted to implement i ts policies of a utonomie , land re form and 
advancement of Melanesians to a share of poli ti cal and adminis tra­
tive respons ibi li ty and to the fruits of a diversi fied e conomy . 
The reaction of 195 8- 196 3 had the ultimate e f fect o f  po lari zing the 
politics o f  New Cale doni a  in terms of autonomy vers us dependency 
and in terms o f  race - with whi tes standing for the continued F rench 
presence , white p ri vi lege , and limi ted autonomy ; the b lacks for 
Independance Kanak . Having embarked on an anti - autonomi s t  cours e 
the French s tate was then oblige d  to intens i fy control o f  the 
Territory ' s  democrati c institutions , against mo unting Mel anesian 
radi calism ( ' repression ' in the language o f  the Independantistes) . 
In March 19 7 7  the Melanesian parties and some Melanes i an 
candidates o f  the UC gained startling vi ctories in the Terri tory ' s  
muni cipal elections , winning o r  th reatening control o f  s everal Eas t 
Coas t communes .  France responded wi th more changes to the Terri­
tori al laws . Aspects of the Loi Bi llotte of 1969 and the Loi Stirn 
of 19 7 3 , whi le formally upgrading the s tatus and powers o f  the 
communes , trans fe rred the responsib i l i ty for the local government 
budget di re ct ly to Pari s . The Me lanesian chefferie ,  increas ingly 
criticized or ignored by some s e ctions of the young radi cals , also 
had their authority weakened in favour of the chefs de subdi vision 
( the equivalent of the metropol i tan s ub-pre fects ) .  Howeve r ,  thes e  
measures ( contrary t o  the e f fe ct o f  s imi lar meas ures in F rench 
Polynesia)  stimul ated rather than dis couraged Me lanes ian nationalism. 
A revis ion of the b as i c  Terri toria l  s tatute in 19 76 indi cated 
the limi ts of local respons ibi l i ty : F rance ( ' the State ' )  still 
appoints the high commiss ione r and the s enior o ffici als o f  the 
administrative servi ces . It retains formal responsibi l i ty for 
foreign a ffai rs , de fence , external communi cations , finance and 
cre di t , j us ti ce , local government , s econdary and te rti ary e ducation , 
and radio and televis ion . Other matters - primary education , health , 
transport , agri culture , and l and are fo rmal ly Territory matters , but 
the Territory lacks the finance , the staff , and the detai led legal 
authority to do much more than routine adminis tration o f  these matters . 
Any maj or new depart�re - the re cent land re form propos als , for 
example - requires elabo rate coo rdination wi th Pari s , vis i ts each 
way by o f fi ci als and poli ti cians , months of p lanning , and dependence 
upon metropoli tan finance . 
Meanwhile the ri gh t  wing and centre parties were also grouping 
and regrouping as factiona lism and leadership rival ries , and di vi ded 
and changing views on how to deal with the autonomi s t  movement , 
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competed with the realization that some consolidation was necess ary 
to meet the threat . The mos t  important conservative party in the 
1960s was the Union Democratique de la Nouvelle-Caledonie headed by 
Lenormand ' s longs tanding opponents Henri Lafleur , Roger Laroque 
and Georges Chacenay ( leading ni ckel miners and bus inessmen ) . By 
19 7 7 , a fter s everal divisions , its po litical s uccessor - aligne d to 
the Gis card d ' Es taing group in France - was called the Rassemblement 
Pour la Caledonie ( RPC ) . Perhaps its mos t  important leader was 
Jacques La fleur , Henri ' s  son . In the 19 7 7  e lections it j oined 
forces with the RPR ( Rassemb lement Pour La Republique ) , a pro 
Chi rac ( Gaul lis t )  group led by the conservati ve Me lanes i an e lder 
Di ck Ukeiwe . The RPC/RPR combination presented a Lis te d ' Union o f  
candidates for the 19 7 7  elections . 
The UC , meanwhi le , had also lost some o f  i ts more cons ervative 
European s upporters like Jean Leques , now opposed to autonomie 
interne because of the increasing pos s ibility of Me lanesian 
dominance . De fections both by these on one hand and radi cal 
Me lanes i ans on the other le ft it in 19 72 in a minority in the 
As semb ly for the first time s ince Mel anes i an enfranchis ement 
( Sim-Barr 19 7 7 : Chapte r  7 ) . The UC responded by moving c loser to 
the Me lanes i ans , s upporting ' Independance Kanak ' ral lies and ,  whi le 
formally c linging to the a utonomie interne programme , noted that 
this was normally a p re lude to Independence . In consequence a 
further group of (more liberal ) European members also split away to 
form new groups s uch as the Union Nouve lle Caledonienne ( UNC) . 
These inc luded abl.e leaders like Jean-Pierre Ai fa , a farmer o f  
Arab des cent and mayor o f  Bourai l .  
I n  the 19 7 7  e lections , then , the Territory was pres ented with 
a range of po licies , from that of the RPR favouring a pe rmanent 
conne ction with France and limi ted local autonomy , through various 
centre parties whi ch wanted a reduction of the privi leges of big 
bus ines s and the trans fer of m�re responsibilities to the 
Terri tory , to the Union Caledonienne , the Parti Socialis te 
Caledonien ( PSC) ( formed in 19 76 from the Trade Union movement and 
with autonomi st leanings ) and the Me l anesian parties favouring 
Independance Kanak . 
In the Territorial Ass embly e lections of September 19 7 7  the 
res ults we re as set out below in Tab le 4 .  
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Table 4 
Resu lts of As sembly E lections 19 7 7  
RPR/RPC 
Various centrist parties 
(Union Nouvelle Caledonienne , 
Union Democratique , Union Pour 
le Renouveau de la Caledonie 
UC 
FULK 
PALIKA 
UPM 
Par ti Socialiste Caledonien 
Percentage 
of vote 
32 . 5  
l8 . 2  
19 . 7  
7 . 8  
6 . 4  
3 . 8  
8 . 4  
Assembly 
seats 
14 
5 
9 
l 
2 
l 
3 
Sour ce : Les Nouvelles Cal edoniennes 22 September 1 9 7 7  
The right wing RPR/RPC ( soon to become the Rassemblement Pour l a  
Caledonie dans la Repub lique - RPCR) and the centrist parties with 
50 . 7  per cent of the vote and 19 seats ( to the combined total o f  
4 6  p e r  cent and 18 seats for the other parties ) were thus able to 
form a coali tion whi ch usual ly dominated the Terri torial Assembly 
and its various Commi ss ions , and contributed mos t ,  but not al l ,  of 
th e member s of the Governing Counci l (e lected by proportional vote 
of the As sembly) . In 1978 Lafleur formed the RPCR from the former 
RPC and other factions o f  the right . 1 Some members shi fted to 
centre partie s . 
As a result of the clear shift of Melanesian support from the 
UC to the Melanesian Independanti ste parties ( and more fundamentally 
because of the developing Independence movement both in the Paci fic 
region and in the rural areas o f  New Caledonia ) the Union Caledonienne 
now formal ly shi fted i ts po licy , fo llowing the elec tions , from 
1 In 19 79 the RPCR stated that it was compri sed of elements of the 
RPR ,  the RPC , the Mouvement Liberal Cal edonien (MLC) led by Jean 
Leques , the Jeunes se d ' Action et de Re flexion Caledonienne ( JARM) , 
Jeunes Canaques Fran�ais ( JC) , Parti Republi cain (PR) and the 
AICLF ( Les Nouvel les Caledoniennes 7 March 1979)  . 
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autonomie interne to full Independence . This was a move o f  very 
great s igni fi can ce .  Although it had already los t s ome European as 
we l l  as Melanesian s upport the UC sti l l  encompas sed both communi ties . 
And i t  was s ti l l  one of the bi ggest parties . I ts s upport for 
Independence meant that s uch a goal w as no longer the preserve only 
of radi cal Me lanes ian parties , but a serious option con fronting New 
Caledonia and France . 
The s ituation brought incre ased polari zation and new bitte rnes s  
to the community .  The September e le ctions h a d  produced some 
unpleas ant nocturnal clashes as the adhe rents of the various parties 
sought to plas ter Noumea with the i r  posters and des troy those of 
the i r  opponents . On a very much smaller and less lethal s cale , 
developments in New Caledoni a continued to provide echoes o f  the 
terrible divis ions whi ch had bese t  other F rench colonies . Given 
that the indi genous community could not forever be isolated from 
the worldwide currents of nationalism it w as inevi table that they 
would re j e ct their underprivi leged colonial status and reas sert 
their racial i dentity and thei r c laim to self- determination . But 
already hal f the French community , un like the settlers of British 
colonies , had been looking to c lose r  i ntegration with the Metropole 
i . e .  departmentalization - rather than responsible self-government ;  
and now many of the remainder ,  who had been wil ling to contemplate 
autonomi e interne , were frigh tened by the prospect of Independance 
Kanak - an Independence presumably dominated by the Me lanes i ans . 
Thi s  is despite the fact that their numbers ( 35 pe r cent of the 
population ) and the i r  near-monopoly o f  managerial skil ls would give 
them effective control of the emergent s tate for many years . 
At bottom , s ettler apprehension is born of hi ghly ethnocentric -
even racis t  - attitudes towards Me l anesians . The French reputation 
for racial to lerance and mixing is rather let down in New Caledoni a .  
I n  the southwes t Paci fi c this i s  not pe culi ar to the French , however ;  
European peoples almost invari·ab ly , i n  thei r  raci al s tereotyping , 
pre fer Po lynesians to Me lanes i ans . These attitudes s tem from s uch 
bas i c  matters as European conceptions of phys i cal be auty , sensuali ty 
and/or avai lability of women , the presence or absence o f  ranking 
structures to whi ch Europeans can re l ate , and the ' open ' or '· close d '  
nature of the society . Moreover the re are histori cal reasons : 
Me lanesians in New Caledoni a put up a spi ri ted res is tance to European 
encroachment and then were bundled onto reserves and not encouraged 
to engage with and ass imi late to the full range of European culture . 
There they naturally held to their social structures and tradi tional 
be lief sys tem ( despi te the admixture o f  Chri s ti anity ) . Some became 
demorali zed and al coho li c .  The c losest parallel i n  the Paci fi c i s  
t o  the Aus tralian Abori gines , and the extremely negative attitudes 
whi te Aus trali ans have formed about them. 
Whatever the reasons there has been little re al mixing in New 
Caledoni a .  Interrac ial marri ages occur but are relative ly few ( in 
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comparison with , s ay ,  French Polynes i a  or New Zealand) . The mixed­
race community is too smal l  to b ridge the two cultures . 
The Admini s tration , having l ong denie d  Mel anes ians entry to the 
s tate s choo ls , has in the last fi fteen years greatly increased i ts e f forts 
to b ring e ducation to the Me lanesians . There are beauti ful s tate 
s chools in e ve ry local centre and a range of s e condary and terti ary 
e ducational institutions . But although Me lanes i ans are responding 
s trongly and the lycees now have cons i de rable numbers of Me lanesian 
s tudents , the response is proportionate ly low compare d  to that of 
other ethni c groups . The reasons are large ly hi s toric and c ultural 
( i t  is hardly s urprising that the Me lanes i ans are rel uctant to come 
forward now to eage r ly embrace a complete ly Gal li c  e ducation system) 
b ut e xplanations by New Caledonian French tend o ften to be in racis t  
terms . Despi te the lib e ral , inde e d  generous , atti tude of some recent 
s ettlers and o ffi ci als , old settler attitudes inevi tably die hard . 
The Mel anes i ans have long been despi s e d ,  i gnore d  or at bes t patro-
nized by many settlers , and s ti l l are . About 85 pe r cent of the 
Europeans live in Noumea and nei ghbo uring townships , and ( like the 
s ettle rs of Algiers and O ran) s carce ly know the indigenous inhabitants . 
The i r  li fes tyle and thei r  as soci ations are almos t total ly s eparate 
from the Me lanesians , whom they meet only as h.i red labour (inc l uding 
dome s t i c  he lp) , or ( more recently) formally in c l as s  in the s chools . 
Inevitably the i r  contempt is incre as e d  by the exce s s i ve drinking of 
some Melanes i ans , and thei r apprehension by the increasing the fts of 
cattle and other prope rty , and the s tone throwing and drunken inte r­
ceptions of European motori s ts at nigh t  near Me lanes i an settlements , 
which have accompanied the renewed Me lanesian s e l f-as s ertion . So 
although Melanesi ans are not gen e rally aggres s i ve , and thus far seem 
incapab le o f  the organi zed ruth lessness o f  the A l ge ri ans or the Viet­
namese , the sett lers ' reaction tends in part towards the purchase of 
arms and s upport for potent i al ly mi li tant organizations s uch as the 
Comit�s d ' Action Civique , and Comi tes d ' Action Contre l ' Independance , 
which s eek to o rganize s e ttlers in a variety of tactics , including 
shows of s t rength , to de fend the s e ttler posi tions and s ti ffen the 
Administration agains t Independantiste demands . 
Whi le French offi cials make l i gh t  of the di vis i ons or the 
dangers , the pos s ibi lity of s ome sort of phys i cal clash is wide ly 
talked about in forma l ly .  Gi ven the his tory o f  the use o f  armed force 
in New Cale donian po litics ( notab ly in the Petaini s t  ve rs us Gaullist 
con frontation of 1940 and in 19 5 8  and 196 3 ) , and given the mi l i tancy 
both of PALIKA rhetoric and some of the settle r  s tatements , it is 
not s urprising that the re are fears of civi l  conflict of s ome kind , 
probably small- s cale and locali zed b ut neve rthe less vi cious and 
deeply damaging . Inde e d  the authorities would be fool ish to i gnore 
the dange rs; and they have not . In 19 7 7  the exis ting gendarmes and 
civi l  po lice were rein force d by a company of gardes mobi les , and to 
the in fantry and marines have been added a company of paratroops . 
A s uccession o f  vis i ting warships col laborate in the rehears al of 
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amphibious and heli copter-borne operations on the coast and in the 
bush . l 
The question then arises , as in previous colonies subj ect to 
nationalis t movements , as to how the forces of the state are b rought 
to bear in civi l  politi cs . Statements by senior French mini ste rs in 
the early 19 70s suggested that New Caledoni a ,  with i ts nickel and 
i ts re lationship to the Tahiti nuclear tes ting programme , was 
essential to France and that the problems of public orde r that could 
be created by a population of 120 , 000 were trivi al ( see , fo r examp le ,  
statement by the former prime mini s te r ,  Pierre Messme r ,  cited in 
Sim-Barr 19 77 : 29 ) . Ce rtainly demons trations by the Foulards Rouges 
and the pro- Independence parties (whi ch sometimes use language 
deemed sedi tious and conducive to vio lence , sometimes resort to 
s tone throwing , and at other times are peace ful and non-violent ) 
have been vigorously broken up by the po li ce , and some of the 
leadership gao led. The tensions aris ing from this si tuation con­
tributed in 19 75 to the shooting by a ne rvous poli cemen of Richard 
Kamouda in Noumea during the dispe rs al of a rowdy (but not 
politi cally organi zed) group of young Me lanesians . Not only because 
of the shooting but because of the vi rtual exoneration of the 
policeman , Kamouda became , for the Independantis tes , the fi rs t 
martyr o f  the modern nationalist movement . 
The land ques tion also produced physi cal confrontation of a 
kind. In 19 7 7  young PALIKA and UPM activists , tired of the 
encroachments by settlers and their cattle and tired of the inces s ant 
talk o f  recovering t radi tional land but the absence of swi ft results , 
launched a campaign out in the rural valleys to reoccupy land. There 
were no k i l lings or woundings but young Me lanes ians an d broussards 
were both armed with hunting ri fles and shotguns and each s ide 
al leged that the other fi re d  shots - to dis courage settlers on the 
one hand or to deter Me lanesians on the othe r .  The PALIKA campaign 
was checked by the gendarmerie and gardes mobiles in the vi cinity 
of Balade , Touho , Poindimie , Ponerihouen and Thio . 
In the countryside the forces of law and order have , with some 
ski l l , maintained a formal peace and generally avoided excessive use 
of force . But the de licacy of the s i tuation , and the factors which 
give rise to that , we re revealed in an incident at N ' Goye on the eas t 
coas t in December 19 7 8 .  Tw o  years previously a new ni ckel mine had 
1 It is di ffi cult to s ay exactly how many mi litary and parami litary 
pe rsonnel are in New Caledoni a .  The 19 76 census figures give 
2 , 500 persons in the armed forces and police togethe r .  Uno fficial 
non-partisan estimates in 19 79 place the number much highe r than 
that - normally in the orde r of 3 , 500 pos sibly ris ing to 5 , 000 
during manoeuvres or change-ove r of army uni ts . 
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been opened and its operations had begun to pollute the gardens and 
the lagoon use d  by an adj acent t ribe ( as we l l  as providing them work ) . 
Afte r a s eries o f  pro tests , in December 19 7 8  the Me lane s i ans 
struck and picketed the whar f to s top the loading of ore . Several 
days of negotiation fai led to move them and on 18 December 
gendarmes were sent to the scene . According to the repor t 
o f  the trial a leade r o f  the pi ckets then menaced an o fficer wi th 
a bush kni fe and the o f fi ce r  leve l le d  his pi s tol at the man whi le 
the gendarmes removed the weapon . At that point Me lanesians 
posi tioned in two groups to the s i de and rear of the gendarmes 
opened fi re . Four gendarmes we re wounded by ball and bi rd-shot , 
others were hit by s tones . The gendarmes apparent ly replied with 
tear gas and pe rhaps with shots in the ai r and regained control 
(Les Nouvel les Caledoniennes 19 December 19 7 8 , 29 December 19 7 8 ) . 
In sum ,  s everal rura l areas o f  the Grande Terre mani fes t  a 
certain tensi on and are at leas t equally s us ceptib le to sporadi c 
violence as is Noumea where demons tration and counte r-demons tration 
could , i f  not intelligently controlle d ,  also ge t out of hand.  
PROPOSALS FOR SYSTEMATIC LAND REFORM 
From time to time metropoli tan o ffi cials ( s uch as Inspe cto r 
Sorin in 19 5 5 )  and s cholars as we l l  as re formist politi cians in New 
Caledonia had condemned the mal distribution of land and urged 
sys tematic and radi cal re form . But li ttle had been done during 
decades of conse rvative po li ti cs othe r than to grant locations and 
concessions of domaine land to Me lanesians , vi rtually for the firs t 
time , in an e ffort to create a Me lanes i an small�olding class . When 
the issue was approached again in the mi d 19 70s , in the context o f  
a dri ve t o  s timulate agri culture , the Kanak res urgence and i ts 
ass oci ated poli ti cal arms we re we l l  es tab li shed .  A ' Corruniss ion fo r 
Rural Economy ' in 19 76 , re flecting the s t rong settler di s like o f  
the reserves , again contemplated the i r  s ub division into individual 
and family ho ldings . Even though the Commiss i on s ugges ted that 
these might s ti l l  be inalienab le the Me lanes i an political leaders , 
and authori ties on the res e rves , we re overwhelmingly opposed - to 
the s urpri se and di s appointment o f  the o ffi cials and settlers . To 
make the ir own s ub divisions on rese rves (whi ch they frequently di d ,  
o ften wi th recogni tion o f  the primary ri ghts o f  the tradi tional 
proprietor clans ) was one thing ; a s ub divis ion di re cted by 
paternalistic o f fi ci a ls or the poli tical parties of their adve rs aries 
was qui te anothe r .  Thei r  oppos i tion was acknowledged by a vi si ting 
metropo litan o fficial , Inspector-General Jacqui e r  ( Dornoy 19 81 : 
chapte r 4) . 
Among the prominent Melanes i an opponents o f  the Commis s i on was 
Andre Gopea of the Union Progre s s i s te Me lanesi enne ( UPM) . I n  May 19 7 7  
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Gopea proposed land re torm , not b y  tackl ing the rese rves but by a 
sys temat i c  redistribution of both private and doma i n e lands that 
we re uncultivated ,  abandoned or ' ins uffi ciently exploited ' .  Thes e 
were to be allocate d e i ther as aggrandis ement of the res e rves or to 
indivi duals ( especially b ut not exc lus i ve ly Me lanes i ans) for 
exploi tation unde r new and more producti ve sys tems of agri culture . 
A new Commis sion Te rri toriale de Reorganisation Fonci�re , which 
included the cus tomary authorities from rese rves adjacent to the 
land from time to time under cons i de ration , was to s upe rvi se the 
proces s .  Proprietors we re to be gi ven reasonab le notice b ut i f  land 
was not then improved it was to be expropriated by the s tate unde r 
a ' ri gh t  of pre-emption' . Compens ation was to be pai d by the 
Terri tory , whi ch would have the power to dete rmine the pri ce of the 
land.  All exi s ting leases we re to be revi ewed by the new Commiss ion 
(AT , Proces - verbal 25 May 1977 : 29 f f) .  
The UPM motion emb raced both the so- called ' economi c ' and 
' psycho logi cal ' (or 'cus tomary') c laims and was flexib le as regards 
reallocation o f  the land . Howeve r ,  imme diate ly , and with Gopea ' s  
foreknowledge , M Lenormand , now back in politics , proposed a UC 
motion whi ch focus ed on the 'cus tomary ' claim : 
Conside ring the peop le despoi led o f  the i r  ances tral lands 
and welcomed by other tribes fol lowing the can tonnemen t ,  the 
Assembly demands that in the repurchase of lands priority be 
gi ven to the urgent prob lems of returning Me lanesian fami lies 
to the i r  ancestral land with respect fo r the s tatus o f  rese rves 
and the right to free choice o f  indivi duals and invi tes the 
Governing Counci l to tab le a dra ft law insti tuting the 
necess ary organizations and structures (AT , Proces - verbal 
25 May 197 7 : 32) .  
Lenormand s ai d  that for twenty years the U C  had been asking for the 
Territory the powers of pre-emption alre ady pos sessed by the Depart­
ments of France . Both motions we re re fe rre d to the Commi ss ion for 
Agri culture to s tudy . 
Soon afte rwards a number o f  cases arose wh ich indicated the 
serious obstacles to the e f fe ctive trans fe r of land under the 
exi s ting legal framework . A clas s i c  case concerned the property 
of the settler Mazuri e r  in the Houai lou val ley . There the tribe 
Nes s akouya contes te d  the boundary; the i r  exi s ting sett lement , 
moreove r , was flooded annually . Twenty ye ars be fore , in 19 5 8 , a 
local leade r had asked for the return of ancestral land for the 
group b ut nothing had been done and in 197 7  the group was again 
asking for the res toration of about 50 ha of the i r  tradi tional land . 
Maz uri er at firs t  would not s e l l  more than 11 ha for a pri ce o f  
CFP 7 mi llion , but eventually the Administration got a n  o f fe r o f  
38 ha fo r CFP 5 mi l lion . Even this was a pri ce much above the 
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average for rural land - perhaps five times a s  much - b ut the 
area was a tense one , Me l ane s i ans having encroached on Mazurie r ' s 
land and Mazuri e r  allegedly having fi re d  shots at them . With some 
reluctance , and fear of incre as ing the already high asking pri ces , 
the Assembly approved the expenditure at the pri ce demanded ,  but 
a sharp di f fe rence of opinion broke out as to whether the land 
should be allocated as aggrandisement o f  the rese rve ( the view of 
Lenormand and the UC ) or as indi vi dual lots ( the view of Roger 
Laroque and the RPCR) . The Me l anes i an e lder M Parawi- Reybas ( RPCR)  
was very criti cal o f  the control of res erved lands by certain power­
ful individuals in the tribal community , and the consequent 
frustration of young Me lanes i ans . In the end the Assembly agreed 
that the attribution would be l e ft for dis cus s ion and decision by 
the Services and the tribu (AT , Proces-verbal 7 December 19 7 7 : 
14- 24 ) . 
Meanwhi le other ' hot points ' had remained unresolve d  because 
of the hi gh demands by settlers . At Boulapari M C re ugnet had asked 
CFP 15 mi l lion for 700 ha and de c lined the Admini s tration o f fe r  of 
CFP 10 mi l lion . At Pouebo M Mainguet had proposed a pri ce of 
2 mi l lion for 40 ha and de c lined the Administration ' s  o ffer o f  CFP 
600 , 000 . At Thio M Bouye aske d  6 mi llion for 1 3  ha for which the 
Adminis tration o f fe re d  1 mi l lion . At Tiwaka near Poindimie 
M Soury-Lavergne asked 19 mi l lion for 5 14 ha (Administration o ffe r 
12 mi l lion ) . At Tie ti ( near Poindimie ) the Societe Civi le 
Pastorale Soury-Lavergne asked 2 . 5  mi l lion for 1 3  ha (Adminis tra­
tion price 1 . 3 mi l lion ) . At Paita the Societe des Etab li s sements 
Ballande asked 7 . 9 . mi llion for 4 1 8  ha (Adminis tration o ffer 5 . 5  
mi llion ) (AT , Proces-verbal 1 Augus t 19 7 8 : 15- 20 ) . 
In all of these cases the purchases were frus trated and in 
some areas , especi ally on the eas t  coas t ,  young Me lane s i ans 
continued the i r  campaigns o f  encroachment on the l and and harrass­
ment of settle rs in frustration at the years o f  i naction as regards 
the key areas of val ley land.  Old arrangements between colons and 
Melanesian e lders began to b re ak down in a climate o f  covert 
violence and vi rulent hatred (see , for example , ' La Val lee D ' Amoa ' ,  
The land question , and alternative modes o f  res olving i t , was 
a maj or and bi tterly debated i s s ue in the e le ctions of 19 7 7 ,  sharply 
dividing the conse rvati ve settler parties and the p ro- Independence 
parties . 
In this context , in June 19 78 , the report of the Commission 
examining the UPM and UC motions (Report No . 81 ) was tab le d  in the 
Te rritori al As semb ly .  Given the nature o f  the Me lanesian demand 
and the tension on the land i tsel f ,  the report was not only con­
servati ve but provocative . The pre face adumbrated two princip les : 
fi rs t ,  the need to proceed with ' great prudence ' because o f  the 
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s ensitivity o:e the question to Ca,l,e,Qoni_a,ns. o;t; a,l.l ,ra,ces (meP,Iling 
especi al ly in thi s  c ase the Europeans } ;  s econdly , to give financial 
aid to the s cheme with a view to the improvement of the l and for 
commercial agri culture . Three types of operation were proposed : 
1 .  urgent redistribution and improvement o f  l and to the 
benefi t  of tribes where l and was contested among them 
and with s ettlers ( the relief of so-called ' hot points ' 
near reserves ) ; 
2 .  the s etting up o f  a small peasantry ( fami liale) ; 
3 .  the es tab lishment o f  modern forms o f  commercial 
agri culture . 
With reference to all of these , i ncludi ng the fi rs t , the report 
spoke of the aspi rations of young people , notably young Melanesi ans , 
to move outside the reserves and s et up modern small farms . The 
report leaned s trongly i n  favour of that aspiration and looked to 
the improvement o f  unexploited land within the reserves as well as 
outside them , and by the ' stranger ' c l ans located there during the 
cantonnement as wel l  as by ancestral claimants . The report pro­
pos ed the allocation of Territory funds in the order of CFP 4 3  
mi l lion for the repurchase o f  l and whi ch would be redis tributed with 
improvement conditions and some payments (ti tres onereux , not 
ti tres gratui ts ) (AT ,  Proces-verbal 2 1  June 1978 : l f f ) . 
In ess ence the policy was a revi talization o f  the exi s ti ng 
progranune of granting locations and concessions not for the 
restoration of customary 'clanique' c laims , b ut for the creation of 
Melanes ian smal l farmers . In urging the development o f  new peasant 
communities adj acent to res erves and near exi s ti ng vi l lages within 
res erves the report again s uggested an attack on the s tructure of 
the reserves themselves . 
Yet Report No . 81 embraced the recommendations of a speci al 
commiss ioner from Paris , M Garri gou , an d  at las t  proposed that the 
state ( the French government and legi s l ature) be reques ted to grant 
the Territory new powers , adapted from the French Code Rural , of a 
right of pre- emption , a right of expropri ation of uncultivated land , 
and the statut du fermage - a sys tem of renting or share- cropping 
of ancient use in France and apparently favoured by the UC to permit 
land-short Melanesi ans , and settlers , to cultivate the land of 
Melanes i an c lans , with recogni tion o f  the latter ' s  proprietorship . 
Local measures were to include a tax on unexp loited land . To 
consolidate the pos i tion of the new Melanesi an peas ants agai ns t the 
claims o f  tradi tional ki n ,  a new succes s ion law was proposed to 
permit Melanes i ans , s ti l l  personally under the statut parti culier 
but acquiri ng farms outside the reserves under the droi t commun, 
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to follow the French rules o f  s ucces.s ion rather than cus tomary 
s uccess ion . ! 
Minutes of the debate in the Agri culture Commi s si on show that 
the report was un like ly to s atis fy the re a l  protagoni s ts , the 
Me lanes ian pol i ti cal le aders and the settlers . Sett ler members 
like M De Ve l le longue of the Hi enghene val ley had wanted no speci al 
regard for the ' politi cal ' aspect and no special favour for any 
race ( i . e .  Me lane s i ans ) in l and al location . M Morlet ( Union 
oemocrati que Caledoni enne ) had grave doubts about the right of pre­
emption and e xpropri ation . M Tj ibaou (Union Caledonienne ) on the 
other hand s ai d  that the pol i t i cal aspect o f  the prob lem was 
ines capab le and that firs t and foremos t the Me lanes i ans wanted 
space in which to practise their cus tomary li festyle . At the heart 
of Me lanesian society the presence o f  ' s tranger ' clans was an 
obs tacle to e f fective functioning of the society . He looked to a 
much larger plan o f  land redi s tribution than appeared to be 
envis aged in the report . The i s s ue of cre dit was also debate d ,  
Tjibaou objecting that whi l e  i t  was readi ly avai l ab le for develop­
ments outs ide res erves it was not re adi ly grante d for deve lopments 
within them . 
In the As semb ly its e l f  the report was inune di ate ly denounced 
by UC , PALIKA and FULK speakers as the charter of a new coloni za­
tion - a col on i s a t i on noi re on the l and of others , denying the 
Me lanes i ans the ri ght to allocate the land in terms of their own 
cus tom and forcing them , by the improvement condi tions , the condi­
tions on credi t , the emphas is on titles under conunon law ,  and the 
propos ed s ucces sion law , into Europeanization . M Machoro ( UC )  
re ci ted the his tori cal spoliation o f  Me l anes i an land and demanded 
that it mus t be returne d ,  at the state ' s  expens e , to the ori ginal 
clans wi thout intermedi ary . Priori ty should be gi ven to the 
re s ti tution o f  tradi tional land to those c lans l i ving on res erves 
as ' s trangers ' .  Europe ans shoul d not inter fere in the determination 
o f  thi s pure ly Me lanes ian matter . M Burck ( UC )  feared the creation 
of smal lho ldings , as in the time of Governor Fe i l le t , wh i ch could 
agai n fail and fa ll into the han ds o f  big accumulators . M Lenormand 
also do ubted the worth of creating smal lho ldings ( very marginal for 
European farmers ) an d s tres s ed the value of tradi tional agri culture 
as a means of ass uring an amp le sub s i s tence and genuine independence 
and dignity which was not avai lab le to pe as ants on the margins o f  
the capi ta list economy . Th is indi cated how far the le aders o f  the 
UC had shi fted from their ear lier as s i mi l ationi s t  s tatements , whi ch 
had spoken of a s ubdivis ion of re serves into indivi dua l and fami ly 
ho l di ngs ( Saussol 19 79 : 3 7 1 ) . 
This had been sugges ted by M Gas ton Morlet ( among others ) during 
the deba tes of the Corruniss ion for Rural Economy in 19 76 ( Dornoy 
1 9 8 1 : Ch apte r 4 ) . 
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PALrI<A speakers (M Gohoup l cri ticized the Administra ti on fo r 
i ts ' co l laboration wi th the local haute bourgeoisie and certain 
local pol i ti cal parties , notably the intervention of the colonial 
forces of order in the face o f  actions to re cover lands s tolen 
from certai n  tribes ' .  He recalle d  the PALIKA pol i cy of ' the total 
and uncondi tional recovery of the l ands ' ,  in accord with i de as o f  
the 19 75 fes tival ' Me lane s i a  2000 ' and the demands o f  the Foulards 
Rouges of 1969 for the recogniti on o f  the Kanak i dentity . Pro­
Adminis tration speakers denounced the UC and PALIKA for denying 
young Me l anesians , in the name of c us tom , access to property , 
respons ibi l i ty , wealth and a p lace in modern culture . The 
Independantistes replied that a bas i s  o f  cus tomary ownership did 
not pre clude entry , from a secure b as e , into the market economy , 
but they di d not exp lain how the adaptation would be made . 
At the conclusion o f  a three and a hal f hour debate the UC 
declined to vote on the report until the As s emb ly had recognized 
the Kanaks ' ' ri gh t  to live in thei r  own homes , on the i r  lands , 
fol lowing thei r  mode of li fe ,  taking into consi de ration the history 
that they have live d  and in con fo rmi ty with the statut particulier 
recognized by the Cons ti tution , fol lowing the princip le o f  the 
right to be di f fe rent ' .  They tab l e d  a motion o f  urgency on the 
point . Right and cen tre speakers denied that the pri ncip le was in 
question - the reserves would continue to be respecte d .  
Only the first motion o f  the report - conce rning urgent 
operations fo r the bene fi t of tribes on contes te d  lands - was 
accepted ,  the UC and Me lanes i an parties having quit the chambe r .  
Next day the As s emb ly di d allow the U C  to put a motion s tating , 
inter alia , that 
consi de ring the progranune o f operations envi s age d in report 
number 81 is enti rely oriented towards the attribution o f  
indivi dual lots and cons i de ring that the maintenance o f  
the reserves and the i r  aggrandi sement are the s ole means o f  
as s uring the s a fety o f  the Me l anes i an culture and the 
adaption of Me lanesian society to a modern rural e conomy 
[ the As semb ly should demand a re form] to the bene fit o f  the 
Me lanes i an collectivi ties whi ch permi ts the aggrandisement 
of res e rves and guarantees to the Kanaks the free choi ce 
of s tatus of property (AT , Proces-verbal 22 June 19 7 8 : 2 ) . 
A further two hours o f  debate dis closed the s ame polari zation . 
Speakers like Je an-Pierre Ai fa , the former UC member and now chair­
man of the Agri culture Commis s ion of the Assembly , angri ly denounced 
the motion as denying indi vi dual p roperty to Me lanesians - already 
we l l  advanced with urban b lockho l de rs in new Noume a suburbs and 
s uppo rted by the local tribal authori ties in re cent rural repurchases 
s uch as the Mazurier estate . The UC and PALIKA spe akers argued that 
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they merely wished to co�rect the bias o f  Report No . 81 and to 
hold out the prospect of some form of development other than the 
wes tern capi talist one . The UC motion , however ,  was los t by 17 to 
1 3 ,  right and centre parties· voting agains t the Independence 
parties . 
The unfortunate res ult of Report No . 81 and the extended 
debate on i t ,  was to polari ze and politi cize views on the land 
question even more strongly than be fore , j us t  at a time when 
economi c ci rcumstances and conside rable i rri tation in the Admini­
s tration with the colons ' high asking prices might have enab led 
some agreement to be reached , at leas t on the j udi cial means of 
recovering the land. By coming out so strongly on the ques tion of 
the modes by which the land should be redistributed ,  Report No . 81 
excited a contrary reaction from the main Melanesian parties at a 
cri ti cal time . Underlying the whole debate about agri cultural 
effi ciency and modes of s uccession was the settlers ' reali zation 
that the res erves , and Me lanes i an clan rights , we re the foundation 
and springboard of the whole Me lanesian ' politi cal ' claim,  whereas 
individual title put all races on equal footing . 
Meanwhile the nationalists were also bringing press ure to bear 
on the land i tsel f .  The agreement the Administration believed it 
had reached with the hierarchy of appointed chiefs and Consei l des 
Anciens regarding the Mazurier property soon broke down , the 
supporters of the ' cus tomary ' c laim blocking those Melanesians who 
were with the Adminis tration in thinking · that the land should be 
available for Melanesians from all adj acent clans who had a need , 
especially the young men . In 19 80 , three years after the acquisi­
tion , the land remains effectively an extens ion o f  the rese rve with 
a few s cattered culti vations . 
The s ame is true for othe r ' hot points ' in Amoa , Tiwaka and 
Neaoua valleys , with the added compli cation that old tradi tional 
rivalries between ' customary ' c laimants have been revived . The 
surveyors have been able to complete li ttle work on the east coas t .  
In the Territori al Ass embly right and centre speakers have in 
consequence become reluctant to vote funds to buy land at specu­
lative pri ces only to produce contention on the groun d .  
THE DIJOUD PLAN 
It was th is bunch of nettles that the new secretary of s tate 
for Overseas Departments and Territories ,  Paul Di j oud , tried to 
grasp in the second hal f of 19 7 8 .  His statements in Noumea , that 
the land re form would be treated as a matter of fi rs t priority and 
the recorranendation that the Te rritory shoul d indeed ass ume the 
powers of preemption and expropriation , caused great concern among 
some sections of settlers . So too di d M Di j oud ' s  tour of reserves 
later that year , when he invi ted the chiefs to tell him frankly 
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what lands they wanted i n  addition and to lodge claims with the 
Administration . However , the offi cial policy was clari fied in a 
press conference by the then high conunissioner , M Eriau , on 3 1  
October 19 78 (France Australe 3 1  October 19 7 8 ) . M Eriau recited 
the principal s tatistics of land-holding at that point : 950 , 00 0  
ha o f  domaine land (mostly mountainous ) ;  3 7 2 , 000 " ha o f  reserve 
autochtone , 16 3 , 000 ha of it on the Grande Terre ; 380 , 00 0  ha o f  
proprietes privees , all on the Grande Terre . I n  Eriau ' s  term o f  
five years a s  high commissioner 5 , 50 0  ha h a d  been added t o  the 
reserves ( 800 ha of it having come from former private properties , 
the rest from domaine land) ; another 5 , 6 30 ha had passed to 
Melanesians outside the reserves as loca tions or concessions . 
Selective quoting of s tatis tics is a normal part of politics . 
M Eriau did not mention that about 100 , 00 0  ha of locations 
( leases ) and 40 , 000 ha of concessions provisoires were held by 
non Melanes ians , in addition to the 380 , 000 ha in proprietorship . 
The UC version of land dis tribution is shown in Table 5 .  
Table 5 
Distribution of land,  19 80 (UC figures ) 
ha 
( a )  Domaine land 
Territory 9 4 1 , 7 3 2  
State 9 ,  372 
Locations domaniales 150 , 606 
1 , 10 1 ,  7 10 
( b )  Proprietes privees 386 , 20 0  
( except towns , and 
recreation reserves ) 
Concessions provisoires 5 7 , 596* 
4 4 3 , 795 
( c )  Reserves autochtones 
The Is lands 209 , 000 
The Grande Terre 16 7 , 659 
3 76 , 659 
* Perhaps 10 , 000 ha of this is held by Melanesians . It is 
di fficult to divide the locations and concessions according to 
race .  Statistics avai lable to me di d not do s o .  
Source : L 'Avenir Caledonien 1 5  May 1980 
34 
About 100 , 000 o f  the 150 , 00 0  ha o f  locations were es timated 
to be held by whites , plus a further 1 10 , 99 8  ha of mining 
concessions from domaine land . Together with the 4 4 3 , 79 5  ha of 
proprietes privees and concessions provisoires this makes a total 
o f  j us t  u:nder 655 , 000 ha held by ' 2 , 700 s ettlers and 2 0  miners ' ,  
whereas two thirds o f  the Melanes i an ( 40 , 00 0  out o f  6 0 , 00 0 )  draw 
their living from agriculture . Thi s  i s  b roadly correct , indeed 
o fficial French statistics give only 9 70 settlers directly living 
on farms as thei r principal source of li fe and income , whi le about 
2 4 , 000 Melanes i ans live on the 16 7 , 00 0  ha of the Grande Terre 
( INSEE 19 76 : 4 1 ) . 
In his October 19 7 8  statement M Eriau noted that in respons e  
t o  M Di j oud ' s reques t Melanesians h a d  registered formal demands 
with the chefs de subdi vision ( the Territory equivalent o f  s ub­
prefects ) for a further 120 , 00 0  ha . But some political leaders 
were by now demanding the return of all land to the traditional 
claimant c lans . Eriau s ub di vi ded the l and c laims . There were , 
he s ai d ,  those ' which have a political motive in the s ense that 
New Caledonia ought to return to the Melanesi ans because it was 
their ances tral territory • • • .  S uch is the point of view o f  
certain extremi s ts ' .  I n  view o f  the presence o f  the 40 per cent 
of Europeans and 20 per cent of other minori ties in the Territory 
this c laim was not realistic and could not be s atis fied . Then 
there were c laims ' claniques ' .  Some were reasonable ; he under­
stood well that Melanesi ans would want back the vil lage s i tes 
from which they had been dispossessed between 1 8 7 8  and 19 1 7 . The 
third category of claims was ' economi c ' , where the tribus were 
closely confined . It was ess ential to s atis fy thes e . 
Referring to the Melanes i an c laim to the large uncultivated 
estates of Europeans , he s aid the belief in the acquis i tion o f  
space a s  the way t o  a better l i festyle w a s  i ll usory . Wh a t  was 
much more important was to improve the l and . Nor would the matter 
be resolved qui ckly . It would take five or ten years and require 
c lose collab oration between the s tate and Territory , especially 
for finance . There was no reason for the Europeans to pani c .  He 
congratulated the minis ter for approaching the matter frankly . 
By February 19 79 Di j oud ' s  land policy had been embedded in a 
comprehens ive ' plan for long-term social and economic development ' .  
The collapse o f  the ni ckel boom had produced unemployment and 
weakened inves tment confidence . The rise of Melanes i an nationalism 
in the region and in New Caledonia had increased the s ense o f  
doubt and dis i llusion among the s ettlers . Above all they wanted 
massive assurance from the s tate that France meant to s tay , and 
as sist the Territory . But M Di j oud had to reckon with Melanes i an 
demands as wel l . He sought to tackle the intensi fying divisions 
in New Caledonia by an integrated prograrrrrne of reform desi gned at 
once to repair the b lighted economi c fortunes of New Caledonia and 
to outbid and isolate the Independantistes . 
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In addition to the long-term plan , which requi red much 
detai led preparation and deve lopment of infrastructure be fore i ts 
e f fects could be felt , Di j oud offered a short-term plan to 
immediately boost the economy . This involved additional s tate 
funding of about $Al00 mi l lion over two years ; in return the 
Territory was expecte d  s ubs tantially to increase local revenue , 
through the imposition of local income tax , for example . The 
divisions and vested interests in Territory politics frus trated 
this attempt . In September 19 7 8  M Andre Cai llard , then leader 
of the conservative coalition in the Governing Counci l ,  introduced 
a very minimal income tax proposal which was fie rcely attacked by 
the UC for the privileges it afforded to the wealthy - no taxes 
on plus-values ( secondary residences etc� or on the export o f  
capital , and a n  actual reduction o f  taxation o n  properties of 
over 15 , 000 ha.  The UC also wanted a reforme miniere , ' be cause 
we believe that the Te rritory , be fore creating an income tax , 
ought to be mas ter of i ts patrimony and of all i ts revenues • ( AT ,  
Proces-verbal 2 1  June 19 78 : 4 3 ) . This i s  a re ference t o  the so­
called ' Terri tori alizat ion ' of the mining industry . 
In the vote on the Cail lard measure the centre parties , also 
wanting a much lower tax threshold than that propose d ,  abs tained 
and the Cai llard proposals were de feated.  Late r ,  angered by a 
speech from the RPCR leader , Jacques La fleur , in favour of moving 
to the s tatus of Overseas Department of France , some of the 
centrists split from the coalition and a new Governing Council 
was e le cted under Lenorman d ,  marking a ' return to o f fi ce ' by the 
UC after a decade in opposi tion . But Lenormand had no more 
success with financial re form than Cai llard , the middle parties 
voting against his too radical propos als . These events indicate d 
the importance of the centre groups . 
Me anwhi le , the b road lines of the long-term plan had been 
sketched by Di j oud himse l f . Detai ls of the programme - 1 10 octavo 
pages under twenty-three chapter heads in the pub lished version1 -
were worked out by a team of French o f fi ci als consulting with 
Territory o fficials and po litical leaders , including the leader 
of the UC . Some last minute changes were made in the commis sions 
of the Territorial As sembly befo re the p lan was debated in full 
session on 2 1  February 19 79 , with the Lenormand group still 
occupying the maj ority of non-o f fi cial pos ts in the Governing 
Counci l .  
In many ways the plan di d n o  more than draw together pro­
posals long talked about by various French presidents and 
ministers and by the various Territory parties . I t proposed a 
revitali zation and long overdue divers i fi cation of the economy . 
This involved a new drive on ni cke l exports , and pos s ib ly the 
1 ' Un plan de developpement economique et social a long terme 
pour la Nouve lle-Caledonie ' ,  Noumea 19 79 . 
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opening o f  a s econd smelter , but also a renewed development o f  
agriculture , the development o f  lagoon and ocean fishing , and the 
promotion of tourism. New infrastructure of roads and transport , 
scienti fi c research , education , health , water s torage and reticu­
lation , · and agricultural extensi on were all promis ed .  Another 
chapter dealt with the i ncreas e of population to promote and 
s us tain an enlarged economy . Others dealt with the enrichment 
of rural li fe and with s upport for the cultural traditions o f  
each ethni c group - not only Melanes i ans b ut also Europeans , 
Vietnamese ,  Indonesi ans and Polynesi ans . Melanesi an culture , 
however , was to be especially recognized and promoted through an 
Institute of Melanesi an Studies , and the chapters on Education 
referred to the development o f  capabi li ty to teach at leas t four 
vernacular languages , firs t  in the s econdary then in the primary 
s chools . Chapter XV ,  entitled ' National Solidarity ' dis cus s ed 
the direct fi nancing o f  new development by France - at the level 
of CFP 1 30 bi llion ( about $Al , 500 mi l lion) over ten years . 
Chapter XVI referred to reorgani zation o f  local finance and the 
need to rais e  more local revenue . The last chapter dealt with 
land , which was explicitly recognized as the most contentious 
problem and the key to s uc ces s  or fai lure of the whole design.  
It sketched a number o f  legal and financial arrangements 
( incl uding the new powers of pre-emption and expropriation for 
the Territory ) by which land could be restored to Melanes i an 
ownership . The p lan was new in that , i ns tead o f  trying to 
minimize the difficulti es and dis advantages of the Melanes i ans , 
it openly recognized their histori c and continued grievances . 
The solution was s ai d  to be the creation of a society more equa l , 
more j ust ,  more fraterna l , b ut s t i l l  certainly French . The plan 
concluded with the rhetorical words : ' Live in France i n  New 
Caledoni a ' . 
Before introducing the plan in the Ass emb ly M Di j oud knew 
he h ad general s upport from the centre and right b ut had los t  
that o f  the UC . Thi s  was because he mis calc ulated by publicly 
asking the UC not to seek Independence for the ten years of the 
plan ' s operation . Such an undertaking was imposs ible for them 
and , in the light of Dij oud ' s  ulterior purposes and his condemna­
tion o f  the UC for not accedi ng to his strategy , they felt 
ob liged to criticize the whole bas i s  o f  the plan , despite i ts 
i nc lusion of many features sought by the UC i tsel f .  
I n  his opening speech Di j oud sought to present the plan most 
favourably to Melanes i ans and to deal with some of the latent 
contradictions in i t .  From the plan , he s ai d ,  Melanesi ans would 
have , in addition to their formal rights as French citi zens , the 
reality of equali ty , and fraternity . They would fi l l  posts 
commens urately with their numbers . The modern economi c expecta­
tions of young Melanesi ans would be ful fi lled and at the s ame 
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time i n  a renewed respect for custom they would find ' the moral 
s tabi li ty of whi ch the communi ty h as need ' . Enlarged perspectives 
both of development ,  in the modern s ense ,  and cultural deepening 
lay along the same path : ' The will of the Government is to 
permit to the Melanes i ans , in thi s  lan d ,  to live happi ly as 
Melanes i ans , to live happi ly as Frenchmen ' .  The heart o f  the 
plan was the as suaging of ethnic di f ferences by the promotion o f  
the Melanes i ans . 
On the burning question of land he attempted to s teer a 
course between Melanes i an and s ettler demands , and included an 
attack on the extremis t  organizations o f  the right : 
The long-term plan states on what conditions the 
[Melanesi an ]  communities will be able , whether as 
communities or as indi vi duals , to recover a part o f  
their lost lan d .  Little by l ittle land reform wi l l  
be the basis o f  a compromis e  . • • between th e  Europeans 
who live in the countrysi de and who wil l  s tay there 
and whose rights we wi l l  defend , and the Melanesi an 
communities who live besi de them. In consi deration 
of this the many extremes of which each of us is well 
aware , wil l  be avoi ded . In the firs t  place there i s  
no sugges tion o f  ques tioning the colonist ' s  right to 
remai n  in the bush and to develop and improve his 
posi tion there . I say thi s  in all solenmity , to our 
compatriots who live in the bush . Di smiss with s corn 
the demagogues who s et you against your Secretary of 
State and the long-term p lan . Gentlemen , Counc i llors 
of the Territory , I say to you and wish you to repeat 
it to your compatriots in the bush , the truth does 
not lie with some committee or other in the bush which 
has gathered together a group of nostalgi c reactionaries . 
The truth is to be found with those who propose a wise 
compromis e  and sound progress (AT , Proces-verbal 
2 1  February 19 79 : 14 ) . 
A reinvigorated agriculture - emphasizing cof fee rather than 
cattle - was an es sential concomitant to the land reform because 
c loser s ettlement would enable the needs of s ettlers and 
Melanesi ans to be reconciled. 
M Di j oud coupled the plan with a renewed assertion of French 
authority . For the compromis e  proposals in the plan to succeed 
the government had to keep the radi cally opposed groups in the 
Territory under rei n .  Hence there was n o  s ugges tion o f  devolution 
of new powers to the Territoria l  pol i ti cal insti tutions . On the 
contrary , Di j oud stated , whi le New Caledoni a  remains French ' it 
is the Government of France who wi l l  command ' . The p lan was the 
wi l l  of France and France asked , ' And now , wi l l  you go with me? ' . 
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Di j oud rei terated that rhetori cal appeal parti cularly to the 
Melanesians , and to the UC . He urged them to allow thems elves 
time to test his seriousness of purpose and his plan as a genuine 
programme to relieve them of humi liation and despai r .  He argued 
that commitment to the plan did not involve a total repudiation 
of Independence - merely that people should forego that goal for 
ten years and work active ly with France for the reforms . Yet he 
also spoke o f  Independence as a ' vain hope • • .  becaus e  who could 
believe that in this tormented and di ffi cult Territory , 
Independence could be pos sible without awful confli ct? Who could 
be unaware that it is France who maintains here the civi l peace? 
Who could be unaware that only France could support real reforms 
both by her wi l l  and by her means ? '  ( ibi d . : 15 ) . 
Among the many notab le features of Di j oud ' s  approach are 
that he is the fi rs t  F rench minis ter ever to openly acknowledge 
that the posi tion of many Melanes i ans is one of humi liation and 
despai r .  That , now s ai d ,  cannot e as i ly b e  put asi de o r  glos sed 
over wi th a smooth coat o f  sele cted s tatistics . For that frank­
ness Di j oud deserves credi t ,  as he does for the comprehens iveness 
of the plan , for all its paternalism. 
Predictab ly , s uccessive speakers from the RPCR applauded 
the plan as a long-awai ted de live rance . They emphasized the 
economic aspects and the need for s tabi li ty to revive inves tment 
confidence , and they probed for undertakings on the exi s ting 
budget de fi ci t .  But some were clearly unhappy about the way 
Dij oud had made so much of Me lanesian problems , and about the 
extent to which his compromi se leaned towards the Me lanesians . 
M Mouren s ai d  that the RPCR acknowledged the need to increase 
Melanesian land holdings where ' ob j ective inquiry showed i t  to 
be necessary ' but demanded that it be trans fe rred as individual 
holdings , not augmentation of res erves where work and development 
were ' made impotent by a feudal system ' . Land should be open to 
all Caledonians , condi tional on us e ,  not on ethnicity (ibi d . : 2 3-
2 4 ) . M Mouren ' s  real purpose was to hold at bay the Me lanesian ' s  
special c laims , which led logically to handing back all land and 
denying the place of other races . 
Nevertheless Mouren went to the core of the problem o f  
mul ti-racial societies in rei terating the traditional French 
pclicy in New Caledonia .  To grant equal access to land and other 
resources for all races would , he argue d ,  create a society more 
j us t ,  united and fraternal than a ' s imple j uxtapos i tion o f  
parallel societies living each according t o  i ts own destiny on 
di fferent paths ' .  He conceived of all ethni c groups mi xing and 
drawing together as the Territory drew closer to France . Whi le 
he did not formally speak of ' departmentalization ' of New 
Caledonia , he said : ' We wish that New Caledonia be France and 
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we indeed insist that i t  not only be a window of France on the 
Pacific b ut an integral part of eternal F rance ' .  Mouren ' s  i deal 
involved the s ubmergence of ethnic di f fe rence in the culture of 
F rance . 
Dij oud h ims e l f  found Mouren ' s  emphases unacceptable and 
intervened to s tate that the long-term plan was not a document 
to be interpreted by each according to his tastes . Rather than 
have it open to individual exegesis he would wi thdraw i t .  All 
opinions had been taken and what counted was the plain meaning 
of what was written in the plan . I f  approved in the Territorial 
Ass embly i t  would have the s tatus o f  a contract ( ibid . : 2 8-29 ) . 
M Dec lercq , a French sociali s t  o f  s ome ten years res i dence 
in New Caledonia ,  opened the attack for the UC . There was much , 
he s ai d ,  that the UC approved in the plan - the restructuring of 
the economy , the locali zat ion o f  the teaching servi ce , the plans 
for teaching the vernacular , the Mel anesian Cultural Inst itute . 
But the UC had the deepes t  poss ib le reservations about other 
aspects , notably the s e ct ion on opening the Territory to the 
outside world and expanding the population . The UC had long been 
aware of the poli tical and electoral purposes o f  that . The pros­
pect that by the year 2000 the Me lanesians could find themselves 
only 30 per cent of the population was gravely disturbing . As 
for greater solidarity with France , Declercq said that the 
Terri tory already had a s upers tructure of bureaucracy too heavy 
and too costly fo� i ts true resources . And the obj ectives of 
France did not correspond to the Territory ' s  resources precisely 
becaus e  they were de fined from outs i de ,  according to external 
norms . Speakers on the ri gh t  had already revealed the exi s ting 
budgetary de fici t ,  dis c losing the existing disequi libri um .  The 
danger o f  the plan was that i t  would entrench an even more funda­
mental ins tability and permanent dependence on France . The plan 
implicitly , i f  not explicitly , inci ted and s upported departmenta­
lization . And the embrace of France was not made attractive by 
the way the state hab itually used i ts power - as evidenced by the 
control of radio and te levis ion , the outdated legal code , and the 
subordination o f  the New Caledonian monetary sys tem to that o f  
the Metropole .  I t  was not even clear that the CFP 130 billion 
for the plan was to be a free and gene rous gi ft or would in some 
fashion ultimately be paid by the Territory . The s ecretary of 
s tate should admit that behind the apparent gene ros i ty lay France' s  
real interes ts , strategic and e conomi c ,  and the inte rests o f  
financiers i n  the p ro fi tab i lity o f  mining . Final ly , s ai d  Declercq , 
to ask the UC to renounce for ten or fi fteen years i ts plans for 
Independence was asking the impos s ible . The party was responsible 
to i ts constituents . On Di j oud ' s  terms they could not s upport 
the plan (ibi d . : 24- 2 8 ) . 
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Several Melanesian leaders of the UC took up speci fi c  aspects . 
M E loi Machoro was high ly criti cal of the limi ted land reform 
proposed in the plan . He founded his critique on the proposition 
that : ' There exi s ts in this Territory one legi timate people : the 
Melanesians ' .  They had been deprived o f  their lands and thrown 
together into tiny reserves . The ob j ect of the UC was to res tore 
to the c lans their traditional land.  The o ffi cial reforme 
fonciere , however , had been deliberately confuse d  with a reforme 
agraire , as evidenced by the improvement conditions attached to 
land returned to Me lanesians and ,  above all , by the intrus ion of 
Wallis I s landers into lands demanded by Melanesians . Whi le 
Melanesi an needs must be satis fied fi rs t , M Machoro emphas i zed 
that , far from any des i re to drive them out , the UC wished to 
recognize the ri ghts o f  Europeans who had worked many years on 
the land and lived there . In general , he believed , the so lution 
to the problem of e thnic relations was not reliance on the inter­
vention of France ( as M Mouren had argued) but ' in dis cussion 
between white and b lack Caledonians who , cons cious of the 
importance of an understanding between di ffe rent ethnic groups in 
the country , would have muted their c laims in the proces s  o f  
mutual concessions ' (ibi d . : 3 1- 3 3 ) . 
M Gabriel Paita , a veteran UC membe r  o f  the Ass embly since 
195 8 , outlined how the loi cadre of 195 7-58 had been amended by 
the laws of Jaquinot , Bil lotte and the Statute of 19 76 and con­
demned ' the centralizing j acobin spi rit [ that ] has ruined us ' .  
' I f  thi s  is France ' ,  he asked ,  ' Where , in future , is New Caledonia ? '  
( ibid. : 35 ) . 
M Jean-Marie Tj ibaou , ex Catholic s eminarian , mayor o f  
Hienghene and active leade r o f  the U C  o n  the Eas t  Coas t , s uggested 
that instead o f  ' vivre en France en Caledonie ' the appeal should 
be ' vi vre autonome en Nouvelle-Caledonie pour se preparer a 
l ' Independance ' - and that not the Independanti s tes but the other 
side should be asked to forego the i r  programme . The heart o f  the 
matte r for Tj ibaou was the di ffe rent effect upon people of having 
responsibi lity or being eternal ly dependent . He ci ted the proverb : 
' The man constructs the house and the hous e constructs the man ' ; 
it was in that sense that the UC spoke of Independence . It was 
logical of the Kanaks to demand thei r  indigenous nationality . The 
UC regarded them as the legi timate people of the Terri tory by fact 
and by right . He went on : ' The UC affirms that non-Melanesians 
who are legitimately Caledonian by French law can become legiti­
mately Caledonian in fact by means of thei r  s truggle with the 
indi genous people for Caledonian independence ' .  Thi s  would create 
a movement of unity , a Caledonian cons cience , and development 
linked to a social programme . The prospect of a ' Caledonie 
Franfaise ' would never become es tablished because 'whi le there 
are Kanaks there , Independence wi l l  be demanded as a right ' .  
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Tj ibaou concluded wi th the wish that soon M Di j oud would be ab le 
to say to them solemnly , as he had s aid to the people of the New 
Hebrides , ' The Caledonian people wi l l  be proud to accede to 
national sovereignty ' ( ibi d . : 36- 39 ) . 
M Yeiwene, another young Melanesian UC member , took up Di j oud ' s  
point about the threat o f  violence and the neces sity for France 
to s tay to keep the peace , and neatly turned i t .  What a con fession 
of fai lure i t  was , he s ai d ,  that afte r 125 years of French rule 
New Caledonia still needed the French army and gendarmes to keep 
the peace . In any case , he sai d ,  to talk of violence was only 
part of Di j oud ' s  strategy . Even if there were people with guns 
i t  was only a con j ecture that they might use them. For his part 
M Yeiwene believed that ' The moment the Caledonians have the 
responsibi lity for thei r  des tiny . . .  they are capable o f  
organi zing thems e lves and acting together o n  social planning whi ch 
ass ures security to each , in respecting the right to be di f ferent ' 
( ibi d . : 39-40 ) . 
Al l in all those Melanes ian speakers dis closed , in addition 
to a quiet determination in favour of Independence , a moderate 
and cons tructive attitude and a view of ' Independance Kanak ' which 
( among those who cared to pay attention ) could have gone far to 
as s uage the anxieties which that concept arouses among non 
Melanesians in New Caledoni a .  The granting o f  real respons ibi lity 
to the Terri tory would ob lige all parties to come to terms with 
one another in the formation of a new Caledonian society . This 
was the proud and profound response to Mouren ' s  argument that such 
could only come in mutual subordination to the authori ty and 
influence of France . 
Right win g speakers tried to answer the UC arguments . 
Mme Antier ( RPCR)  complained : ' Mus t libe ra l France include in 
the plan the cons truction of a Berlin wall to stop immi gration? 
The salvation of the Melanesian community . . .  is not in the con­
s truction of such a wa ll , but in the long term plan , in the land 
re form , in the respect for custom , in the kindergartens , in 
maternity care ' (ibi d . : 56-5 7 ) . Such mate rnalism would have had 
some appeal to some Melanes ians ; but the prospect of liberal 
France being liberal with the Melanesians ' land was about the 
mos t  damaging thing she could have said - the prospect of a 
renewe d coloni zation by Wallis Islanders or Vietnamese refugees 
or other migrants be ing the mainspring of Melanesian determination , 
and ce rtain to provoke physical resis tance . M Roger Laroque 
condemned what he called ' racis t  Independence ' which would produce 
nothing but ruin of the Terri tory and dangerous confrontation 
(ibid . : 61-62 ) .  It was not made clear why a Melanesian-led state 
would be more ' racist ' than a French- led one . M Laroque obvi ously 
feared for his privi leges . 
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The pro F rench Mel ane s i an e lder M Di ck Ukeiwe ( RPCR} endorsed 
the plan , as for the fi rs t time o f fering a fi rm prospect for the 
Melanesians of integration , equality and j usti ce combined with 
respect for tradition . Some Me lanes i ans certainly , fearful o f  
confrontation and conflict , fe lt that the s afer course was t o  seek 
the economic advantages of continued relations wi th F rance , at 
least for the time being . 
M Di j oud himsel f ,  summing up , bitte rly criti cized the UC , 
accus ing them of betrayal in having participated in dis c us s ion 
of the plan b ut not s upporting it in the Assembly . He denied 
that extensive immigration was intended , c laiming that the plan 
was re ferring to demographi c i ncreas e . He argued also that the 
plan would generate sel f-s ufficiency for the Territory , not 
greater dependence , and that a fter ten years it would be ab le to 
pay for i ts own s e rvi ces . He denied also that France was in New 
Caledoni a for i ts own i nte rests or those o f  financiers , pointed 
out that the wishes o f  the I s le o f  Pines people not to have the 
Club Mediterranee bui l d  a resort there ( a  sub j e ct of recent 
controversy} would be respecte d .  F rance was in New Caledonia 
only because a maj ori ty of Caledonians wanted F rance to s tay , and 
because i f  France left there would be s chism and b loodshed .  Nor 
did he. require of the UC that it cease to contemplate i ts goal o f  
Independence , only that for ten years i t  leave that ob j ective i n  
abeyance and work wi th h i m  in b ui lding the new society (ibi d . :  
6 2-6 5 ) . 
But the UC in the end abs tained from voting . The radi cal 
socialist ,  M Jacques Violette , quit the chamber b e fore the vote . 
The four representatives of FULK , PALIKA and the· UPM had s i gni­
fied their hostility by non- attendance throughout . For all of 
these parties good government , or the promise o f  i t , had come 
too late to be a s uf fi ci ent subs titute for self-government . 
Moreover it was coming in a form that implied a new threat o f  
increased Me lanesian subordi nation in the s ame measure a s  mate rial 
prosperity increased.  
The first cons equence o f  the adoption o f  the Di j oud plan was 
the demise of Lenormand ' s  Gove rning Council . The plan was deemed 
to have become Territory policy and , because they opposed i t , 
Lenormand and his colleagues we re asked to res i gn . This they 
de clined to do and , organized by Jacques La fleur , the ri ght and 
centre parties in the As s embly passed legi s lation ( dra fted in 
Paris under M Di j oud ' s di rection } providing for a premature 
di ssolution on 1 March 19 79 . 
The new laws embodied provis ions that the right had been 
press ing in the National As s emb ly for two years . Parties which 
polled less than 7 . 5  pe r cent of voters ins cribed on the rol l  
( the original proposal was 1 0  per cent o f  votes cas t }  would not 
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be enti tled to share i n  the distribution o f  Assemb ly seats . 
Secondly , the Governing Council would be elected by maj ori ty vote , 
not proportional repres entation , of the Assembly (Les Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 19 Apri l 19 79 ) . 
The new e lectoral law was designed , according to i ts 
promoters , to produce a s table maj ority in the Terri tori al 
As sembly and the Governing Council , necessary to implement the 
fis cal re form and the Di j oud plan .  After twelve months' confusion 
about the budget and fiscal reform there was a case for this . 
Some of the centre party leaders had misgivings at the rather 
drastic interference with the Te rritory ' s  electoral sys tem , and 
there can be little doubt that the large and relatively tightly 
organized RPCR expected to bene fit at the expense of the frag­
mented Melanesian parties ( PALIKA having gained only 6 . 5  per cent 
of votes cas t for i ts two seats in 19 7 7  and the UPM 3 . 8  pe r cent 
for one seat ) . 
However , i f  this was the conservatives ' s trategy it did not 
enti re ly succeed ,  becaus e the various factions supporting 
Independence ( the UC , PAL IKA ,  FULK , the UPM , and the small Parti 
Socialiste Caledonien represente d by Jacques Vio lette ) l , quickly 
came together to form a Front Independantiste (FI ) campaigning 
as a single force and o f fering one list of candidates in the four 
e lectoral circonscriptions . Its campaign statements were 
rhetori cally anti capi talist and anti imperi alist and for an 
Independence both Kanak and Socialist . What this meant in te rms 
o f  detai led internal policy was not very clear , but it di d 
include the goal of immediate and unconditional return to the 
clans of their tradi tional land and the ' Terri tori alization ' o f  
mines . 
The centre parties also came together under the presidency 
of Jean-Pierre Ai fa to form the Federation Pour Une Nouve lle 
Societe Caledonienne ( FNSC ) , from the former Union Nouve lle 
Caledonienne , Union Democratique (of Gaston Morlet ) , Parti 
Republi cain Caledonien and Aveni r Jeunesse de la Caledonie . Its 
policy was liberal-democrati c ,  for the Di j oud plan and a reduction 
of ' privi leges ' ;  against Independence and agains t departmenta li za­
tion . Es sentially it wanted a continuance of Territori al status , 
but on a ' contractual ' not ' hierarchi cal ' basis , and saw the 
Dij oud plan as substantially contributing to that end (Les 
Nouvelles Caledoniennes 30 May 19 79 ) . 
1 The socialists split during the preceding year . Many white 
trade unionis ts support the Federation Socialiste Caledonienne , 
led by M C laude Fournier , and are anti Independence . Viole tte 
and his group have apprehended and accepted the Me lanesian 
Independan ti stes ' point of view and work closely with them . 
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In the e lections o f  1 1  June for the parl iament o f  the 
European Community , New Caledonian vo ters were presented with the 
li sts of Jacques Chirac , S imone Vei l  and Fran�oi s  Mi tterand . Some 
indication o f  pol i tical alle gi ances was provided though only from 
a low turnout of voters ( only 66 per cent of those on the rol l s ) . 
Ve il ' s  group scored 4 5 . 8 7 per cent , Mitterand ' s  2 8 . 94 per cent and 
Chirac ' s  only 19 . 56 per cent . Surprisingly , 1 , 08 2  voters were 
entered for the Par ti Communiste (Les Nouvell es Caledoniennes 
12 June 19 7 9 ) . 
Campaigning for the Terr i tory e lec tions centred openly on a 
choice for or against Independence ,  both s ides having reasonable 
access to radio and television late in the campaign but with both 
newspapers (France Australe , partly owned by the Societe Le Nickel , 
and the more conservative Les Nouvelles Caledoniennes ) inevitably 
giving total support to the anti-Independanti stes . In a tense but 
violence- free elec tion , with 7 3 . 5  per cent of voters turning out , 
the RPCR emerged wi th fifteen seats and the FI with fourteen . Thi s  
was the same number o f  seats as the various partie s  o f  the FI had 
held in the previous As sembly . Moreover , because of the way the FI 
had ranked i ts candidates in the four circonscriptions , the distri­
bution between UC , FULK , PALIKA , UPM and PSC - indeed the very 
personnel - was almost the same as be fore . In that sense Laf leur ' s  
electoral s trategy had fai led . Moreover - again at the behest o f  
the right in the National Ass embly - one more s e a t  had been given 
to the Southern circonscription and , although the RPCR had gained 
one extra seat above the fourteen he ld by the RPR/RPC in 19 7 7 , they 
had in the meantime been j oined by the two members of the Movement 
Liberal Ca ledoni en . They should have had s ixteen or seventeen seats 
on their own reckoning . The fourteen seats of the RPCR there fore 
could be seen as showing a loss of votes to the FNSC . The FNSC had 
won seven seats and , as in the debate on the Di j oud plan , coale sced 
wi th the RPCR to form a clear ma jority and provide the seven member 
Governing Counci l . The ve teran Melanes ian anti-Independantiste , 
Dick Ukeiwe ( RPCR) be came vice pre sident of the Council l (Les 
Nouvel les Caledoniennes 2 July 19 79 ) . 
A number of other parties o ffered ful l  l i s ts of candidates , 
including the Uni te Wal lis ienne et Futunienne , the Federation 
Social iste Caledonienne ( the non- Independence wing of the soci alists ) , 
the Rassemblement Populaire Caledonien et Metropol i tain and the 
Ras semblement Democrate Chretien . None of the se gained enough votes 
to win a seat . They ( e special ly the Federation Socialiste 
Caledonienne ) fel l  vi ctim to the new e lectoral law .  New 
Caledonian pol i tics has thus produced a di f ferentiation of three 
broad al ternative groups , two of which oppose Independence .  I n  
percentage terms 65 per cent o f  those who voted supported the 
1 The hi gh commi ss ioner is pre siden t ex offi cio . 
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conservative coalition - the Governing Ma jority - and 3 5  per cent 
the F I . Thi s  provides a formal mandate in favour of continuing 
the exis ting relationship and implementing the long- term plan . I t  
was hai led a s  s uch b y  Pres ident Giscard d ' Es taing o n  a vi s i t  to 
New Caledonia in late July and by M Di joud , though both were 
equal ly emphati c that France would s tay in New Caledonia only as 
long as a ma j ority did wish i t .  This was not an entirely comforting 
doctrine for the right , or for any settlers who wanted the question 
of Independence to be totally excluded as if the July elections were 
a constitutional referendum in favour of de facto departmentalization , 
not s ub j ect to changing electoral will . Yet the French Government 
had , in thi s  sense, interpreted the result correctly , for the FNSC ,  
whi le oppos ed to Independence had also opposed departmentalization . 
The consti tutional relationship of New Caledonia with France remains 
that o f  an Overseas Territory but i ts future i s  open to debate and 
evolution . 
Meanwhile the FI has chal lenged the legi timacy of the anti­
Independence ma j ori ty . They can show , from an analysis of the 
electoral returns commune by commune, that the predominantly 
Melanesi an communes voted s trongly for the FI and that the s upport 
for the National Maj ority came mainly from Noumea and i ts environs , 
and some small towns . Moreover these areas ( especially Noumea and 
the Southern ci rconscription) contain many transients ( servicemen 
and officials on their tour of duty ) and many recen t  immigrants who 
have retained homes in France and are already returning there in a 
steady trickle.  The FI claim wi th much j us ti fi cation , that these 
people ought not to be determining the future of the true Caledo­
nians - that is those who have been born in New Caledonia or whose 
commitment is who l ly to i t . Indeed i f  one discounted the 25 per 
cent of the population not born in New Caledonia ( in c luding , by 
19 7 6  census figures , 20 , 00 0  out of the 5 0 , 000 Europeans and 50 per 
cent of Wallis I s landers) the 6 5  per cent maj ority would be likely 
to shrink considerab ly .  Indeed i t  would shrink to insignificance 
if voting age is kept in mind ; very few Wal lis Is landers over 18 
years were born in New Caledonia . A precise estimate canno t ,  
however , b e  cal cul ated o n  racial lines because between 15 per cent 
and 30 per cent o f  Melanes ians did vote for parties o ther than the 
FI and an indeterminate number of non Melanes ians ( for example 
Violette ' s  group o f  sociali s ts , the remaining European supporters 
of the UC and some Tahiti ans ) s upported the FI . l 
1 Thi s  much would be broadly agreed by a number of scho lars , 
offic ials and poli ti c ians with whom I discus sed the matter in 
Noumea in July-December 1979 . Est imates of the percentage of 
pro Independence Melanesi an voters vary from 85 per cent ( the 
FI view) to 65 per cent ( the view of some officials)  . Many did 
not vote . On the other hand many Melanes i ans will s ay that all 
Melanesians are pro I ndependence at heart , but some are frightened 
of confrontation . 
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However , the forced nature of the election , and the role of 
the non-permanent voter has certainly , in the eye s o f  the Indepen­
danti stes , j usti fied their non-acceptance of the e lectoral result . 
Their radical wing , PALIKA ,  immediately launched a new campai gn o f  
demonstration and protest parti cularly during the visit o f  
Pre sident Giscard d ' Estaing in late July . On the East Coast thi s  
involved barricading roads with tree trunks and fel led telegraph 
poles . A campaign by PALIKA involving demonstrations and strike 
ac tion was also launched to chal lenge the pauci ty of Melanes ians 
in the teaching services and the assimi lationi st nature of the 
curricula . One such demonstration at the Lycee La Perouse on 
22 August , against the repl acement of a temporary Melanesian 
teacher by a permanent teacher from France , resulted in a large 
crowd of high school students (obliged to collect outside the 
school gates which were closed against the demons trators )  being 
violently dispersed by baton-wielding police and gardes mobi les . 
New demonstrations to pro test thi s action began to draw counter­
demonstra tions organi zed by a new Mouvement Pour l ' Ordre et la Paix 
(MOP ) compris ing elements of former commi ttees of s imi lar nature . 
When the MOP is sued a call for the broussards to come into Noumea 
for a mass ral ly aga inst the Independantistes the situation became 
menacing and the high commi ss ioner temporarily banned all mani ­
festations . Calm re turned to the capital , which was not real ly 
broken by the Melane sians ' mass meeting on 24 September . In thi s  
context the UC leaders were also responsible for succes s fully 
arguing moderation and pro test wi thin the law . 
On the international plane the FI has sent mi ssions of i ts 
leaders to countr ies and organi zations deemed likely to be sympa­
theti c ,  or important , to their cause , particularly the ne ighbouring 
independent Pac i fic state s ,  Al geri a ,  and France i tself . Organi zations 
approached included the South Pac ifi c  Forum, the Organi zation for 
Afri can Unity , the League of Rights of Man and the Ecumenical 
Council . At the UN the ambas sadors of Algeria , Libya , Bulgari a ,  
Guinea , Conak ri and Madagas car were contacted . Wi thin France strong 
statements of support were given by the Catho lic Commi ssion for 
Jus tice and Peace and from the French Commun ist and So cial ist 
par ties . I n  early 1980 Mi tterand ' s  colleague , M France s chi , the 
Socia list Party ' s  spoke sman on Over seas Territories , visited Noumea . 
It is l ikely that some o f  the independent Paci fic states will seek 
to have New Caledonia reins tated on the UN list of countries for 
deco loni zation . Meanwh i le , within New Caledonia the Evangelical 
Church , a predominantly Me lanes ian organi zation , has come out in 
favour o f  I ndependence . 
On the other hill� is there evidence that the Di j oud plan will 
be impleme nted sufficiently to win support for the continuance of 
the Terr itorial relationship? I n  August 1 9 79 the first moves were 
made through th e creation of the Promotion Melane s i enne headed by 
an energe ti c Me lane s ian member of the Governing Counci l ,  M Frank 
Wah uzue . M Wahuzue is a former Foulard Rouge , but he favours 
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entrepreneurial e conomic development and was concerned at the 
divisions whi ch have appeared in Me lanesian society , espe cial ly 
over the land redistribution , and the threat o f  increas ing violence 
already manifest in some physical clashes over the allocation o f  
repurchased land . He be lieve s  that there i s  muc h  to b e  done i n  
terms o f  the ordering o f  society and resolving o f  such contentious 
matters before Independence can be contemplate d .  Hence his support 
for the RP CR and the Di j oud plan . In this he i s  s incere , but his 
opponents argue that he has al lowed himself to be made a pawn by 
Jacques Lafleur and the righ t ,  and that his support for the pro­
motion of Mel anesians under the pate rnalistic aegis of the Ad.minis­
tration invo lves their continual denial o f  real re sponsibility and 
is a betrayal . The FI have there fore boycotted the P romotion and 
denounced Ukeiwe and Wahuzue as puppets . 
In late August 19 79 the P romotion organ i zed an extended 
co lloquium to whi ch the chef ferie and o ther interested persons from 
all over New Caledoni a  were invi ted . About 150 came . The dis cus s ions 
were rather dominate d  by the ten or twe lve edu cated Me lanesians in 
Adminis tration pos ts or in the National Maj ority parties of the 
Assembly . There was also a number of European members cons tantly 
giving advice . However ,  thi s  did not s top the Me lane sians saying 
some strong things in criticism of French po licies and elaborating 
a thoroughgoing set of demands - in respect of land , law ,  education , 
cul tur e , wome n ' s  rights - whi ch fil led out much o f  the important 
detail of which the Di j oud plan is devoid,  and which closely 
paralleled many o f  the particular demands o f  the FI . 
The land section o f  the P romotion ' s  demands was ambivalent as 
to the p�inciples to fo l low ; i t  supported both a systematic location 
o f  old clan territories and a survey o f  the c laims with a view to 
determining greate s t  need . I t  was no ted that considerable di ffi culty 
migh t be expe cted in locating the true ' maitres de la terre ' of any 
lands , given the con fus ions o f  the last hundred years . The Commi ssion 
debated at length the i s s ue of whether land should be real located 
as aggrandisement o f  reserves or in individual European- s ty le ti tles , 
and proposed a new a l ternative . De claring ( like the Independantistes) 
that cus tomary landholding was no ne ces s ary barrier to development 
of individual e nterprises , it called for the legal reco gnition o f  
propri ete clanique - something between the ti tles o f  the droi t 
commun and the tribu and much more tradi tiona l .  Consei ls de Clans 
consisting of the family heads (both o f  ' an ci ent ' and ' new ' fami lies 
in a given locality)  should regulate land matters , wi th Consei ls 
des Chefs de Clan and a Conseil de Grands Chefs for appeal and in 
the event of interc lan disputes . This was an e f fort to estab lish 
some kind o f  Me l ane sian au tho ri ty in land matters whi ch would be 
respe cted more than the French- created offi cial chefferie and 
Conseil des Anciens ( Commission pour la Promoti on Melanesienne : 
19 79 ) . 
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After a period of some months o f  unce rtainty , wi th the me tro­
po l i tan French budge t itself held up , the promised financial re forms 
be gan to emerge . In De cember 19 79 Paris confirmed a budget of 
CFP 16 . 2  b i l lions ( approximately $Al90 mi l l ion ) for 1980 - the 
first time in many years that the Terri tory had a de fini te b udge t 
be fore 3 1  De cembe r .  Included i n  thi s  was 2 . 5  b i l l ion for the 
s tate primary s chool sys tem (previous ly funded by the Terri to ry ) . 
M Di joud promi sed approximate ly CFP 5 5 . 5  mi l lion per year for ten 
years for the repurchase of land (Les Nouvel les Cal edoniennes 
15 De cember 19 79 )  . That is about doub le the rate of spending in 
19 79 . Moreove r ,  the ele ctoral re form - or a sharpe r reali zation 
among the right and ce ntre of the need to co llaborate - produced 
a more s tab le maj ority and in January 19 80 that ma j ority final ly 
passed into law a proposal for personal income tax - albe i t  a low 
and regressive one of 15 per cent on salaries earned above 
CFP 370 , 000 per month ( about $A54 , 00 0  per year) . Thi s ,  and com­
parab le taxe s on bus ine s s  turnover and bank intere s t , wi l l  produce 
a contrib ution of about CFP 200 mi l lion ( $A2 . 44 mi l l ion) largely to 
be spe nt on promoting a griculture and capital works . Moves are 
under way for a spe cial entry programme to rapidly increase the 
number of Me lane sian teachers ( at present only 19 3 out of 9 50 )  in 
the s tate primary s chools . The Me lanesian Cul tural Ins ti tute was 
set up in 1980 wi th s taff to make pre liminary s tudies in four o f  
the ma j or Me lane s ian languages and e thnomusi co logy . Consi deration 
is be ing given to extending soc ial security bene fi ts in some form 
( chi ld endowme nt , increased maternal allowance s ,  or old age pensions ) 
to the rural subs i s tence farmers - the Melanes i ans - who have 
hi therto mis sed out on the bene f i ts paid to sal aries .  However , 
th is has been talked about b e fore and there is a danger that i t  
wi l l  appear a s  a clumsy attempt t o  b uy the support o f  Me lanesian 
elders . 
In general , al though the se measures will make some contribution 
to redu cing the gul f  in ma te rial standards between ri ch and poor , 
be tween whi te and bl ack , they are too limi ted to e ffect real 
s tructural change in the lopsided New Caledonian so ciety . Be cause 
of th is , because the re forms are under the direction of the b ureau­
cracy and the Governing Ma jority in New Caledonia , and because 
they imply closer in te gration wi th France ,  they wi l l  not capture 
the imagination and involvement of many Me lanes ians . M Wahuzue and 
the Promotion Me lane s i enne have found themse lves too limited in 
l 
Les Nouvel les Caledoni ennes 8 January 1980 . Six b i l lion of this 
i s  for the servi ces o f  the s t ate i tse l f  ( army , navy , s tate pub l i c  
servants)  and t e n  b i l lion for ma t ters e s sent i al ly Terri torial 
( P.duca t ion , hea l th , te chnical services , the development fund 
F I DES , subsidy for the ni cke l indus try , etc . ) .  
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funds and too c ircumscribed by the establi shed areas of the bureau� 
cracy to achieve their bolder aspirations ; Wahuzue wrangles publicly 
wi th some of his conservative French co lleagues and occasionally 
makes statements that show his sense of urgency about Melanesian 
rights , and the likely consequences o f  the ir non ful fi lment . The 
funding of primary education by the state implies the closer embrace 
of France which for the Independantistes is an unacceptable price 
to pay for improvements in the servi ce . I t  evokes echoes o f  the 
fierce controversy which raged in 1976 when the state substantially 
took over funding - and hence , to some extent , direction - o f  private 
education . Education - the content of curricula , staffing , etc . -
is , along with land , the mos t  important focus of Kanak protest and 
pres sure , leading to boycotts , s i t-ins and other forms of challenge 
to the authorities , and occas ional confrontations wi th the forces o f  
law and order . 
NEW DI RECTIONS IN LAND POLICY 
The framework establi shed by Di j oud ' s  interv�ntion has pro­
duced a number of important shifts of policy on the land question . 
The Commission d ' Et udes des Problemes Fanciers set up in late 19 7 8 ,  
though j usti fiab ly somewhat sceptical o f  the attempt to establish 
a finite picture of traditional clan di s tribution , has responded 
to Me lane sian demand and is attempting to ree stabl i sh clan locations 
as at the be ginning of coloni zation . Re searchers of ORSTOM ( Office 
de la Recherche Scienti fique et Technique Outre-Me r )  are systema­
tically seeking to determine , from aerial photographs , old maps , 
archaeology and interviews with the traditional elders , the dis tri­
bution o f  taro and yam cul tivations and vil lage sites throughout 
the Grande Terre ,  and the migrations - forced or otherwi se - s ince 
colonization . 
There has also been more f lexib ility in the modes by which 
land has been redistributed . In September 19 79 the Territorial 
As sembly approved purchase of thirteen parcels o f  land , total l ing 
1 , 250 ha mainly acquired from the Catholic Church , for a total 
pr ice of CFP 2 5 . 5  mi llion ( approximately $A2 83 , 000)  ( AT ,  Proces­
verbal 11 September 19 7 9 )  . Of those only three were specifically 
stated to be for subdivision into indivi dual lots ; two were for 
tribal groups organi zed as agricultural societie s ;  seven were for 
various clan or fami ly groups who in some cases already occupied 
them , outside the reserves ; one was expressly for aggrandisement 
of a reserve , and destined for subsistence agriculture . Al l were 
paid for by a grant from the Fonds d ' Inve stis sement de Developpe­
ment Economique et So c i a l  ( FI DES ) , a fund which had hitherto been 
used strictly for lands be ing commercially improved . l All in all 
1 The other important state development fund which has assisted 
in recent year s is the Fonds d ' Aide au Developpement des Iles 
et de l ' Interieur ( FADIL) . 
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1 , 500 h a  were granted under common law titles i n  1 9 7 9  and 3 , 2 00 ha 
under customary law . In 1980 ( to October ) only 600 ha were 
attributed under common law and 5 , 200 ha under customary law 
( in formation from S ervi ce d ' Etude s et de Legislation 4 November 
19 80)  . The hard line demands of the RP CR and Report No . 81 o f  
19 7 8 ,  that the land be returned only i n  individual titles under 
the droi t commun , have thus been set aside . 
Attribution under the cus tomary law has been facil i ta ted by 
the adoption o f  le gislation for the lega l  re cogni tion of a propriete 
clanique as demanded by the Promotion Me lanesienne . The draftsmen 
of the text very shrewdly produce d a s imple and minimal defini tion -
which neverthe less re co gnized the fami ly as an integral uni t  o f  the 
c lan - and spe ci fied a mechanism by which the clan would act . Given 
that the question of de finitions of groups for landowning purposes 
is one o f  the most vexed and intractable problems in the Paci fic , 
the text is worth quoting in ful l : 
The land o f  the clan is the common property o f  the fami ly 
groups of whi ch it is composed . These fami ly groups are 
represented by the customary chiefs o f  the fami ly who 
constitute the c lan Counci l .  
The clan Council regulates the us e and division o f  lands 
among members of the clan as we l l  as the specification , 
where applicable , o f  the proprie tary rights o f  the clan , 
ac cording to cus tomary law . 
It may equal ly , wi th due respect to customary rules , and 
in ways which it wi l l  determine , in thi s  context authorise 
the tenure freely or for payment , o f  persons s tranger to 
the c lan (AT , Arrete 21 May 19 80) . 
The las t provi s ion imparts a nece ssary fle xib i l i ty ,  for any onus or 
impulse under the law to give a s tric t  de finition o f  a ' c lan ' , or 
any o ther cus tomary group , inevi tab ly di storts and damages the 
fabri c of sub tle flexib le institutions and pro cesses , and produces 
acrimonious divis ion . Even so the debate in the Territorial As semb ly 
produced some anxious cr iti cism that ' the clan ' was going to be 
di ffi cult to e s tab l i sh in practice , and certainly the app lication 
o f  the law will not always be easy ( AT ,  Proces-verbal 14 May 19 80 : 
3 lff) . 
I t  is important to note that the proprie te clanique is a form 
of landholding under the droi t coutumi er not the droi t commun . The 
Territo rial As sembly has no power to legi s late such bas i c  matters 
under the common law . I t  doe s  have the power to de fine the modali ­
ties of the customary law . l This meant that some e arly plans for 
1 I am indebted to M Somny , Che f du Service d ' Etudes et de Le gis­
lation , for this explanation . 
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the new form o f  title to b e  sub j e ct to al ienation b y  mortgage o r  
lease , for example , could not b e  estab lished.  Attributions o f  
c l an  property thus tend to reinforce Mel anesian custom rather 
than impe l ass imi lation to French property concepts and usages , 
much to the disgus t and disappointment o f  some members o f  the right . 
The FI speakers ' ob j ections to the legal recognition of the clan 
seemed a little forced , and obvious ly s tem from the commi tment to 
opposing all such measures from the paternal i s t  s tate , rather than 
from intrinsic weaknesses in the law .  
I n  the context o f  the reforme fonciere , however ,  by far the 
most important issue is the power o f  pre -emption and expropriation . 
In March 19 80 a bill , or avant-projet , to grant such powers to the 
Territory in re spe ct o f  unused or under-used land was leaked in the 
Noumea press . Not surprisingly , in view of the strength of their 
reaction in 19 5 8 ,  the settlers again reacted vigorously to the 
introduction of such measures - thi s  time by the ir erstwhile pro­
tector , the French state . Divis ions opened among the Governing 
Maj ori ty , the FNSC general ly favouring acceptance of the measures 
as ne cessary and many of the RPCR being bi tterly ppposed , espe cially 
to expropriation . A de legation wen t to Paris to seek modi fi cations 
and M Di joud re turned to Noumea for a di s cussion in camera with the 
Te rri torial Assemb ly .  The terms o f  the avant-projet were revi sed 
in an effort to diminish the authori ty of the French state in the 
appli cation of the re form and to try to keep it large ly wi thin the 
control o f  the Territo ry Assembly and Counci l .  They were repub lished 
on 30 May . 
The text acknowledged that , in the context of general agrarian 
reform and revival , the Me lanesians had a spe cial need . It speci fied 
that the re serves would not be affe cted and affirmed the right of 
choi ce o f  Melanes ians to live under the droi t coutumier or the 
droi t connnun . I t  affirmed support fo r the development of unculti­
vated or insuffi ciently exploited la.rids , notably through the 
constitution of family enterpri ses and for food production , and for 
the trans fer to Me lanesian collectives , family groups or individual s 
of enough land to enab le them to s ati s fy their needs , their custom 
and their traditional mode of life . Arti cle s 2 to 5 provided that 
the state , the Terri tory and , where appropriate , the communes were 
to co llaborate for the purpose of acquiring the ne cessary land , if 
po ssible by agreement . An incentive for this would be the provi s ion 
of compensation and pe ns ion arrangements for farmers s ixty years of 
age or more ( later reduced to fifty year s or more )  who ceded their 
land to the programme . When proprietors voluntarily o ffered an 
estate ,  the Territory would have a three months ' right of pre- emption ; 
where there was fai lure to agree on price , the price would be fixed 
by the court of fir s t  instance . The high commissioner ( later the 
chef du terri toi re) in counci l would have power to de clare an es tate 
abandoned or uncultivated; the proprietor would be given time in 
which to improve the land. Where agreement was not reached the 
Council of Government could is sue a de claration of pub l i c  need and 
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expropriation ; an inquiry would then fol low b y  a commi s s ion 
presided over by a magistrate and including representation of the 
state , the Territory , the commune , the Mel anesian authorities and 
rural propr ietors and farmer s ;  i f  thi s  commis sion recommended 
affirmatively the declaration would be promulgated by the high 
commissioner . I f  the land so acquired were not used within three 
years for the purposes de fined in Artic le 1 ,  the former proprietor 
could apply to have it ceded back to him . Lands a cquired would be 
attributed under modes de fined by the Territorial As semb l y ,  e i ther 
under the droi t commun or the droi t coutumier ( Les Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 30 May 1980 ; AT , Proces-verbal 2 S eptember 1980 : 
29- 4 3 ) . 
However circums cribed ,  the expropriation principle i s  
into lerab le to many settlers . In theory the law can be applied to 
any property , where the Me lanesian s ' needs are deemed serious 
enough , not j ust to undeveloped property . In thi s  sense it i s  
a stronger measure than , say , the Undeveloped Freeholds Ordinance 
1969 in Papua New Guinea . Although model led on the Code Rural o f  
metropoli tan France i t  seems to many settlers t o  s trike at their 
cons ti tutional property rights and to open the way to wha t are 
cons idered the ' poli tical ' land c laims of the Independan tis tes , 
not j ust their ' e conomi c '  claims . The MOP opposed the avant-projet 
and a new organi zation called RURALE ( Ruraux , unis pour une 
reforme agraire liberale et equitable)  was formed to continue the 
lobby . 
A new feature o f  the opposi tion i s  its mani fes t  bel i e f  that 
the French state is sel ling out those whom it should primari ly b e  
prote cting . In thi s  context the events i n  nearby Vanuatu have fed 
the fires of opposition . There too the s tate , despite much rhetoric 
from M Di j oud about protecting the settlers and their properties , 
had signed a consti tution which re turned the proprietorship o f  all 
land to the Me lanesian customary owners and in the end was not ab le 
to secure automatic leases for the se ttlers agains t a determined 
Vanuatu drive to review all title s . Several hundred re fugee s from 
the defeated rebe l lion , in which settlers had participated in order 
to try to retain control of land , came to New Caledonia and j oined 
in the opposi tion to the avan t-projet and the cri ticism o f  the 
Admini s tration . 
On the other hand Jean-Pierre Ai fa and Gaston Morlet , settler 
members o f  the FNSC , - strongly de fended the re form in a series of 
pub l i c  mee tings as neces sary to the rec ti fi cation of hi s toric 
Melanesian grievances and the stability o f  New Caledonian society . 
Frank Wahuzue o f  the Promotion Me lanes ienne al so de fended it against 
attacks by his more conservative col league s in the RPCR .  In the 
National Ass embly the law has been s trongly suppor ted by Lionel 
Cherrier , New Caledonia ' s  senator and a centrist in po litics . 
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Th e  avant-projet for the reforme fonciere went to the 
Territorial 1\S sembly on 2 September 19 80 for i ts express ion o f  
opinion and after furious debate was approved by e i ghteen votes 
( o f  the Governing Maj ority) to fourteen . The FI voted against ,  as 
did M Gui l lemard , a most determined settler opponent ( two o ther 
members of the Governing Maj ority abstained ) . During the debate 
se ttlers organi zed by RURALE crowded the chamber , chorused 
ob j e ctions against the speakers of their own parties ,  like Morlet , 
who were supporting the proposed law , and afterwards gave Gui llemard 
a hero ' s  wel come . Afterwards RURALE , working through Jacques 
Lafleur , the RPCR deputy in the National Assembly , lobbied for an 
amendment which would remove the special emphas i s  on Melanesian 
c laims and needs and promote settlement by all races wi th development 
conditions on the title . 
The law went before the National As sembly in P aris in December 
1980 . The debate there showed the sharp polari zation between the 
centrists , l ike Cherrier , for whom the law was primari ly political 
in ob j e ctive , seeking to recti fy the historic injustice of the 
Me lanesians , and those of the right , who wanted it confined to the 
economic needs of smallholders of any race . The former view 
admitted the acquisition of land already improved . Cherrier was 
bi tterly denounced by RURALE for his ' treason ' to the settler cause . 
In the end the law was passed wi th an amendment l imi ting the extent 
of any s ingle property expropr iation to 50 per cent of each property 
affected . 
Neverthe less · the open adoption by the s tate , and by people like 
Cherrier and Mor let , o f  a ' politi cal ' aspect to the re form may be 
an important breakthrough . It is the first real sign that the Di j oud 
re forms wi l l  tackle the structural and histor ical legacies of the 
colonial order and radi cally reali gn land redi stribution with 
recogni tion of the Melanesians ' c la ims . The que stion is whether , 
in application , it will go fa� enough . 
In the meantime the Admini s tration can show that ,  despite the 
continued intrans igence of some , there has been a very considerable 
amel ioration o f  the se ttlers ' attitude s ince 19 7 7- 7 8 ,  to the point 
that they are prepared to .conterrplate any land re form at all . 
Indeed Morlet lauds 2 Sep tember 1980 as the day the Territory 
demonstrated its coming to matur i ty .  In 1980 the land reallocated 
from the private sector , as compared with domaine land , was in the 
order of seven to one , a direct reversal o f  the proportions of 1979 
( information from Service d ' Etudes et de Le gi slation 4 November 
1980) . 
The intention of the Admini s tration now is to trans fer land 
to Me lanesian hands at the rate of 10 , 000 ha per year for ten years . 
Leaving aside the concessions and assuming that most of the land 
trans ferred comes from se ttler s rather than from domaine land , 
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this would make the proportions of land he ld by Me lane sians and by 
settlers more or less equal . Many settlers on the East Coast have 
in fact had li fe made uncomfor tab le for them by Me lanesian pressure -
and wi l l  be glad to sell out . The question is one o f  pri ce , and 
the reserve expropriation power is no doubt being sought by the 
Adminis tration , as it was in Papua New Guinea , to brin g down the 
settlers ' speculative asking pri ces as much as to se cure any 
parti cular piece of land . 
A further ingredient in the land re form programme is the new 
law on success ion to real estate held under the droi t commun , outs ide 
the reserve structure , by Me lanes ians who in most cases wi l l  be 
personal ly under the statut pa rticulier. This was foreshadowed in 
debates in 19 76-78 as part of the drive to create and sustain a 
clas s  of Melane sian smal lholders , b ut has be come more urgent in 
re spe ct of people who have acquired suburban houses .  In some cases 
brothers or members of the wider kin group , basing succession claims 
on custom, have overborne the cl aims of the immedi ate family of the 
de ceased . Regardless o f  any larger social ob j e ctive it appeared 
only j us t ,  to the Administration as indeed to many Melane sians , to 
give more legal pro te ction to the succession rights o f  widows ( or 
widowers)  and chi ldren of the de ceased . Accordingly an arrete o f  
1 5  September 19 80 provided that ci ti zens o f  the statut ci vil 
parti culier coul d opt ( in wri ting on a prescribed form) , only in 
respe ct o f  property he ld under the droi t commun , whether the mode 
o f  succession would be customary ( and regulated by the Clan Counci l)  
or according to principles spe ci fied in the arrete ( derived from 
French common law principles ) . The main parts of those provis ions 
are as fo l lows : 
The children or the ir de s cendants succeed to [ the common 
law estates of ] thei r  father and mo ther , grandfather or 
grandmOther , or other de s cendants , wi thout di stinction o f  
s e x  o r  o f  primogeniture . They succeed b y  equal portions 
and by head when they are o f  the first degree [ o f  de s cent ] 
and re cognised by their Chie f .  
The spouse [ conjoi n t ]  has the usufruct o f  the es tate or 
o f  that part o f  the estate appertaining to minors . 
In the absen ce o f  an eligib le chi ld the surviving spouse 
[ conjoin t ]  inheri ts the estate . 
In de fault of any he i rs according to the above principles 
succe ssion proceeds according to customary usages . Where 
the formal choice had no t been exercised the deceased would 
be pre sumed to have opted for cus tomary usages . 
( AT ,  Arrete 15 September 19 80 ) . 
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The las t  provis ion indicated the limits to which the Adminis­
tration wi shed to push Me lanesians towards French concepts of 
property , even property held under common law title . For this 
they were critic i zed in debate by M Gui l lemard ( of RURALE and the 
RPCR) who was clearly unhappy about any tendency for individual 
prope rty to be drawn b ack into the customary system . But few 
politicians , even of the right , are now as ass imi liationist as 
M Gui llemard , at least in their pub l i c  statements . For their 
part the FI ob j e cted to any modi fi cation of cus tom at all . 
Indeed there is one adverse e ffect o f  the new succe ssion law 
whi ch may become serious ; i t  is the same as that which Briti sh law 
re lating to Maori land produced ,  and also French practi ce in Tahi ti . 
The principle o f  succe ssion by al l chi ldren in equal proportions i s  
a rec ipe for fractionation o f  the e s tate over tw o  or three genera­
tions into uneconomic interests , and into an almost unmanageab le 
number o f  owners . Thi s  problem has great ly bedevi lled land 
administration in New Zealand , the Cook I s lands and French Polynesia , 
putting much land beyond e ffi cient use . I t  now threatens to arise 
in New Caledonia for precise ly the same reasons : an attempt to be 
equitable ( according to Western European concepts o f  equity and law ,  
to which the admini s trators feel bound) to the direct i ssue o f  the 
deceased . I t  sets aside , with potentially unhappy consequences , 
the cus tomary principle s  which operated to eliminate certain parties -
particularly non residents with property elsewhere - from the suc­
cess ion . 
The atti tude of the FI to al l of thi s  activity has been 
ostens ibly disdainful or hos ti le . The Administration has made it 
clear all along that it doe s  not accept the most fully developed 
FI c laim - the ' global ' claiml that all the land should be re turned 
to the tradi tional claimant c lans without condition . As both sides 
aver , that would be tantamount to a trans fer o f  sovereignty to the 
Melanes ian people . Nor does the Admini stration yet propose even 
to hand over who le zones of land ( domaine land for example) to let 
the Melanesians sort out for themselves . I t  believes that the bulk 
of the land should be he ld for publi c purposes such as forestry or 
water reserve , or for tour i sm or other forms of development by non 
Melane sians . This includes the zone mari time whi ch in French 
Polynesia has been suppres sed in favour of the customary claimants 
1 The phrase was used by M Machoro in debate on the avant-projet 
(AT ,  Proces-verbal 2 September 19 80) . 
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and which the Melanesian parties in New Cal edonia have also demanded 
should be suppressed , especial ly in respect of the Loyalty Islands 
and the Ile des Pins . l 
Moreover , even where the land is handed back to Me lanesians , 
although the modes of attribution have recently become more 
flexible ( as indicated above ) the Administration seriously doubts 
the capability of Mel anes ians to sort out the competing claims of 
various clans in view of the conflicting customary claims in the 
first place , the bouleversemen t of the clans sinc e  coloni zation , 
and the difference of opinion between Melanes ians pursuing an 
' economic ' claim and those wanting priority to be given to the 
' cus tomary ' claimants , with primacy to traditional agriculture . 
For these reas ons , and because political allegiances and factions 
run through the whole situation , the Administration has tended to 
keep land re form fairly much in its own hands , hoping that the 
formally recognized clan authorities - including the new Clan 
Counci l s  - can sort out the attribution . 
The FI , however ,  consider that the whole reform - with the 
land sti l l  theoretically open to non Melanesians - leaves them 
still under a form of coloni zation - a colonisation noire where 
the land is to be attributed to Wallisians or Indonesians , or to 
Melanesians favoured by the Admini stration and the official 
chefferie .  The Independan tis±es have hitherto brought pressure to 
bear - including threats of sorcery or phys ical confrontation -
to frustrate some of the official subdivi sions . The is sue was 
sharply revealed in mid 1980 when the Administration propo sed to 
1 The zone mari time or zone de cinquante pas geometrique ( actually 
81 . 20 metres )  is a coastal s trip measured above high-water mark , 
reserved to the French state to be used for public purposes . I t  
was introduced into pre revolutionary France b y  Colbert ,  and while 
it has. lapsed in France itsel f  i t  has been instituted in many 
French colonies . It has been suppressed round parts , but not 
al l ,  of the New Caledonian coast . ( I  am indebted to M Somny , 
Service d ' Etudes et de Legisl ation , for this information . )  The 
anxiety about returning domaine land came out strongly in debate 
in January 19 79 when , with Lenormand br ie f ly ho lding o ffi ce as 
vice president of the Governing Counc il , the As sembly was asked 
to approve the return to the Kunie people of the I le des Pins of 
20 ha of land on the Kuto peninsula , held by the Terri tory since 
the days of convi ct se ttlement . A motion to defer the Lenormand 
proposal was de feated by only sixteen votes to thirteen . The 
land was a focus for debate about possible development by Club 
Mediterranee or other tourist organi zations and i t  is unlikely 
that i t  would have been returned by the Assembly as consti tuted 
after the July 19 79 e le ctions ( AT ,  Proces-verbal 25 January 19 79 : 
1 1- 48) . 
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real locate a repurchased es tate near Dumbea to Wal lis I s landers , 
characteri sti cally prolific and land- short . The FI responded 
through a public letter from Madame Pidjot claiming the land on 
behal f  of the clans dispossessed in the colonization - to whom it 
is intolerable to see the land again reassigned - and by vi gorous 
island-wide lobbying agains t the Wal lis ians . The scheme has lapsed , 
in a climate of mounting tension between Melanesians and Wal l is ians 
( including a major brawl during the annual grande braderi e in 
Noumea) and serious second thoughts among some Wal lisians about 
their position as clients of the French . 
Meanwhile the FI has tried to set up its own land re form . Thi s 
re j ects the procedures evoked by Di j oud , whereby land claims were 
invited on a needs bas is and some clans claimed nothing whi le others 
claimed adj acent land, regardless of the traditional claimants , thus 
intensifying the conflicts at the base of Melanesian life since the 
cantonnement .  The F I  re form i s  to be based on a systematic region 
de fini tion of old clan territory and i ts recovery by systematic 
pressure on the Administration and on the settlers , including direct 
occupation o f  land . The re covery o f  c lan terri tory would not pre­
clude continued occupance of the land by ' s tranger ' clans , or by 
longstanding European and other se ttlers , provi ded tha t the under­
lying traditional ri ght was reaffirmed and reestablished . In 
practi ce , however , the FI has found it di ffi cult to disentangle the 
rival claims , and traditions are no t as clear- cut as had been hoped 
by many - including the anthropologi st Jean Guiart , brother-in- law 
to Lenormand , who is in strong sympathy wi th the FI approach and 
more confident of the abilities o f  the Me lane sians than of the 
bureaucracy or official chefferie to sort out land claims . There 
is some need of technical expertise in tradition , archaeology , 
mapping , etc . , to help establish the claims . For this reason the 
ORSTOM research has become caught in the political crossfire . 
Because they are e ssentially working for the Administration the 
ORSTOM scholars cannot readi ly publish , or pre-publish , the ir 
findings ; but they re ly in part on access and in forma tion from 
Melane sians . Some of the clans cooperate but others ( espe cially 
the ' s tranger ' clans)  are re ti cent about di sclosing where they came 
from , i f  the impli cation is that they must return to remote or 
possibly poor land . The research is coming under increas ing 
critici sm from the radi cal sections of the FI . Meanwhile the 
parties of the FI are urging the ir own local sections to pre ss 
ahead wi th efforts to sort out their interclan disputes and 
establ i sh priorities of rights , and to continue pres sure on the 
land , including direct occupation of land claimed . 
The land re form is thus gravely weakened by the divi sion o f  
fundamental purpo se be tween the F I  and the Admini stration and its 
supporters , and the lack of cooperation be tween them . The attempt 
by Di j oud to push ahead more bo ldly with a re form from above has 
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probably come too late . Twenty years ago , before Independence had 
become a clear-cut goal , a very generous restoration of land both 
to clans and to individual smal lholders might have satisfied most 
land grievances and even bui l t  substantial support . When the push 
for reform did be come more vi gorous the Admini stration still felt 
unable to involve substantially the Mel anesians grouped in the F I  
be cause i t  saw the Front ' s  goals as reaching beyond land reform to 
pol itical ends . In turn , though acknowledging that some of the 
recent deve lopments - the proprie te cl ani que for example - may be 
use ful , the F I  formally re j e cted the o fficial programme . 
I f  the FI and the Admini s tration are not l ikely to aqree on 
the fundamental pr inciples and goa l s  of land re form it is a l so 
unlikely that either side wi l l  achieve i ts whole purpose , for 
neither has the pol itical or physical power ful ly to overbear the 
other . The ques tion of physical force was pub l i cly discus sed early 
in 19 80 when the MOP wrote an open le tter to the high commi ss ioner 
(with copies to Pres ident Giscard D ' Estaing,  M Di j oud and others)  
call ing for a much tougher enforcement o f  law to di s courage the 
'fau teurs de guerre ' .  They ins tanced the unlawful occupation , by 
Melanesians , of the land of a M Lacroze who , they said , had had 
shots fi red at him (Les Nouvel l es Caledoniennes 19 January 1980)  . 
To this M Charbonniaud , the high commi s s ione r ,  repl ied 
acknowledging that ,  de spi te the dai ly e f fo rts o f  the pol i ce and 
gendarmes , the situation was not eve rywhere s ati s factory . He no 
longer he sitated to s ay that in a Terri tory three times the s i ze 
o f  Corsica the forces at his dispo sal did not permi t ,  in certain 
regions , the assurance of a pre sence suffi ciently ' dissuasi ve e t  
securisan te ' . S ti l l , h e  s ai d ,  whatever the tens ions ' in a certa in 
zone ' , the s tati stics showed New Caledonia to be. re latively 
peace ful , compared with ce rtain regions of France , and the forces 
o f  law and order , strengthened at his reque s t ,  were amp le to bring 
back to reason , when neces sary , ' the agi tators and extremists of 
al l hori zons who would trouble the pub l ic peace ' (Les Nouvelles 
Caledoniennes 2 1  January 1980) . Certainly the po lice forces are 
strong enough to prevent any widespread open campaign of occupation 
of land and the FI have not ye t attempted this . However the kinds 
of pre ssure used s ince 19 77 have s uc ceeded in se curing a higher 
rate of re turn of land and a modification to the previous ly narrow 
modes of attribution . On the East Coast and the north of the 
Grande Terre Mel ane sian pre s s ure will continue to the extent o f  
making settlers uncomfortable and willing to sell , and the 
Administration will use its new powers to relieve ' ho t  po ints ' or 
to transfer l and be fore the problem be comes too ' hot ' . 
In the pro cess some Me lanes ians will gain satis faction . In 
some respects , however , land r e form since 19 5 1  ( the Di j oud programme 
incl uded) has ac tual ly increased tension among Melanes ians - among 
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rival claimants or people having di fferent views o f  land use . In 
some places this is so serious as to hal t the real location of land 
already acquired from settlers . No doubt many settlers are not 
unhappy to see the Me lanesians so divided : the internal divi sions 
over land certainly , in the short run , hinder their capacity to 
organize for larger pol itical goals . But it would be too cynical 
to say that the Administration also we lcomes thi s ,  if only because 
they are we ll aware that ,  in the larger view , unre lieved Me lanesian 
frustrations and tensions find express ion in hostility to the 
authorities . Indeed there are strong latent anti Administration 
sentiments among even ' o fficial ' Melane sians . It was , after all , 
the firm demand of the Promotion Melanesienne that resulted in the 
concepts of propriete clanique and clan councils being approved . 
This wil l  go some way to transferring responsibility to wi der 
circles o f  Me lanesians , hope fully crossing political lines and 
helping to se cure agreements on the al location of land . 
However , there is sti l l  a possibility that the clan counci ls 
and the creation of proprietes claniques wi l l  be regarded by many 
of the FI as too o fficial and too circumscribed . Certainly Wahuzue , 
Parawi-Reybas and o ther ' pro Adminis tration ' Melanesians distrust 
the capac ity of their own people to make an equitable dis tribution . 
They import a strong ' e conomi c '  elemen t into the ir views on l and 
redistribution and suspect that the Independan ti stes ' concept of 
returning to the pre- coloni zation distribution wi ll disadvantage 
some of the more populous land-short groups . The of ficial land 
re form could lose much of its poten tial for satis fying ' politi cal ' 
grievances by al lowing such divis ions to emerge among Melanes ians 
in its application . 
There is therefore much to be said for the view that some FI 
spokesmen and the anthropo logist Jean Guiart are now trying to 
impress upon the Admini stration , name ly , that a bold strategy is 
required of using the new le gal powers to buy out settlers in 
entire di stri cts and re turn the land , including the domaine land 
and the zone mari time ,  to the Melanes ians , of all persuasions , 
leaving them to work out the ir own clan distribution . Once as sured 
that they can reestablish their bas ic customary rights , Guiart 
argues , Me lanesians wil l be generous , as they were in the Tchamba 
val ley experiment of 196 0-6 1 ,  not only to other land-short 
Me lanesians but also to bona fi de farme rs of the old settler 
families . This is almost certainly correct . A bo ld redis tribution , 
probably larger than the 10 , 000 ha per year now proposed,  would go 
a long way to sati sfy hi stor ic grievances in who le di stri cts , 
giving ful l  re sponsib i l i ty to Melane sians and ob liging them to fu lly 
confront the ir own divi sions , hope fu l ly as a pre lude to reso lving 
them . 
Some of ficials are certainly not unwil ling to approach thi s 
view of reform,  especially for the East Coast . It is not beyond 
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their imaginations that - despi te the widespread settler pre j udi ce 
against black l andlords - settlers may eventual ly be come tenants 
of Melane sian c lans ( as was accepted by M Di j oud in the construction 
of the Vanuatu consti tution ) . Ce rtainly there has been a notable 
willingnes s  among some o ffi cials to be flexible and innovative in 
land matters , and to modi fy some of their national hab i ts of over­
regulated , over-pre cise , over- s upervis ed admini stration - habits 
which have histori cally been the obs tacle to devolution o f  
responsibi lity in most French Terri tories . 
But the imp lementation of a bold s trategy in land re form should 
also involve keeping the settler community more or less in support ,  
for to override se ttler hostility too dras ti cal ly i s  to further 
increase the enmity between settle rs and Melanesians and de stroy 
whatever meagre chances remain of creating true community among 
the diverse peoples o f  New Caledonia . Certain ly , at present , the 
centri sts - Ai fa , Morle t ,  Cherrier , etc . - are in the ascendant 
and they have committed themselve s  to a ' political ' land re form . 
To push much harder involves a risk o f  the breakdown o f  the 
Governing Maj ority . The centri sts , and the French government , would 
not be at all unhappy if a new alignment could be made wi th the UC , 
and indeed overtures have been made to the UC leaders . But they 
are ho lding firmly to the FI and to the concept of Independance 
Kanak . 
In the l ast resort , the shape o f  the land re form thus depends 
upon , rather more than it will determine , the outcome of the larger 
political/racial s truggle . The central tenet and minimal demand o f  
Independance Kanak i s  Me lane s i an primacy . For many o f  the FI , l and 
re form is only a facet , perhaps the maj or face t ,  . o f  a s truggle for 
ful l autonomy - po litical , e conomic and cultural - for the Kanak 
people . Not even return of all the land would ne cessarily sati s fy 
that demand . 
On the other hand the se ttlers cannot feel easy about their 
future in a Me lanesi an-dominated re gime . Perhaps the concept of 
Independance Kanak as de fined by the UC might j us t  sati s fy some o f  
th e  settlers . I t  i s  easy to believe , i n  talking with Tj ibaou and 
hi s col leagues , that the Melane sians wi ll indeed be re asonable and 
not discriminating against non Kanaks who are bona fi de workers for 
a Caledonian society . But mos t  se ttlers are apprehensive that the 
attitude s o f  the Me lane sians are e s sentially racist and that the 
posi tion of non Kanaks will be very insecure once the ' multi­
racial ' approach that has legitimated whi te dominance is abandoned .  
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THE OUTLOOK 
Prediction is hazardous , given the comp lexity of the 
situation,  but assessments of likely developments are constantly 
demanded by Australians concerned about the region .  The fol lowing 
is offered as an individual interpretation of the situation 
according to the evidence up to 1980 . 
The evolution o f  pol i tics i n  New Ca ledonia wi ll be determined 
by the balance of physi ca l  s trength a nd will of the three distinct 
cul tural groups - the representatives of the French s tate , the 
Caledonian settlers , and the Kanak na tionalists . It wil l  be 
convenient to look a t  each o f  these i n  tur n ,  then a t  their inter­
action .  
( a )  The French state 
The depth of the political polar i zation in New Caledonia 
between Kanaks and non Kanaks is largely the result of selfish and 
maladroit poli cies by the French government in the Gaul list period . 
Up to that po int Paris had sought to mute the underlying co nflict 
between resurgent Melanesians and defensive whi te settlers by 
rej ecting, for example , the establishment of separate electoral 
co lleges for black and whi te ,  and by opening up , through the 
application of the loi-cadre , increasing devo lution of poli tical 
respo ns ib i l i ty to the Terri tory . The UC , then a ful ly multi­
racial party, o ffered s cope for the aspirations of both main races 
to be ch�nnelled i nto normal pol i tical-admini strative proces ses . 
The society would have become i n  time more and more Melanes ian in 
character , but with legal adjustment o f  issues like land , wi th 
rac ial tolerance ,  and with co ntinued links with France .  The quasi­
coup o f  19 58-63 s tulti fied those pro cesses and forced pol i ti cs into 
more radi cal channels , encouraging Kanak nationalism and the deline 
o f  the UC as the party embracing the broad middle ground of 
politi cs . The conservatives sowed the wi nd and reaped the whirl­
wind , and they continue to do so . 
In engaging i tsel f  so s trongly in the period 19 58 to 1969 , 
and holding mos t  real authority in i ts own hands , the French state 
entered upon powers and responsibil i ties which it will have 
difficulty in rel inqui shi ng even i f  i t  wi shes to . The threat o f  
racial violence , eas i ly controllable in 1958 , h a s  now become very 
r eal ; so has the Terr itory ' s  fiscal dependency on the French grant . 
The more France assumes the respons ibi li ty ,  the greater the 
dependency of the Territory , as the FI points out . I t  is a sel f­
j usti fying prophecy whi ch has suited French interes ts . 
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The costs in money , opprobrium and perhaps blood o f  such 
a s i tuation would normal ly have led the Br itish to try to divest 
themselves of direct rule , whi le seeking to retain national 
advantages by other means . Not so the French . The reasons are 
complex and often subtle - more so than many ' Anglo-Saxon ' 
observers recognize , and worthy of closer s crutiny . 
From 1958 to the ear ly 1970s certainly , naked self- interes t  
was dominant . French ministers did not seek t o  c loak the impor­
tance of ni ckel as a s trategic metal . The dire ct participation of 
the French s tate in the Societe Le Ni ckel , and be tween French 
pol i ticians such as President Pompidou and the Roths child Bank , 
explain the frank subordination of the New Caledonian economy to 
the interests of the metropole ,  and the assumption o f  the nece ssary 
pol i tical control to ensure i t .  Even the bus ine ssmen o f  the right 
in New Caledonia comp lain of the extent of thi s  control , parti cu­
larly in the tight re gula tion of n i cke l production , and the 
exclusion of foreign investors from the nicke l indus try . 
Thi s  is still largely true today . In National As sembly 
debates on New Caledonia , government speakers still refer to the 
importance of nickel and the need for France , not the Territory , 
to control the mining indus try ( see s tatement by Di joud , AN , 
Proces- verbal 25 November 19 78 : 369 6 ) . But i t  is an obvious ly 
de clining importance . Whereas in 19 76 France acqui red about 75 per 
cent of he r nickel from New Caledonia , in 19 80 the proportion had 
fallen be low 45 per cent , and for 1981 France (which contro l s  
quotas under the loi Bi llotte o f  19 69 ) has ordered a further 
reduction in production . S ince the devaluations of the North 
Ameri can do llar in the mid 19 70s and the opening of new mines in 
Indone s i a ,  nicke l from Canada and Indone sia is more compe titive . 
Thi s  i s  one of the reasons why some of the lo cal dire ctors of the 
SLN have fli rted with Independence , whi ch might enable them to cut 
free of ties with the French franc ,  French quo tas and French 
sal ary structure s ,  and perhaps again be come compe ti tive . 
Nicke l exploi tation i s  not now a suffi cient reason for France 
to s tay in New Caledonia , though the denial of the re source to 
other powers remains impor tant . The National As sembly debates 
re fer also to the exploi tation o f  the new o cean i c  resource s 
accorded by the 200 mi le terri torial waters . They also refer to 
the nuc lear te sting programme centred on French Polynes ia which 
i s  regarded as an ensemble wi th New Caledonia and the Territory 
of Wal lis and Futuna . For the Gis cardians as for the Gaul l i s ts , 
and perhaps the Socia l i s ts too , French Oceania repre sents France 
in the world at large , sus taining he r self-image as a wor ld power , 
parti cularly as an independent mar i time and nuclear power . ( See , 
for example , s tatements in AN , Proces-verbal by Di joud , 12 May 19 78 : 
166 6 ;  Debre , 13 May 19 78 : 166 1 ;  Gaston Flos se ,  16 November 1 9 7 8 : 
769 5 , 3 1  October 19 78 : 9 2 3 8 ;  Piot , 3 1  October 19 79 : 9 2 39 ;  and 
Lafleur , 31 October 19 79 : 9 24 1 . )  
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I n  thi s  context the ancient rivalry with the ' Anglo-Saxon ' 
world i s  a vi tal and powerful force . The reluctance of Frenchmen , 
including those who favour decoloni zation , to see New Caledonia 
become an area o f  ' Anglo-Saxon ' - particular ly Aus tralian -
influence i s  very real . 
Moreover , it is important that New Caledonia i s  the l ast 
remaining French Territory which i s  deemed a settlement colony . 
Al though the government explicitly s tates that Terr i tory interests 
would in the last resort be sub j ect to the superior interests o f  the 
metropole (AN , Proces-verbal : Di j oud , 12 May 1978 : 1666 ; F lo s se , 
16 November 19 7 8 : 76 9 5 ) , and the French pub lic i s  normally indif­
ferent to the interests o f  a few thousand settlers at the opposite 
end of the globe , the concept o f  the right of French national s  to 
be protected i s  a power ful pol i tical symbol ,  for the Gaul lists in 
particular , and could be used to embarras s  any government which 
overrode them too blatantly . 
Thus , even though in s tr ict economi c terms New Caledonia may 
already be a net liability ,  France ' s  conception o f  her plac e in the 
world is a very sub s tantial rea son for her continued presence . 
Even though the Soc iali s t  and Conununist speakers denounce the 
colonial nature of the e conomic system which creates a condition 
of imbalance and underdevelopment in New Caledonia , a government 
of the left would be very re luctant to open itself to charges o f  
dimini shing French power and influence o r  abandoning French 
c i ti zens . It could no t eas i ly o f fer Independence in the absence 
of an electoral ma jority for Independence , whatever i ts sympathies 
wi th Kanak claims . 
Final ly , there i s  a s trong conunitment still to a concept o f  
' civi li zing mi ss ion ' ,  o f  the duty o f  France , b y  means o f  her 
culture and her institutions , to subsume narrow sectional interes ts 
and to instil order . The racial c la ims of non French are regarded 
as narrowly atavistic and dangerous , to be muted in the spread of 
French enlightenment �  Views such as these are sometimes stated in 
the Nationa l Assembly ( for examp le AN , Proces-verbal 10 June 19 80 : 
1689 ) and are certainly hel d  pass ion ately by , for example , young 
French s chool teachers in New Caledonia . 
Thus , a l though the government o f fi cially states that it wi l l  
remain i n  New Caledoni a  only a s  long as a ma j ority wi shes it , there 
is little s ign as yet of a weakening of resolve to play the 
paternali stic rol e . M Di j oud and metropolitan o fficials both 
exhibit some di sdain for what they s ee as the petty and sectional 
quality of the par ty leaders in New Caledonia and express a firm 
determination to obl ige them to make concessions and come to terms 
with each other . Moreover , M Di j oud and successive high conunis­
s ioners have frequently stated their determination to use force to 
suppress extremism and enforce the l aw .  And indeed there is little 
doubt that the s tate retains ample po lice power to restrain 
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systematic extra- legal action and violence . Al though there has 
been exces sive use o f  force by police , as at the demonstration 
involving lyceens on 25 August 19 79 , the present high commissioner , 
Claude Charbonniaud , has shown some skill in the use of state 
power in potentially explosive si tuations . For example , on the 
morning of 6- 7 January 1980 a police inspector named Ferriot , 
living at Mont Dore , east of Noumea , ( and according to Roch Pid jo t  
(AN , Proces-verbal 1 2  January 19 80 : 35 )  a member o f  MOP) shot dead 
a Me lanesian named Theodore Daye and wounded another ,  apparently 
after the inspector and his wife and child had been accosted and 
assaul ted by a group of drunken Me lanes ians as the French fami ly 
drove home from town . The violence of the incident , on both sides , 
is a not altogether surprising product of an endemically sour 
si tuation between Melanesian squatters on the beach , sometimes 
drunken and volati le , and the prosperous bourgeoisie in the houses 
above , sheltered behind strong fences and signs saying ' Propriete 
privee ' and ' chien mechan t ' . This in turn exempli fies the divided 
society , the mutual distanc ing , hos tility and contempt of the two 
main races , and the siege mentality o f  many settlers , which are 
the product of 123 years of unhappy co loni zation . M Charbonniaud 
acted quickly to defuse the situation . Ferriot was arrested and 
tried for murder . He was found guilty only of manslaughter and 
sentenced to five years imprisonment .  This did not entirely sati s fy 
the FI , but the rule of law looks rather more even-handed than it 
did when Kamouda was ki lled in 1975 . 
As long as France is prepared to use the police and gendarmerie 
coo lly ,  and to back them with the continued pre sence of about 2 , 500 
troops , po litical mi li tancy is likely to be contained though 
sporadic acts of violence wil l no t be entirely prevented . ( Since 
this text was written , M Pierre De clercq , se cre tary-general of the 
UC , was shot dead in his Noumea home on 19 September 19 8 1 .  Serious 
rioting and large-scale po liti cal rallies subsequently occurred in 
bo th Noumea and rural areas . A young French settler has been 
arrested and charged with De clercq ' s  murder , amidst Melane sian 
claims that groups of armed settlers have ' hit li sts ' o f  
Independantiste leaders . )  
(b)  The settlers 
Many - o f  the recent migrants who have settled in Noumea and 
experienced mixed e conomic fortunes are not s trongly committed to 
New Caledonia . More are now leaving than are coming in and i f  
political violence developed many more would hasten to catch 
their p lanes . The old settler families , and others who have 
invested deeply , are another matter . Their ties wi th the country , 
indeed with parti cular farms or townships in the bush , are strong 
and emotional . Many would be as loath to surrender their land 
and the ir way of li fe as their Australian or New Zealand counter­
parts , and would be prepared , given suf fic ient opportuni ty ,  to 
65 
fight to preserve them . This ( among other less admirable things ) 
was demonstrated in Algeria and in the rebellion in Vanuatu . 
The rebe llion on the island of Espiritu Santo was e ssentially 
a move by French and other settlers and Amer ican speculators , 
playing upon local indigenous prej udices against central government 
author ity , to force constitutional rearrangements which would 
support their property interests . The constitution agreed upon in 
October 1979 had cancelled all previous proprietary land ti tles 
held by non�indigenous citizens , and the victory o f  the Vanuaku 
Party (which for years had been campaigning for the return o f  
plantation land t o  the customary owner s )  suggested that even 
leaseholds might not be readily forthcoming . Some French offi cials 
fooli shly became implicated in the rebellion and Di j oud ' s  s tatements 
about ensuring that French l ives and property would be protected 
served to encourage the rebels . Some of the settlers in New 
Caledonia ,  having similar concerns about land and the place of 
settlers vis-a-vis re surgent Kanaks , inevi tably sympathi zed wi th 
the rebels - some of whom were close friends and kinsmen . The 
right-wing press raised the possibility of a ' Nownea-Santo axi s ' .  
The defeat o f  the rebe llion threw into New Caledonia a wave 
of settler ' re fugees ' who complained bitterly not only about the 
mi litant Kanaks but about what they saw as a betrayal by the French 
state and by Di j oud in particular . They have lent their support 
to the opponents o f  land re form in New Caledonia and they are 
widely believed by the FI to be armed and to have the elements o f  
mi litary organization . With organi zational bases in Noumea as wel l  
as the bush townships , these new settlers d o  no t trust the state 
to safeguard the ir intere sts and some certainly contemplate the 
possibility of independent action to take power rather than concede 
authority to the Melanesians . Mos t  Melanesians are contemptuous of 
their actual capacity to do so , but unti l  the victory of Mitterand 
in the French pres idential elections of 198 1  some of the FI were 
apprehensive of the possibi lity of ill-considered actions by 
radical Melanes ians being used as the pretext for a rightis t  coup , 
as in 1958 . Since Mitterand ' s  vic tory the possibility of such an 
outcome has all but disappeared . 
It should be recognized ,  however , ( not least in Australia) 
that while many of the Caldoche (whi te Caledonians ) are narrow , 
greedy and il liberal people , many others are no t .  Those who are 
not include , for example , many who were in the UC but who feel 
that the concept of Independance Kanak cannot be supported 
be cause its emphasis on the primacy of one race would render the 
situation of other races - even longstanding Caledonians -
subordinate and precarious . They do not regard metropolitan France 
as ' home ' and some of them want to create a Caledonian society , 
autonomous , and liberal , but es sentially multi-ethnic .  Many have 
left active pol itics ,  disil lusioned with the frus trations and the 
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sectional pas sions which have been generated b y  the p res sure- cooker 
e ffect of the abrogation of the normal channels of politica l 
expression and responsib ility . France would do we l l  to recreate 
the conditions under which s uch people might reengage in active 
political li fe .  
The Wal li s  Island and French Polynesian settlers are key 
sections o f  the population . Many of them have become di s i llusioned 
with being clients o f  the French in an economy which cannot provide 
enough j obs . They acknowledge the p ressure the Mel anesians can 
bring to bear to prevent them taking up lan d ,  and many also acknow­
ledge the val idity of Me lanesian customary c laims based on concepts 
identical to their own . Some are wil ling to enter into di alogue 
with the Me lanes ians in order . to determine whether their future 
might be better in a Me lanesian-led state . 
( c ) The Kanaks 
There is sti l l  among some settlers a dangerous tendency to 
think o f  the Independence movement as something es sentially 
dependent upon the actions o f  a radical minority . Such a view 
seriously underes timates the extent to which Melanes ians throughout 
the Terri tory have been fired by the prospect of emerging into ful l  
self-determination . Most Me lanes ians are s trongly commi tted to the 
concept of Independance Kanak . Anything less than that -
Independance Cal edonienne for examp le - is di s trusted as l ikely to 
involve the continued subordination o f  Mel anes i ans to white se ttlers . 
The freedom and dignity and s e l f-respe ct involved in Independance 
Kanak is a much richer prospect than the material gains or the 
s tate patronage o f  Me lane sian culture whi ch the Di j oud plan offers , 
and the French government would be very foo lish to bel ieve that i t  
can easily supplant the one for the o ther . Perhaps France h a s  had 
a deceptive succes s  in French Polynesia . There the indi genous 
people appear , for the present , to have suc cumbed to the flow o f  
spending which accompanied the nuclear programme and the granting 
of local o ff ice and limi ted lo cal autonomy ; they have left the outer 
islands , emasculated the ir ancient culture for the prospect o f  
good wages in Papee te , and muted the earl ier demands for 
Independence . But thi s  success depends on continued e conomi c 
indulgence , and , in any case , Melanesia is di f ferent . Me lane sian 
cultures have shown themselve s  to be more clo sed , less wi l ling to 
compromi se in essen�ial s .  Moreover ,  in New Caledonia the indigenous 
people lost more and have much more to regain . The leaders o f  
what is after all s t i l l  much the largest ethnic group in the 
Territory - the ma jority group until nearly 1960 and , wi th the 
di scontinuance of mi gration , slowly incre asing its proportion o f  
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the total l - wi l l  be loath to settle for less than primacy in some 
form of emergent New Caledonian state . The very threat impl ied in 
the Di joud plan , that new development and new immigration wil l  
further reduce the Melanesian proportion of the population and 
wil l  cause their opportunity to pas s , cer tainly makes many Melane­
sians more determined not to cooperate , and makes - some of them 
likely to be more reckless in their methods if their ob j ectives 
are frustrated by obvious ly manipulative devices such as were used 
in the past . 
Moreover , for most Melanes ians Independance Kanak appears 
increasingly imminent and inevitable . Thi s  is largely the result 
of their interpretation o f  the histor ic forces o f  de coloni zation 
in the wor ld at large and in Oceania in parti cular . Continued 
French rule appears more and more anoma lous . The Independence o f  
Vanuatu i s  seen as presaging that o f  New Caledonia . Coming o n  top 
of the sympathy expressed towards FI emis saries by Paci fic govern­
ments , the success in Vanuatu of a Me lanes ian ( and regional ) 
mi litary intervention against right-wing reaction was a heady 
experience . In 1980 it appeared to many Paci fic I slanders that 
New Caledonian Independence must indeed be imminent ,  and some F I  
leader s were emboldened to s e t  dates for a Declaration o f  Indepen­
dence ( 24 September 1982 and Christmas 198 3  have been mentioned) . 
Their diplomacy within the region has intensi fied as has the 
redoub ling of effort to organi ze Melanesians at local leve l within 
New Caledonia . There i s  also discussion ( though not adopted po licy) 
of forming groups o f  Me lanes ian ex- soldiers and ri f le c lubs because 
' they ' ( the settlers ) are armed ( Union Caledonienne , Report of 
the XI Congre ss , 1980 : 3 ) . 
But the expectation that the success of Independence movements 
in the region wi l l  somehow logical ly lead to the Independence o f  
New Caledonia i s  misleading . In the l a s t  re sort ( in the absence o f  
a common frontier with another such struggle )  the New Caledonian 
Independence movement must be worked out es sential ly wi thin New 
1 The pro jections for 19 85 , based on exi sting natal ity rate and a 
nil ba lance of migration are 
Europeans 
Me lanesians 
Polynes ians 
Others 
Total 
5 2 , 56 1 
( 34 . 3  per cent ) 
6 7 , 306 
( 44 per cent ) 
2 0 , 2 7 8  
( 1 3 per cent) 
12 , 516 
( 8  per cent) 
15 2 , 66 1 
( Servi ce de la Stati stique , ' La population de la Nouvelle 
Caledonie , Notes and Documents No . 4 ' , February 19 80 . )  
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Caledonia . Given the continued determination o f  both the French 
government and the settler majori ty in New Caledonia , and their 
wi l lingness to defy external disapprovals , 'Independance Kanak ' is 
not ye t assured . A premature De claration o f  Independence , while 
l ikely to be o f  considerable propaganda value to the F I , i s  also 
like ly to ge t the partic ipants arres ted . None o f  the regional 
powers has o ffered sanctuary for a government in exile and , hope­
fully,  none would take on the French army . The FI from time to 
time talk of support from Cuba or Algeria or Libya . I t  may come , 
in the form of money , or even in smuggled arms or bombs to be 
exploded in Pari s .  But there i s  no close base for actual mil i tary 
support and the regional powers ,  including Australi a ,  would 
unanimously re ject assistance from such quarters .  The FI threat 
to dal ly wi th such people ,  whi le not to be taken l i ghtly , may in 
the end prove counter-productive . 
Never the less there are some trends within New Caledonia which 
favour the FI cause . These are partly demographi c ;  the proportion 
of French and other settlers in the population will continue to 
fall ( unless there is an unforeseeable e conomic miracle ) while that 
of the Melane sians grows . Secondly , the Me lane sian population i s  
very young - hal f  o f  it be low the age o f  twenty- five . These young 
people are now passing through good education but into unemployment ,  
and into sub-standard l iving conditions both o n  the reserves and 
the Noumea suburbs . In short they are be coming both more aware and 
more di ssatis fied . They are be coming a more volatile proletariat , 
much less constrained by the customs o f  the ir fathers and the 
moderate po litics of the older non-violent leaders like Roch Pidjot . 
They are a dynamic force which wi l l  strengthen , not abate . At 
present they are il l-or ganized but brooding and hostile . The 
potential for conflict between them and the adamant right i s  
considerable . Unfortunate ly , now , s o  i s  their distrus t  o f  all 
non-Kanaks .  They too are part o f  the harvest that the conservative , 
colonial-minded power-brokers wil l reap . 
( d) The interaction 
The outcome of the interaction of the forces outlined wi l l  be 
a matter of power and of pol i ti cal will founded upon deep cultural 
values . In the immediate future F rance , and the settlers , wi l l  
concede t o  the Me lanesians , vi a the land reform , much of the rural 
area , e spec ially the East Coas t .  They wi l l  not , however ,  read ily 
concede their control of the south or of the overal l political 
process . De spite increasingly mi litant acts by radical Me lanesians , 
whi ch mus t come , the combination of metropolitan and settler power 
wi l l  contain any widespread or systemati c attempt to challenge the 
existing political order through extra-legal means . Independance 
Kanak wi ll not be won , in the short run , by direct action or 
external d iplomacy , though a continuance of such dip lomacy , and 
exis ting Fabian tactics internally , will win further recognition 
of Melanesian grievances .  
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The Independence parties must rely largely , for the pursuit of 
their cause , on the e lectoral proces se s . In this regard i t  is just 
conceivable that , with the departure of some of the settlers , the 
attainment of. voting age by more young Melanesians , and the switching 
of vote s by some of the Polyne sian mi grants (provided the Melanesians 
make them. a c lear and generous offer of acce ss to land and ci tizen­
ship under Independance Kanak) , the Independantistes could win a 
ma j ority in a future e lection . There remains , however , the possi­
bility that the settlers would attempt to frustrate such an e lectoral 
verdi ct by means o f  a coup , as in 1958 or more recently in Santo . 
Much would then depend upon the atti tude of the French government 
and army ; but the possibi lity of civi l war - race war - would be 
high . 
Such an outcome , opening New Caledonia to extremist pol itics 
and international adventures of right or lef t ,  would be unacceptable 
to the region , and to Austral ia , as it was in Vanuatu in 1980 . What 
precisely would be done about it would depend upon France ' s  
willingne ss to accep t  a democratic result and ( i f  necessary) the 
wi l lingness of her partners in the Wes tern alliance , including 
Aus tralia and the United States , to remind her where her honour as 
a defender o f  democratic l iberties truly lies . 
But it is unlikely that New Caledonian pol itics ,  in the next 
few years at leas t ,  will produce an electoral ma j ority for Indepen­
dence - or at least for Independance Kanak . The root dilemma , and 
one to which more and more Caledonians will be addressing themselves , 
is whether one must conclude that one or other race in New Cal edoni a 
mus t  be dominan t ,  and exploit the others ,  or whether a genuine 
Caledonian community with some sor t of acceptable multi-racial ism can 
yet be achieved . It is now dangerously late to hope for such an 
outcome ; such is the legacy of conservative , colonial and anti­
democratic poli tics of previous decades that Melanesians and 
settlers are now largely polari zed ( notwithstanding a minority o f  
Mel anesians like Ukeiwe i n  official positions ) . But not to work 
for it seems to doom the is land to intensifying confrontation , or 
at best to a formal stabili ty achieved only out of common fear o f  
French police power , to sullen muted hostility and apathy instead 
of dynamism . That must indeed be a melancholy prospect· for 
thoughtful Frenchmen to contemplate . 
What prosp�cts remain , however , for the creation of genuine 
community between the e thnic groups in New Caledonia? This is 
c learly the expressed wish of those c entri st po liticians who are 
genuinely suppor ting reform , and no doubt it is also the real 
preference of the Mitterand government . 
The unfortunate paradox is that the very direct involvement 
of the state in trying to engineer such an outcome , inherently 
threatens , as much as promotes , a sense of community in New Caledonia . 
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Thi s is partly because the state - any s tate b u t  espe cial ly the 
French s tate , remote as it is and repre sented essentially by 
o fficials on tours o f  duty - i s  an unsub tle ins trument for handling 
inter-cultural problems of the utmost intri cacy , like the land 
question or mul ti-cul tural education . S chemes developed ' from 
outs ide ' ,  by the mos t  talented and wel l-intended o fficials , are 
inherently unl ikely to apprehend the intricacies of a society as 
dis tant from the European as i s  the Me lanes ian society . Moreover , 
some o fficials are basically out of sympathy with what they con­
sider to be outrageous and reactionary Me lanesian demands , and 
respond to them only sluggishly . 
But the more fundamental weakness of state paternalism is the 
inevitable fact that , because the state takes the responsibility ,  
and withholds it from ( in this case) the New Caledonians , extreme 
demands are encouraged rather than discouraged , and community 
weakens rather than grows . Part of the prob lem , as mentioned 
earlier , is that the concepts of the Dij oud plan are too late and 
too limi ted . Over the last decade the FI has emerged and formulated 
its position and programme . I ts bas ic demand s - for a devolution 
of authority leading to Independence - having been denied , it holds 
aloof and re j ects intrinsically good measures one after another . 
M Dij oud regularly invited its l eader s to participate , but on terms 
which , to the FI leaders ,  involved denial , or at least fatal delay , 
of programmes for which they had been elected . 
For these reasons important groups of settlers - bus inessmen 
and intellectual s - have again begun to talk of ' Independance 
Caledonienne ' .  Senator Lionel Cherrier has spoken of a ' Common­
wealth ' relationship , and among o fficials and politic ians di scussion 
of a further revision of the Terr itory statute is widespread . Some 
suggestions have been made that it should go as far as the Cook 
Islandsmode l , 1 but most re ference among the settlers and officials 
is to the statute of French Po lynesia . This involves a responsible 
Governing Counci l  elected by the maj ority in the Terri torial 
Assembly and de liberating without the high commissioner . I t  could 
involve ministerial direction of the civi l service . A bold and 
progress ive Governing Council could also conceivably increase 
taxation and reform salary struc ture s to reduce the dependency 
upon France , promote ' Territoriali zation ' of education , and 
ins ti tute economic measures which re form the co lonial nature of 
the economy . 
1 The essential feature of which is that the Cook I slands may opt 
for ful l  independence wi thout any necessary reference to the 
New Zealand parliament .  
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Some members o f  the FNSC glimpsed the se po ssibilitie s . Some 
even approached the UC about forming a new and progress ive coalition . 
But the UC declined . Anything short of ful l  Independence i s  
unacceptable .to all the Melanes ian parties , and the radical 
sections of the FI denounce moves leading to a ' bour geois indepen­
dence ' .  
In the short run then , the pol ic ies o f  the centri sts like 
Cherrier and Morlet are likely to be frus trated . But there has 
not yet been a serious attempt to bui l d  a Caledonian society wi th 
a genuine acce ssion to political responsibility .  There are 
important elements of f luidity in the s i tuation stil l . Many of the 
Mel anesians are strongly opposed to the use of force , both on 
pr inciple and for fear of its futi li ty and danger . They wi l l  con­
tinue to work within the electora l process . The reform programme , 
while unl ikely to command widespread support , may have the two­
fol d  e ffect of inducting some Melanesians into positions o f  
re sponsibil ity and simultaneously convincing them of the selfish­
ne ss , bankruptcy and dangers of the politics of the right . Many 
Wal l i s  I s landers and Tahitians have become disil lusioned with 
French paternali sm and would almost certainly we lcome a genuine 
devolution of power to New Caledoni a  itse l f . 
Among the Europeans there are old divi sions between peti ts 
blancs and grands colons , between Caldoche fami lies of three 
generations and recent metropolitan arrivals ,  and between 
socialists and communi sts on the one hand and Gaul li sts or 
Gi scardians on the o ther . They are greatly divided and uncertain . 
Al l that the 19 79 e lection showed was that they are , for the most 
part ( despite M Lafleur and his group) opposed to departmentali zation 
with France and to Independance Kanak as hi therto presented . 
Di si llus ionment wi th the Di j oud plan paradoxi cally reinforced the 
common ground of the Caldoche , even of the right , and the 
Independantistes on the key point : a disl ike o f  paternalistic 
metropolitan direction . The debate on the reforme fonciere 
actually produced some dialogue between the two , and an affirmation 
from speakers of the FI that they would rather be given the money 
and al lowed to deal directly with the settlers - and that they had 
no desire to evict longstanding and genuine bush farmers . 
I t  is jus t conceivable that out o f  all thi s , and out o f  the 
posi tive encouragement o f  a l iberal revis ion of the Territory 
statute , combined with the poli cing of actions outside the law ,  
New Caledonian pol i tics could b e  contained wi thin legal/democratic 
channels and that new poli ti cal conste llations could form . There 
would seem to be clear advantages to the Kanaks to continue wi th 
the ir hitherto highly succe ss ful Fabian tacti cs , seeking support 
from sec tions of the Polynes ians and the whites , and to avoid 
actions which could precipitate a debacle . Certainly they must 
apprehend that their goal s can only be attained by securing 
7 2  
re cognition o f  their views wi thin New Caledonia ;  the friendly 
reception given to the ir outs ide diplomacy , whi le important , is 
no sub stitute for thi s given the l imited capacity of other states 
to bring pres sure on France , espe cially in the absence o f  an 
ele ctoral ma jority for Independence . 
Conversely there would seem to be many advantages to the non 
Kanaks in understanding what ' Independance Kanak ' ,  as defined by 
Tj ibaou and the UC , really means , and perceiving the advantages it 
could o ffer in terms both of the dignity of sel f-respons ibi lity 
and the material advantages of reduced exploi tation by the 
metropole .  
This phase o f  dialogue between the moderate Kanaks and the 
progress ive settlers has scarce ly begun , but assuming that the 
Kanaks cannot win alone - or no t at least without going through a 
physi cal confrontation of unpredi ctable outcome - they must win 
support from a substantial se ction of the settlers for the concept 
of shaping a new autonomous New Caledonian society , which may , in 
the normal course of politic s , give Me lanesians a preponderance 
commensurate with their numbers but would not s imply override the 
combined interests o f  the settler groups . The exigencies of the 
si tuation may , however ,  have to reveal themselves more starkly 
be fore the proponents of ' Independance Kanak ' or ' Independance 
Caledonienne ' ,  of ' bourgeois '  _or ' sociali s t ' mode ls find common 
ground in the renewed pursuit of an autonomous Oceanian society . 
What is the likely attitude o f  the metropole to thi s proce ss? 
In the light of its recent de fence po licy statements the Mitterand 
government wi ll presumably continue to pursue a modi fied version o f  
France ' s  traditional Pacific region po licie s , which , i n  turn , re late 
to the determined assertion of French power in the world , based on 
the independent nuclear/mi li tary capacity . France ' s  commitment to 
a ' multi-racial ' posi tion for New Caledonia has been partly to 
underwrite her continued presence in the Paci fic , partly out of 
concern for the settlers in New Caledonia,  and partly from convic­
tions about the universal applicability of French values and 
institutions . The se atti tudes carry the grave danger that the 
portended changes o f  policy in New Caledonia wi ll be only a variant 
on existing ones : too ungenerous ,  too settler-oriented , too set on 
emphas i zing France and French culture rather than New Caledonia 
and New Caledonian culture and as such unable to draw off Kanak 
mi litancy into legal/constitutional channels . There is still a 
risk of over reliance on repre ssion and on the maintenance of the 
old colonial structures with the ir inherent ins tability .  
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( d) Impli cations 
If the above analysis is an accurate asses sment of the si tuation 
in New Caledonia ,  two conclusions would appear to follow . First , 
it would indeed be dangerous for the French state to relax its 
authority abruptly or prematurely ; secondly , while the French state 
does remain in strength the emergence of true community in New 
Caledonia is not possible .  The reso lution of the paradox is to be 
found in the certain and pro gressive withdrawal of the authority 
of Paris over a stated period of time and after it has ins ti tuted 
genuine structural reforms . Ultimately the spokesmen of the UC 
during the debate on the Di j oud plan are correct : there wi ll be no 
true drawing together of the ethnic groups until they are obliged 
to accept responsibi lity and work out compromi ses in the evolution 
of a fully sel f-determining autonomous society responsible for its 
own land dis tribution , its own economy , its own education system , 
its own levels of salaries and social welfare bene fits , and 
eventually its own po lice force s and enforcement of law and order . 
Only with responsibility wil l come real wi sdom . In this regard the 
FI would have much to think through . How wi ll they dis tribute the 
land among contending customary claimants , after a century of re­
location? What land rights or citi zenship conditions will they 
offer the ethnic minor ities , including the French and the Wal li sians ? 
For their part , the other groups would be obliged to de cide what 
conditions they consider essential and what they can realistical ly 
expe ct in an autonomous New Caledonia , wi th the gendarmes and 
so ldiers withdrawn . That would be normal hea lthy politics ; and it 
would be entirely possible if the French state were to say , not 
' We are here for ten years during which we wi ll prove Independence 
to be a futi le goal ' ,  but ' We are going to be here for five or 
ten years at mo st,  and during that time we shal l help you , 
Melanesians , French , Wallisians and others , to work out the basic 
structures of your emergent Oceanic society with ultimate consti­
tutional arrangements open to review ' . In that society , whi le 
Kanaks may come eventual ly to a pr imacy commensurate with their 
number s ,  it should be entire ly possible for non Melanesians to 
live securely and in moderate prosperity . At this stage only a 
minority of Independan tistes want the French to go ; rather they 
want the rule of France and white exploitation to end . I f  that 
dis tinction could be made clear and grasped by more Frenchmen in 
New Caledonia the existing tensions would greatly re lax and much 
constructive thinking ensue . The respon sibi lity for communicating 
the dis tinction lies largely with the FI , bu t the repre sentative s 
of the French state could also do much to promote i t ,  instead of 
breathing portents o f  bloodshed and slaughter . Nor would living 
standards co l lapse with the withdrawal of mas sive French subs idies . 
If mining and other maj or companies regi stered in France and taxed 
in France were instead taxed in New Caledonia , i f  income tax was 
at reasonable level s ,  if even hal f of the investment presently 
placed outside New Caledonia by Lafleur , Pente cost , Laroche and 
others was pla ced ins ide the country , local ly-based enterpr ise 
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could be we ll- founded and lo cal service s maintained at a reasonable 
level . Certainly the lavi sh metropol i tan s alary levels would 
decline , but so too would the inflated cos ts of goods and services .  
In arguing for a genuinely locally-based economy , with its appro­
priate levels of revenue and expenditure , the UC speakers in 
February 19 79 had economi c rea son on the ir s ide . 
To embrace such a policy and e s tabl ish a timetable o f  c are ful 
evolution towards self-government and Independence Caledonienne ,  
would seem to o ffer only advantage s  to France . Firs t ,  she would 
avoid the opprobrium o f  sustaining an e s sential ly colonial relation­
ship and gain the international credit of shaping a democratic 
pluri-ethni c  society - albeit perhaps with the Mel anesians primus 
inter pares . Such a go al , one o f  the most pri zed and elusive in 
human history , is ye t po ssible under the aegis of a heri tage o f  
liberal French traditions and insti tutions , provided that basic 
Oceani c  realities are a lso re cogni zed and re co gn i zed promptly . 
Secondly , France need not lose any of her e s sential national 
intere s ts : naval bases , fisheries and oceanographic and other 
scienti fic research , agreements for the a cqui s i tion of strate gi c 
mineral s ,  would all be entirely po ssible under agreements with an 
autonomous New Caledonia .  Thi rd ly ,  France would e s cape the ri sks 
of being involved ever more deeply in po lice or mi li tary action , 
as i s - probable i f  Me lane sian radi calism increases . Fourthly , 
French Caledonian settlers could remain se cure and the influence 
of French language and cul ture remain we lcome and strong in thi s 
re gion . 
This is not to say that the French state has no cons tructive 
role to play in the immediate future . On the contrary . The l and 
que stion il lustrates thi s  we ll . Given the ir way , as they large ly 
were from 19 58 to 1978 , the conservative settlers would conduct 
no land re form which recogni zed specific Me lanes ian grievances ; 
al lowed to realize the ir ' global ' land demand , radi cal Me lane sians 
could well pre cipitate confusion and inj usti ce . The state does 
have a key role in ge tting a reasonable process o f  land redi stri­
bution moving and has sought to do that . Up ti l l  very recently 
it has lost much of the potential goodwi ll o f  that endeavour by 
seeking sti ll to dire ct the land re form too closely in too 
narrowly conce ived directions . It has thereby al ienated a good 
many whi le genuinely sati sfying very few . The application of the 
legislation of 1980 wil l show whether the state has learnt that 
it mus t ,  whi le prodding the exces sive ly conservative and 
restraining the exce s s ively mi l i tant , s till al low the real protago­
nists in the Territory to exerc i se respons ibi li ty . I t  is no t an 
8asy task . Some officials and pol iti cians deserve recogni tion for 
having got as far as they have . 
But certa inly France �;ould make re form more acceptable by not 
pr esenting parti cular re forms as de signed to forestall or frustrate 
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any one ultimate political/cons ti tutional outcome and to engineer 
another . In the grand de sign as we l l  as in the particular the art 
mus t  be to enable and to encourage Caledonians to take ini tia tives 
and make compromi ses but not to pre scribe the outcomes too closely . 
Aus tral ia ' s  responsibi lity 
The people of the small s tates of Oceania are inevitably con­
cerned with Kanak nationalism in New Caledonia , from ti es of colour 
and culture and shared re j e ction of colonialism .  They all look 
increas ingly to Aus tralia for her re sponse to the si tuation . 
Indeed Aus tralia has a considerable capacity to encourage or to 
res train the Oceanic s tates in their attitude to the French presence . 
In the event of any more serious crisis in New Caledonia , Australia ' s  
atti tude would be crucial and Paci fi c I s landers are prone to ask 
where Aus tralia would s tand in such an eventuality .  
On the o ther hand , French people i n  New Caledonia are prone 
to accuse Australian s  of unwarr anted interference in the Territory -
of blatan t anti -French and pro-Independan ti s te atti tudes . Certainly 
some of the Aus tralian media s tatements have been crude in the ir 
analysis and arrogant in their advo cacy . Moreover , Melane si ans as 
wel l  as se ttlers are we l l  aware of Aus tralia ' s  di smal record with 
the Aborigines and prone to re j e c t  Austral ian professions of con cern 
as hypocri tica l . There is too a very real apprehension that 
Aus tralia , which has hi s tori cally had imperialistic de signs of he r 
own in the South Pac ific , seek s to replace French inf luence with her 
own ; 1 even tho se French who favour the granting of Independence 
genuinely fear thi s  when Aus tralians vo ice the ir opinions . 
Australians , therefore , whi le de fending the right to an opinion 
in the affairs of the ir own region , have to exercise considerable 
care and responsibility in the expre s s ion of that opinion . They 
need not ,  however , remain mute . The sugge stion that Aus tral ians 
have di squalified themselves from a right to speak because of their 
treatment of the Aborigine s ( or New Zealanders in respect of the 
Maori ) is faci le . Of cour se Aus tral ians and New Zealanders mus t  
continue t o  put their own houses i n  order , but proportions do al ter 
1 An extraordinary novel Le General Chez les Canaques by the popu lar 
nove list Pierre Nemours ( Edi tions Fleuve No ir , Paris 19 7 5 )  deve lops 
its p lot round a conspiracy by Japane se and Aus tral ian bus ines smen 
to divide the region under the fa�ade of a Me lanes ian Confederation , 
ousting France in the proces s .  The novelist oc cas iona l ly adds 
rubrics purporting to be s cho larly . One , re ferring to London ' s  
pres sure on France to leave the New Hebrides adds : ' . . .  an evident 
aspiration by Aus tralia to leader ship of this region of the world 
i s  one of the components o f  thi s s i tuation ' .  
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cases . Aborigine s , and Mao ri s , are smal l minori ties in Aus tral i a  
and New Zealand ; Kanaks a r e  near ly 4 4  p e r  cent o f  New Caledoni a ' s  
population and decidedly the l ar ge st ethnic group . Furthermore , 
if moral right be comes the te s t  then Aus tralian s  and New Zealanders 
have a moral right - that earned by 100 , 00 0  war graves on French 
soi l ( 1 , 000 a lone in the war ceme tery at Bourail north of Noumea 
itself ) , graves o f  Australas ians who died in defence of the 
liberties of France and of New Cal edonia aga inst mi litarism and 
fas cism. With thi s  in mind Frenchmen - and Mel anesians - should 
not be surprised if Australian concern is s ti l l  displayed in 
respect o f  s tability and peace ful sel f-de termination i n  their own 
region . 
For that a fter all i s  the real basis o f  Austral ian interes t .  
New Caledonia is a p ivotal part o f  Oceania , o f  whi ch Austral i a  and 
New Zealand are also part . The s tab i l i ty o f  the region i s  crucial 
to Australasian security . Whi le many French settlers in New 
Caledonia retain homes in France and intend to go back there , 
Aus tralasians will not be going home to Europe . They are o f  the 
Oceanian region and they wi l l  certain ly claim an enti tlement to be 
concerned about what happens in New Caledonia . 
Yet equa l ly Aus tral i ans mus t have regard for the interests o f  
the French i n  New Cal edonia - o f  the many French fami l ies already 
two and three generations o ld ,  and of the concern of the proud and 
ancient French civili zation to pre serve i ts place in the wor ld 
through i ts language , its laws , i ts liberal tradi tions , i ts naval 
power . Nor are the se things necessar i ly anti thetical to the 
region ' s  interests ; looking at the que s tion only from the narrow 
view of regional defence Aus tralas ians would neep to ask whether 
they could , for example , themse lves fill the vacuum left by the 
wi thdrawal of France from the region , agains t the manifest Soviet 
de sire to e stab l i sh ties with the smal l Pacific s tates . I ndeed 
some Australians probably are ( wi ttingly or unwittingly)  affected 
by the sentiments o f  194 0 ,  when an Austr al ian cruiser helped the 
Gaul l ist settler s overthrow the Pe tainis t  admini stration , and by 
the subsequent years of all ianc e .  
However , whi le giving due recognition to the French role in 
regional defence and to the rich contr ibution French culture c an 
make when free ly of fered and free ly accepted , Australians are 
neverthe less entitled to point out that the se advantages are 
fundamental ly undermined if they are e s tab lished only through 
anti-democratic and whi te-supremacist policie s . Li tvinov vainly 
argued about the time o f  Munich that ' peace is indivi s ible ' ;  one 
can go further and argue that the social j ustice which is the 
ba sis of peace is al so indivisible . And in New Caledonia now 
social j ustice demands reco gni tion of the special c laims o f  the 
large st s ingl e ethnic group , the indigenous people o f  the Territory . 
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The whole region joins with the F I  in proclaiming that ; Austral ia 
can scarcely do less . 
This work has argued that recent reforms in New Caledoni a  are 
inadequate to achieve soc ial j u stice and stabil ity there , largely 
because of the ul terior political motives agains t  which they have 
been couched . It has further sugge sted that r esponsible Frenchmen 
both in the metropole and the Territory are themse lves aware of thi s . 
It is unrealistic , however , to expect Frenchmen suddenly to accede 
to Independance Kanak , e i ther by per suas ion or threat of force . 
Aus tralian influence in the region should therefore be directed 
towards three princip les : firs t ,  to assuring the Oceanic peoples ,  
including the Kanak people o f  New Caledonia , that Australia 
recognizes the rights o f  the Kanaks , by virtue o f  their numbers and 
the ir status as the i ndige nous people of the land , to obj ect to 
further irmnigration into New Caledonia and to become primus inter 
pares in a democrati c , autonomous state ; secondly , to reaffirming 
to France and to the region that actions subvers ive of the legal­
democratic process , such as o ccurred in the S anto rebel lion , and 
which threaten to admit e ither tyranny and o l i garchy of the right 
or adventuri sm of the non-democratic left are unacceptable to 
Aus tralia;  thi rdly , to reas suring France and Caldoche s e tt lers that 
Austral ia re cognizes longs tanding and reasonable French insterests 
in New Ca ledoni a ,  and the role France still has to p lay there , 
whi le encouraging the swi f t ,  genuine and generous devo lution o f  
re sponsibi l i ty t o  the Terri tory , leading t o  ful l Independence , 
though wi thout prescription of ultimate pol i ti cal/consti tutiona l 
relationships between New Caledonia and Fran ce . 
I t  is very large ly the lack of that re sponsibility which has 
promo ted the pol i tics o f  race and prevented the proponents of 
Independance Kanak and Independance Cal edonienne from finding their 
cormnon ground . The assumption that Kanaks and settlers are locked 
in perpe tual antagonism , and that there fore respons ibil ity cannot 
be devolved , dooms New Caledonia to at best a stulti fying , debili­
tating subo rdination to overriding metropol i tan contro l ,  and at 
worst to crue l racial s tri fe , affec ting the who le Oceanic region . 
This work is based on the opposite assumption , that some cormnon 
ground exi sts or will develop amon g  Kanaks and settlers working 
to bui ld an autonomous so ciety , but that only prompt and genuine 
re form , accompanying true devo lution of re spons ibility , will 
enab le the in terlocuteurs val ables o f  both s ides to gain requisite 
influence . 
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Pos tscript 
This text was subs tantial ly completed by January 1981 . It has 
been amended in the light of the victory of Fran�ois Mitterand in 
the French pres idential elections of May 19 8 1  and the murder o f  
Pierre Declercq , secre tary-general o f  the Union Caledonienne , on 
19 September 19 8 1 .  But neither event has requi red that the analysis 
be fundamentally changed . Bas i cally the argument remains that the 
poli tics of racial confrontation is intensi fying in the Paci fi c ,  
large ly as a result o f  French colonial po licies , and that i t  i s  an 
urgent and an exacting task of both French and regional s tatemanship 
in respect of New Caledonia to prevent the ugly sequence of action 
anq reac tion from worsening. 
Vanuatu serve s as a warnin g .  Coloni al exploitation o f  
Melane sian land led t o  a sharp reaction , via the Me lanesian 
nationalist movement , producing consti tutional provisions limi ting 
citi zenship and perpetual land titles to e thni c  Melanesians and 
the ir des cendants . In turn the settlers , with encouragement from 
some local officials , rebel led and were suppressed , not by metro­
po litan forces but by Papua New Guinea forces with Austral ian 
support . Vanuatu has since been so di strustful of white influence s 
that even bona fide settlers , inc luding those mindful o f  the ir 
place in a Me lane sian so ciety and respectful of its laws and its 
people , are finding it di ffi cul t to establish themselve s and 
contribute to development . Meanwhile pan-Me lane sian race 
cons ciousne ss and mi li tancy towards the French in New Caledonia 
verges on adventur ism and flirtat ion with the non-democratic left . 
The se atti tude s threaten a divis ion within the re gion which would 
be dangerous to its stability and se curity , and ultimately threaten­
ing to Melane s ia itse l f . New Ca ledonia is the focal po int of these 
atti tude s .  Only very prompt , generous and determined po licies 
by France herse l f ,  aimed at a New Caledonian Independence which 
recogni zes Me lanes ian primacy wh ile seeking liberal terms for non 
Me lane si ans for whom New Caledonia is home , can inter cept the 
cycle of racis t or ethnocentric action and reaction and make it 
possible for some kind of commun i ty to develop across racial and 
cul tural lines , both within New Caledonia and in the region as a 
who le . 
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45 , 5 1 ,  5 3 , 5 8 ,  60 , 62 , 6 3 ,  65 , 70 
Di j oud Plan , see Land re form 
Domaine , see Land tenure 
Dornoy , M . , 8 ,  9 ,  14 , 17 , 2 8 ,  
26 , 30n 
Douglas , B . , 1, 2 ,  3 ,  4 
Droi t commun , see Laws and titles 
Droi t coutumier , see Laws and 
titles 
Economic claims , see Clans 
E conomy , see New Caledonia 
Ecumenic al Coun ci l ,  46 
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Education , see New Caledonia 
Elections , see Territorial Assembly 
Eriau , M, 3 2 , 34 
Espiritu S anto , see Vanuatu 
Europeans , see Settlers 
Evangelical Church , 46 
FADIL ( Fonds d ' Aide au Developpe­
ment des Iles et de l ' Interieur) , 
see Territorial As sembly 
FI ( F ront Independanti ste )  party , 
4 3 , 4 7 , 60 , 6 1 ,  6 4 , 6 5 , 7 3 ;  
e lections , 4 3 , 44 , 45 ; 
Independence , 43 , 45 , 46 , 6 7-68 , 
70 , 7 1 ;  land reform , 4 3 ,  5 1 ,  5 3 , 
54 , 55 , 56 , 5 7- 5 8 ,  60 , 70 .; 
see al so Independence , 
Territorial Assembly , Land re form 
FIDES ( Fonds d ' Inve stissement de 
Developpement e conomique et 
social ) , see Territorial As sembly 
FNSC ( Federation Pour Une Nouvelle 
socie te caledonienne ) party , 4 3 ,  
52 ; elections 44 ; Independence , 
4 3 ,  45 , 70 , 7 1 ;  land re form , 4 3 , 
5 1 ,  5 2 ; see also Independence ; 
Territorial As sembly , Land re form 
FULK ( Front Uni Pour la Liberation 
des Kanak s ) party , 19 ; 
elections , 2 2 , 4 4 ;  I ndependence , 
19 , 43 ; land re form , -30-4 2 : 
see also Independence , Terri­
tori al As sembly ,  Land Reform 
Familiale , 29 
Fede ration So cialiste Caledonienne , 
43n , 44 
Fe il let , Governor , see Governors 
Ferriot , Po lice Inspector , 64 
Fi j i , 19 
Foulards Rouges party , 18- 19 , 2 5 ,  46 
Fournier , C . , 4 3n 
France , and Independence movement ,  
i ,  1 ,  2 3 ,  34 , 3 7 , 45 , 49 , 7 2 , 7 8 ,  
responses to , 1 ,  14 , 2 0 , 2 5 , 45 , 6 3 , 
69-70 , 72 , 7 3 ,  7 4 ; land pol i cy , see 
Land tenure ; Land re form, re lations 
wi th New Caledonia ,  9 ,  14 , 2 0 ,  2 4- 2 5 , 
3 4 ,  35 , 39 , 42 , 5 8 ,  6 1-62 , 7 4 ;  loi 
Billotte , 2 0 , 62 ; loi -cadre , 9 ,  1 3 , 
14 , 40 , 6 1 ;  loi Sti rn , 2 0  
France s chi , M ,  4 6  
French Polynesi a ,  immigration from , 15 , 
16 , 17 , 66 ; Independence , 7 0 , race 
rel ations , .  2 4 ,  36 
Garrigou , M, 29 
Gaul le , C. de , 14 
Gaul lists , 6 1  
General Counci l , 9 
Ge rmany , 2 
Gi s card d ' Estaing , V . , 45 , 46 , 5 8  
Gohoup , M ,  3 1  
Gopea , A . , 19 , 26- 2 7  
Gorodey , D . , 19 
Governing Coun ci l , 9 ,  14 , 3 5 , 44 , 46 , 7 0 ; 
changes to , 42- 4 3 ; e lections , 2 2 ; land 
re form ,  2 7 , 3 5 , 5 1 ,  56n 
Gove rning Majority , 45 , 4 7 , 4 8 , 5 1 ,  5 3 , 60 
Governors , Du Bouze t ,  1 ,  2 ,  3 ;  Fei l let , 4 ,  
30 ; Grimald , 14 ; Gui llain , 2 ,  3 ,  4 ;  
Jacquino t ,  14 ; Pe choux , 14 
Grande Terre , 1, 49 , 5 8 ; land re form ,  5 ,  
7 ,  10 , 19 , 26 , 3 3 , 34 ; see also Re serves 
Grands chefs , see Land admini stration 
Grands colons , 1 3 , 7 1 ;  see also Se ttlers 
Group 1 8 7 8  party , 19 
Gui art , J . , 1 3 , 5 7 ,  59 
Gui l lemard , M,  55 
Hienghene , 40 
Hienghene val ley , 30 
Higginson , J . , 7 ;  see also Socie te Le 
Nicke l 
Houai lo valley , 2 7  
I le des Pins ( is le o f  Pine s ) , 5 ,  7 ,  4 1 ,  56 
Independance Caledonienne , 7 2 , 7 7 ;  campaign 
for ,  70 , 7 4 ;  oppos i tion to , 66 ; see also 
Independance Kanak , i ,  2 3 , 69 , 7 1- 7 2 , 7 7 ,  
campaign for , 19 -20 , 2 1 ,  4 3 , 60 , 66 , 6 7-
68 ; opposi tion to , 4 1 ,  65 , 7 1 ;  see also 
Independantistes , 2 0 , 2 5 , 46 , 49 , 5 2 , 64 , 
69 , 7 1 ,  7 3 ,  and land re form , 3 1 , 40 , 52 , 
56 , 59 ; see also Land reform 
Independence , 19 , 20 , 2 1 ,  2 3 ,  36 
38 , 4 1 ,  44 , 5 8 ,  6 2 , 6 3 , 6 6 , 70 ; 
autonomie interne , 9 ,  19 , 2 0 , 
2 1 ,  2 3 ,  42 ; au tonomist , 13- 14 ; 
campaiqn for , 1 ,  2 0 , 2 1 ,  2 2 ,  2 3 , 
40 , 43 , 44-45 , 46 , 6 7-6 8 ,  69 , 7 4 , 
7 5 ;  departmentalization , 2 3 ,  38 , 
39 , 43 , 45 , 7 1 ;  and land re form , 
i ,  1 ,  3 1 ,  38 , 40 , 5 8-59 , 60 , 7 1 ,  
7 3 ;  opposition to , see France , 
Settlers 
Indi genat ,  see Me lanes ians 
Indonesians , 7 ,  56 ; immigration 
from , 15 , 16 , 17 
JARM ( Jeune sse d ' Action et de 
Re flextion Caledon ienne)  party , 
2 2n 
JC ( Jeunes Canaques Fran9ai s )  party , 
2 2n 
Jacquie r ,  Inspe ctor-Gene ral , 26 
Jacquinot ,  Governo r ,  see Gove rnors 
Kamouda , R . , 2 5 , 64 
Kanak , 1 8 ,  2 6 , 3 1 ,  40 , 60 , 6 1 ,  6 3 , 
6 5 ,  66-6 8 ,  7 1- 7 2 , 77 ; see also 
Independance Kanak 
Kun ie people ,  56n 
Kuto peninsul a ,  56n 
Lacroze , M, 58 
Lafleur , H . , 1 3 , 2 1 ;  see also RPC 
Lafleur , J . , 2 1 ,  2 2 , 35 , 42 , 53 , 7 1 ,  
73 ; see also RPCR 
Land , i ,  8 ,  2 8 ;  and colonization , 
1- 8 ;  holdings , 7 ,  10 , 1 1 ,  2 8 , 3 3-
34 , 49 ; and pol i tics , i ,  1 ,  8 ;  see 
also Independence 
Land adminis tration , chefs de s ub­
division , 34 ; Code Rural 29 , 52 ; 
Consei l de Grands Chefs , 47 ; Con ­
sei l des Anci ens , 10- 1 1 ,  32 , 47 ; 
Consei ls des Clans , 4 7 ;  Consei ls 
des Chefs de Clans , 47 ; grands 
chefs , 5 ;  ma1tre de la terre , 3 ,  
4 ,  10 , 4 7 ; Service du Domaine , 12 , 
28 ; tribu , 3 ,  4 ,  10 , 2 8 ,  34 , 47 
Land dispute s ,  2,  11,  2 5 , 2 7- 2 8 ,  47 , 
5 7 , 5 8 ;  see also New Caledonia 
Land reform , i ,  6,  9 ,  57 , 60 ; pro­
grammes , 1 ,  10- 1 3 , 2 7 - 2 8 ;  Di j oud 
P lan , 32-44 , 47 , 6 7 , 72 ; Report 
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No . 81 , 2 8- 32 , 5 0 ; right o f  pre­
ernption , 2 7 , 29 , 3 2 , avant proje t  
Mar ch 19 80 , 5 1- 5 2 , 53 ; opposition to , 
1 ,  30- 3 1 ,  5 2 , 59 , 6 0 ;  see also 
Reforme fonci ere , RURALE , P romotion 
Me lanesienne ; New Caledonia ,  Terri­
torial Assembly 
Land tenure , government poli cy , co lonial , 
104 ,  36- 3 7 , 5 1-54 ; agri cultural 
cooperative s , 12 , 49 ;  concessions 
domani al es and concessions gratui tes , 
11 , 12 , 18 , 2 6 , 29 , 3 3 ; concessions 
provisoi res , 3 3 ;  domaine , 1 ,  7 ,  10 , 1 1 ,  
1 3 , 2 6 ,  2 7 ,  3 3 , 5 3 ,  55 , 56n , 59 ; 
loca tions domaniales , 1 1 , 2 6 ,  29 , 3 3 ;  
lots de vil l age , 12 ; octroi , 4 ;  
vacan te , 1-2 ; zone mari time , 55 , 56n , 
59 ; Melanesians , 104 , 10 , 3 3 , 3 7 , 5 8 , 
59 , 68 ; proprietary rights , 2 ;  Settlers , 
2 ,  4 ,  5 ,  7 ,  � l ,  12 , 3 3 , 37 , 65 ; see also 
Laws and titles , Reserves , Clans , Land 
re form 
Laroque , R . , 1 3 , 2 1 ,  2 8 ,  4 1 ;  see also 
RPCR 
Laws and titles , Code Rural . 20 , 5 2 ; 
droi t commun , 6 ,  1 1 ,  12 , 13 , 2 9 , 47 , 50 , 
5 1 ,  5 2 , 54-55 ; droi t coutumi er ,  6 ,  50 , 
5 1 ,  5 2 ; law of succession , 54-5 5 ; loi 
Bi llotte , 2 0 ,  62 ; loi-cadre , 9 ,  1 3 , 14 , 
40 , 6 1 ;  loi _Stirn , 2 0 ;  s tatut ci vi l  
parti culier ,  5 4 ;  s tatut de droi t commun , 
9 ,  1 3 ; ti tres gra tui ts , 29 ; ti tres 
onereux , 29 
Law o f  succession , see Laws and titles 
League of Rights o f  Man , 46 
Leenhardt , M . , 6 
Lenormand , M . , 9 ,  1 3 , 14 , 2 7 ,  2 8 ,  30 , 35 , 
42 , 56n , 57 ; see also UC 
Leques , J .  , 2 1  
Locations domaniales , see Land tenure 
Loi Bi llotte , see Laws and titles 
Loi-cadre , see Laws and ti tles 
Loi Stirn , see Laws and titles 
Lots du vill age , see Land tenure 
Loyalty I s l ands , 5 ,  7 ,  56 
Libya , 46 , 6 8  
MLC (Mouvement Libe ral Caledonien) party , 
2 2n , 44 
MOP ( Mouvement Pour l ' Ordre et la P aix) 
party , 46 , 5 2 , 54; see al so RURAIE . 
Machoro , E . , 30 , 40 , 55n 
Maingue t ,  M ,  2 8  
Maitre de la terre , see Land 
administration 
Maoris , see New Zealand 
Mare I s land , 18 
Mazurier , M ,  2 7- 2 8 ,  3 1 ,  3 2  
Me lanesian Cultural Ins ti tute , 
39 ' 48 
Melane sian Independence , see 
Independence 
Mel anesian nationalism , 8 ,  9 ,  
18- 2 0 ; see also Independance 
Kanak, Kanak 
Me lanesi an  po litical activi ty , 
see FI , FULK , PALIKA ,  UC , 
UPM 
Melanesian population , 4 ,  7 ,  8 ,  
10 ' 1 1 , 14 ' 15- 17 ' 2 3 '  45 ' 
6 7 , 6 8 ;  see also New Caledonia 
Mel anesians , ass imi lation , 6 ,  9 ,  
36- 3 7 ; e conomic assimi lation , 
7 ,  11 , 17- 1 8 ;  education , 6 ,  2 4 , 
36 ; enfranchisement ,  8 ,  2 1 ;  
indi genat ,  5 ,  6 ,  8 ,  19 ; and 
settlers , 6 ,  8 ,  26 ; see also 
New Caledonia , Mis s ions 
Melanesians and land , i ,  8 ;  
land demands , 8 ,  19 ; land 
ownersh ip ,  3 3 , 5 8 ,  5 9 , 68 ; 
see also Clans , Land re form , 
Land tenure , Reserves 
Mining , see Nickel 
Mi s s ions , 5 ,  6 ,  8 
Mi tte rand , F . , 4 4 ,  65 , 7 8  
Mont Dore , 6 4  
Morle t ,  G . , 30 , 4 3 , 5 2 , 5 3 , 60 , 
7 1  
Mouren ,  M ,  38 , 39 , 4 1  
Nai s se line , N . , 18 , 19 
Nassirah , 1 2  
National Assembly , 9 ,  14 , 42 , 44 , 
5 2 , 5 3 ,  62 , 6 3  
National Maj ority , see Governing 
Majority 
Neaoua val ley , 32 
Nessakouya tribe , 27 
New Caledoni a ,  economy , 1 4 , 1 7 ,  
18 , 20 , 34 , 35-36 , 3 7 , 42 , 48 , 
61-62 , 70 , 72 , 7 3 ,  7 4 ;  see also 
Me lanesians , Nicke l ,  Terri­
torialization 
New Caledonia , education , 6 ,  24 , 
36 , 4 8 ,  49 , 7 3 ;  see also Me la­
nesians , Mi s s ions 
84 
New Caledonia ,  e le ctions , 9 ,  2 0 , 2 1 , 
4 3 , 69 ; see also Territorial Assembly 
New Caledon i a ,  government , 1 3 ,  2 0 , 3 7 , 
42-43 , 6 1-62 , 70 ; see also F rance , 
Laws and ti tles 
New Caledonia , population , 15-17 , 3 6 , 
67 , 6 8 ,  76 ; see also Me lanesians , 
French Polyne sian s , Indonesian s , 
Vie tnamese 
New Caledonia , race relations , i i , 6 ,  
2 3 ,  2 5- 2 6 , 2 8 ,  6 1 ,  64 , 7 3 ;  see also 
Land dispute s , Me lanesians , Settlers 
New Guinea , 2 ;  see also Papua New 
Guinea 
New Hebride s , see Vanuatu 
New Zealand , 2 ,  2 4 ,  5 5 , 64 , 70n , 
75- 7 6 ; see also Cook I slands 
N ' Goye , 2 5  
Nicke l ,  5 ,  7 ,  17 , 1 8 ,  2 5 , 3 4 , 3 5 , 39 , 
62 ; see also Socie te Le Nicke l ,  
Territorial i zation 
ORSTOM ( Office de la Recherche 
S ci enti fique et Te chnique Outre-Mer) , 
i ,  49 , 57 
Octroi , see Land tenure 
Organization for Afri can Unity , 46 
PALIKA ( Parti de Liberation Kanak) party , 
19 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 46 ; ele ctions , 2 2 , 4 3 ,  44 ; 
Independen ce , 19 , 46 ; land re form , 30 , 
3 1 ,  3 2 , 42 
PR ( P arti Repub l i cain) party , 2 2n , 43 
PSC ( Parti Socialiste Caledonien) party , 
2 1 ,  2 2 , 43 , 44 
Pai ta , 28 
Pai ta , G . , 40 
P apua New Guine a ,  19 , 5 2 , 5 4 ,  78 
Parti Communiste , 44 
Parawi-Reybas , M, 2 8 ,  59 
Pe choux , Governor , see Governors 
Pidjot , R . , 14 , 64 , 68 
Pid j o t ,  Mme ,  5 7  
Poi goune , E . , 19 
Poindimie , 2 5 ,  2 8  
Po lynesians , see French Polynesians 
Pompidou , G . , 62 
Ponerihouen , 25 
POUE�bo , 2 8  
Promo tion Me lanesienne , 46 , 47 , 48-49 , 
59 ; and land re form , 47 , 50 , 52 ; 
see also Land re form 
Proprie tary rights , see Me lanesians 
Proprie te clani que , see Clans 
RPC ( Ras semblement Pour la 
Caledonie ) party , 2 1 ,  2 2 ; 
see also RPCR 
RPCR ( Rassemblement Pour la 
Caledonie dans la Republ ique ) 
party , 2 2 ,  2 5 , 47 , 5 3 , 5 5 ;  
e lections , 2 2 ,  4 3 , 4 4 ;  Indepen­
dence , 3 8- 39 ;  land re form , 2 8 ,  
3 8- 39 , 4 1-4 2 , 5 1 ,  5 2 ;  see also 
FNSC 
RPR ( Rassemblement Pour la 
Republique ) party , 2 1 ,  2 2 ; 
see also RPCR 
RURALE ( Ruraux , uni s  pour une 
re forme agraire liberale et 
equitable ) ,  5 2 ,  5 3 , 54 , 58,  64 
Ras semblement Democrate Chretien , 
44 
Ras semblement Populaire Caledo­
nien et Me tropoli tain , 4 4  
Rebellion o f  187 8 ,  4 
Re forme agrai re , 40 ; see also 
Land re form 
R.e forme foncie re , i ,  1 ,  4 0 ,  5 1 ,  
5 3 ,  7 1 ;  see also Land reform 
Reforme miniere , 35 ; see also 
New Caledonia 
Report No . 8 1 ,  see Land re form 
Reserve s , 2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  5 ,  7 ,  8 ,  9 ,  1 1 , 
1 3 ,  26 , 2 7 , 29 , 3 1 ,  49 , 5 1 ;  
agrandissement , 10- 1 1 ,  1 3 , 2 7 ,  
2 8 ,  3 1 ,  47 , 49 ; appropri ation , 4 ;  
subdivi s ion , 12 , 26 ; administra­
tion , Commi s s ion for Rural 
Economy , 26 , Commission Terri­
tori ale de Reorganisation 
Fonciere , 2 7 ; land use , 7 ,  10 ; 
re form ,  12 , 2 7 , 30 , 3 3 ;  see 
also Land re fo rm ,  Cattle , Co ffee 
Ri ght o f  pre- emption , see Land 
re form 
Rothschild Bank , 7 ,  6 2  
Roux , J .  - C . , 1 ,  2 ,  7 ,  11 , 1 2  
Saus so l , A . , 1 ,  2 ,  4 ,  5 ,  6 ,  8 ,  9 ,  
10 , 11 , 1 3 , 19 , 30 
Servi ce du Demaine ( Lands Depart­
ment ) , see Land administration 
Se ttlers , and Independence , 
opposition to , 2 1 ,  2 3 ,  34 , 3 8 ,  
4 1 ,  43 , 44- 45 , 46 , 64 , 65-66 , 
69 , 69 , 7 1 ;  Comi tes d ' Action 
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ci vi que , 24; Comi tes d ' Action 
Cantre l ' Independance , 2 4 ; support 
for ,  14 , 2 1 ,  7 0 , 7 1 ;  see also FNSC ; 
Governing Maj ori ty ;  Independence ; 
Independance Caledonienne ; MOP 
Settlers and land , i ,  2 ,  7 ,  1 2 ,  64 , 
7 1 ;  opposition to land re form , 26 , 
30 , 32 , 34 , 5 1 ,  5 2 , 5 3 , 60 , 65 ; 
see also Land re form ;  RURALE 
Settlers and Me lanesians , 6 ,  8 ,  40 , 
5 8 , 64 ; see also Land disputes ,  
New Caledonia 
S e ttlers , po liti cal activity , 9 ,  14 , 
2 1 ,  2 3 ,  4 3 , 65 ; see also FNSC , 
Governing Majority ,  MOP , RPCR 
S im-Barr , A . , 1 8 ,  2 1 ,  2 5  
so ciete Le Ni cke l , 7 ,  17 , 4 4 ,  6 2 ; 
see al so Nickel 
Solomon Islands , 19 
Sorin , Inspector , 7 ,  9 ,  26 
Soury-Lavergne , M, 28 
South Pacific Forum , 46 
Statut ci vil particulier ,  see Laws and 
ti tles 
Statu t  de droi t commun see Laws and 
titles 
Tahiti , 55 
Tchamba val ley , 12 , 59 
Terri torial As sembly , e lections , 14 , 
2 0 ,  2 1- 2 2 , 4 2 , 4 3 , 44-45 ; and 
Independence , 1 ,  44 , and land re form , 
2 8- 3 2 , 38-42 , 49 , 50 , 5 1- 5 2 , 5 3 ;  
Agri cu lture Commiss ion , 3 1 ;  FADIL ,  
49n , FIDES , 49-50 ; see also New Cale­
donia 
Te rritorialization , 35 , 43 , 70 ; see 
al so New Caledonia ,  Nickel 
Thio , 2 5 ,  2 8  
Thompson , V .  ( and Adlo f f , R . ) , 6 ,  7 ,  9 ,  
14 
Tieti , 2 8  
Titres gra tui ts , see Laws and ti tles 
Ti tres onereux , see Laws and titles 
Tiwaka val ley , 2 8 ,  3 2  
Tj ibaou , J . -M ,  30 , 40-4 1 ,  60 , 7 2  
Touho , 2 5  
Traditiona l c laims , see Clans 
Tribu , see Land adminis tration 
UC ( Union Caledonienne ) party , 8 ,  18 , 19 , 
2 1 ,  46 , 60 , 6 1 ,  7 3 ;  elections , 9 ,  13 , 
14 , 2 0 , 2 2 , 35 , 44 ; Independence , 
1 ,  9 ,  19 , 2 0 ,  2 1 ,  2 3 ,  36 , 7 1 ,  7 2 ;  
land reform , 8 ,  9 ,  13 , 2 7 ,  2 8 ,  
30 , 3 1 , 32 , 3 3 , 36 , 39-40 , 42 ; 
see also FI , Independence , Land 
re form , Lenormand ,  Terri torial 
Assembly 
UICALO ( Union de s Indige nes Cale­
doniens Amis de la Liberte dans 
l ' Ordre ) party , 8 
U.MNC ( Union Multiraciale de 
Nouve lle Caledonie ) party , 19 , 2 5  
UNC ( Union Nouvel le Caledonienne ) 
party , 2 1 ,  2 2  
UPM ( Union Progressiste Multi­
raciale and later Union Pro­
gress iste Me lanesienne ) party , 
19 , 2 5 ; e le ctions , 2 2 , 4 3 ,  44 ; 
Independence , 19 ; land reform , 
2 5 ,  26- 2 7 ,  2 8 ,  42 ; see also FI , 
Independence , Land re form 
Ukewie , D . , 2 1 ,  4 1 ,  4 4 ,  4 7 ,  69 
Union Democratique de la Nouve l le 
Caledonie , 2 1 ,  2 2  
Union Jeunesses Caledonienne s ,  _ 19 
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Union Pour le Renouveau de la 
Caledonie , 2 2  
Unite Wal lisienne et Futunienne , 4 4  
Uregei , Y . C . , 19 
Vacante , see Land tenure 
Val le D ' Arno a ,  see Amoa val ley 
Vanuatu , ii , 41 , 5 2 ,  60 , 65 , 67 , 
69 , 7 8  
Vei l ,  S . , 4 4  
Ve lle longue , d e  M ,  3 0  
Vie tnamese immi gration , 7 ,  16 , 17 , 
36 , 4 1  
Violette , J . , 42 , 43 , 43n 
Wahuzue , F . , 46- 47 , 4 8-49 , 5 2 , 59 ; 
see also Promotion Melanesienne 
Wal lis Is land 
Wal lis I slanders , immi gration , 15 , 
16 , 17 , 45 , 66 , 73 ; and land , 40 , 
4 1 ,  56 , 5 7  
World War I I ,  8 
Yeiwene , M ,  4 1  
Zone mari time , see Land tenure 
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From the late 1 960s radical  groups a mong the M ela nesl a ns of N ew Ca ledonia 
began to campaign for I ndependence. By the mid 1 970s th ree M e la nesian 
pol ltlca l p a rties c h a m pioning I nd e pe n d e nce h e ld seats I n  the Territoria l  
Assem b ly a nd I n  1 9 7 7  t h e  m u ltl· raclal  u n ion c a ledon le nne a lso opted for 
I n d e pe n d e nce. The French govern m ent h as recently sought to meet th e 
pressu res with a wide-ra nging prog ra mme of economic and socta l develop· 
m e nt. ce ntra l to the progra m m e  Is a ren ewed reforme fonclere a imed at 
return i ng su bsta ntial  a reas of land on the main Isla n d  to M elanesian owner· 
ship a nd control. There Is consldera ble agreement that th is Is urgently neces· 
sarv. B ut there Is great d isagreement about the extent a nd location of the 
land to be affected, the terms on which It wll l  be acq u i red and the m a n n er on 
wh ich It should be rea l located a mong M e laneslans. These matters underl ie 
current N ew c a ledonla n pol itics a n d. strongly affect the Independence Issue. 
A l a n  w a rd's  monogra p h  exa m ines the reform prog ra m me, a n d  the land 
reform I n  p a rticu l a r, I n  rel ation to N ew c a ledon t a n  society a n d  pol itics, 
I n c l u d i ng t h e  colon i a l  b a c kg ro u n d. It t h e n' re l ates the N ew c a ledon l a n  
situation t o  Austra l ia 's  region a l  Interests a n d  responslbl l ltles. 
Alan w a rd completed h is MA at the Victoria u n iversity of Wel l ington a n d  h is 
PhD at the Austra l i a n  N ational  U niversity. H e  Is cu rrently (1 981·1 982) Director 
of the R u ra l  Lands Departme nt, Repu bllc of Va n uatu, on second ment from La 
Trobe U n iversity where he Is Reader In H istory. H e  was fou ndation chairm a n  
o f  t h e  Research centre for Southwest Pacific studies at La Trobe U niversity 
a n d  served as consu lta nt to the com m ission of I nq u i ry  Into Land M atters and 
.the Lands Department I n  Pa pua N ew Guinea.  D r  ward Is the author of a book 
a nd n um e rous a rticles on Pacific h istory a nd politics. 
Department of Pol ltica l  and Soci a l  Change 
Research Sch ool  of Pacific studies 
Austra l i a n  N ationa l  U n iversity 
PO BOX 4 Ca nberra ACT 2 600 
I S B N  0 86784 077 3 
I SSN 0727·5994 
